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From the Editor

D

avid Johnson opens our Spring issue with a Special Commentary,
“Fighting the ‘Islamic State’ The Case for US Ground Forces,”
in which he argues a “clear assessment” of the nature of war
the United States is engaged in against the Islamic State will point to the
necessity for using American ground troops.
Our first forum, Megacities: Pros and Cons, features three articles
with opposing views regarding the importance of megacities in future
warfare. The first, “The Case for Megacities,” by Kevin Felix and
Frederick Wong, contends that megacities are becoming an increasingly
important in tomorrow’s rapidly evolving strategic and operational
environments. The US military will likely avoid combat in megacities
whenever possible; however, Felix and Wong claim operating in such
environments will not always be avoidable. To neglect preparing for
them is, therefore, strategically unwise. Michael Evans challenges that
view in “The Case against Megacities.” Evans maintains the megacities
argument is an unproven hypothesis; rushing to embrace it is like replacing “population-centric counterinsurgency with population-centric
megacity operations.” Doing so without careful research and analysis
is, thus, ill-advised. William Adamson’s “Megacities and the US Army”
argues the Department of Defense’s current urban strategy is “on an
uncertain trajectory and is need of new leadership,” and the US Army is
the right service to provide it.
The second forum Culture and the US Army, considers three themes
of cultural significance to the Army. The first, “Learning from the Past,
Looking to the Future” by Matthew Morton, offers a framework to aid
strategic leaders in reflecting on the last decade of conflict in order to
prepare themselves to offer the “best advice they can” in the future.
The second article, “Ethics and Army Leadership: Climate Matters” by
Charles Allen, examines the apparent lapse in ethical conduct among
the Army’s leaders and their organizations, and critiques how the
Department of Defense assesses ethical climates. The third, “Military
Innovation and Military Culture” by Andrew Hill, highlights important flaws in some of the more popular theories regarding culture’s
moderating effect on military innovation. He also offers two principal
recommendations for creating a culture of innovation.
Our final forum is Changes in War’s Character, which offers two articles
concerning new developments in contemporary warfare. The first, “The
Individualization of American Warfare” by Glenn Voelz, contends the
increased focus on targeting individuals rather than formations, and on
identity rather than status, by US forces amounts to a subtle but significant alteration in war’s character. Whether and how long this change
will persist remains to be seen. The second, “Small Forces and Crisis
Management” by Benjamin Jensen, identifies a trend toward small,
multi-domain forces that can facilitate compelling an adversary to do
one’s will—short of escalating to major war; however, in his view, crisis
management has not yet adjusted to this trend.
In our Of Note section, Daniel Glickstein takes yet another look at
Why We Lost. ~AJE

Special Commentary

Fighting the “Islamic State”
The Case for US Ground Forces
David E. Johnson
Abstract: This article argues counterinsurgency wars are not analogous to the challenges presented by the Islamic State. The United
States needs to accept the nature of the war it is in, and undertake
a clear and comprehensive assessment of the means necessary for
strategic success. Such an assessment will make apparent the need to
commit US ground combat forces.1

T

he rise of the Islamic State has forced policy makers to confront
uncomfortable questions: What will it take to defeat the Islamic
State? What is the nature of the current conflict against the
Islamic State? Can the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), bolstered by US and
allied air power, advisers, special forces – almost everything short of
ground combat forces – defeat the Islamic State? The difficulty the Iraqis
experienced in taking Tikrit and the recent abandonment of Ramadi
should be instructive, as was the premature announcement by US Central
Command of a coming ISF spring 2015 offensive to retake Mosul, which
was followed by an admission that the ISF is not yet ready for the kind
of fight Mosul would entail.2
Many have already commented on the need to have all US options
on the table to defeat the Islamic State. Retired Marine Corps General
James Mattis recently wrote US strategy should include ground combat
forces “to achieve our war aims.”3 This article explains why US ground
forces are not just a better option than the ISF, but absolutely necessary
for achieving US policy objectives against the Islamic State.

Does Our Strategy Fit the War We Are In?

All students of strategy have had the ends-ways-means catechism
drummed into them at some point in their education. Assessing the
US strategy for the war with the Islamic State from this perspective is
useful in reaching an understanding of what needs to be done to defeat
the Islamic State. Additionally, it will illustrate the continuing challenges

1     This article is derived from my commentary in War on the Rocks which argues US ground
forces are necessary to defeat the Islamic State, and that a crucial test would come with the battle to
retake Mosul. This essay expands on that premise, even though it is being written as events unfold
on the ground in Iraq. See David Johnson, “Means Matter: Competent Ground Forces and the
Fight Against ISIL,” War on the Rocks, March 19, 2015. This essay incorporates much of this earlier
commentary.
2     Loveday Morris, “Iraqi Offensive for Tikrit Stalls as Casualties Mount,” Washington Post, March
16, 2015; and Robert Burns, “Pentagon Calls Mosul Briefing a Mistake by CentCom,” Associated Press,
March 3, 2015; and Nancy A. Youssef, “Exclusive: Pentagon Doubts Its Own ISIS War Plan,” Daily
Beast, February 20, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/20/pentagon-doubtsits-own-isis-war-plan.html.
3      James Mattis, “Using Military Force Against ISIS,” Defining Ideas, March 4, 2015, http://www.
hoover.org/research/using-military-force-against-isis.

Dr. David Johnson is a
senior historian at the
RAND Corporation
and an adjunct professor at Georgetown
University. From June
2012 until July 2014,
he established and
directed the inaugural
Chief of Staff of the
Army Strategic Studies
Group. He is a retired
US Army Colonel with
a PhD in history from
Duke University. He
is the author of numerous books and articles
on military strategy.
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in post-9/11 strategy formulation and, in particular, the chasm between
desired ends and deployed means.
President Obama, in his February 11, 2015 letter to the Congress
requesting an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to
fight the Islamic State, set forth clear “ends” for his strategy: “to degrade
and defeat ISIL.”4 To this point in the fight against the Islamic State,
the US “way” has been limited to “a systematic campaign of airstrikes
against ISIL in Iraq and Syria” and supporting various anti-Islamic State
security forces.5 American “means” are limited to air power, advisers,
and US support to the Iraqis. The other means beyond US supporting forces—the “boots on the ground”—include the ISF, Kurdish
Peshmerga and Sunni and Shi’a militias, the latter backed by the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps. Indeed, Major General Qasem Soleimaini,
commander of the Iranian Quds Force, was at one point directing the
offensive to retake Tikrit.6 This is problematic in terms of US strategy
in the region, but also creates sectarian tensions with Iranians deeply
involved in taking Sunni areas.
The AUMF explicitly states it “would not authorize long-term,
large-scale ground combat operations like those our Nation conducted
in Iraq and Afghanistan.” This is the fundamental flaw in conceptualizing a strategy for defeating the Islamic State in Iraq—seeing this new
fight as similar in character to the past 14 years of war in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Clausewitz is instructive when he stresses that war is “an instrument of policy. . . . This way of looking at it will show us how wars must
vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give
rise to them.” 7 Quite simply, the United States needs to understand the
war it is in and the adversary it faces in the Islamic State.
The Islamic State is not an insurgency like the United States
fought from 2003 until its departure from Iraq. Rather, it is an aspiring
proto-state bent on taking and holding territory. Thus, the centrality of
“protecting the people” from the insurgents that is the cornerstone of
US counterinsurgency doctrine—the “way” the United States eventually approached the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—is irrelevant to the
Islamic State itself. Protecting the Iraqi population from the Islamic
State is important, but that will be accomplished through conventional
operations that destroy the Islamic State and seize the territory it currently occupies in Iraq.
To date, air power and limited Iraqi ground operations have degraded
the Islamic State and put it at risk when it moves in the open. In response,
the Islamic State has gone to ground in urban areas. This creates a new
reality on the ground and a problem that cannot be solved through airstrikes alone, though retired US Air Force Lieutenant General David
Deptula has argued that a stepped-up air campaign could defeat the
4      Barack Obama, “Letter from the President–Authorization for the Use of United States
Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,” The White House,
February 11, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/11/letter-presidentauthorization-use-united-states-armed-forces-connection.
5      Ibid.
6      Paul McCleary, “Iranian General again in Iraq for Tikrit Offensive,” Defense News, March 2,
2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense-news/blog/intercepts/2015/03/02/iraq-iran
-is-war-terrorism/24270363/.
7      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.
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Islamic State.8 Islamic State fighters are now able to conceal themselves
in the terrain and amongst the people of the cities they occupy. They
are more akin to Hamas in Gaza or the North Vietnamese Army in
Hue than they are to an insurgency of the type we fought in Iraq and
are fighting in Afghanistan. These urban areas are where the Islamic
State will have to be defeated if the United States is to realize President
Obama’s stated policy objective. US success is, therefore, inextricably
linked to the success of ISF ground combat operations against the
Islamic State in the difficult tactical environment of a densely populated
urban battlefield. As currently structured, if the ISF fails, so does the
US strategy.

ISF Is Not the Army We Need

If one accepts the fight against the Islamic State requires ground
combat to defeat a conventional force that is holding territory, the
crucial next step is deciding the appropriate “means” to execute that
“way.” Although the administration continues to emphasize all options
are on the table, the letter from the President to Congress requesting an
AUMF specifically states “Local forces, rather than US military forces,
should be deployed to conduct such operations.”9 Furthermore, the role
of US ground forces is extremely limited in the AUMF:
The authorization I propose would provide the flexibility to conduct
ground combat operations in other, more limited circumstances, such as
rescue operations involving US or coalition personnel or the use of special
operations forces to take military action against ISIL leadership. It would
also authorize the use of US forces in situations where ground combat
operations are not expected or intended, such as intelligence collection and
sharing, missions to enable kinetic strikes, or the provision of operational
planning and other forms of advice and assistance to partner forces.10

Although some like General Mattis have argued for the need to
include US ground forces in the fight, most have limited this discussion
to providing advisors and tactical air controllers at lower levels to the
ISF.11 John Nagl has been a consistent voice in this debate arguing:
We are going to have to put those American troops embedded inside Iraqi
units, in close support of those Iraqi units, in order to enable and empower
them to expel the Islamic State from that country in a reasonable period
of time. That’s not an occupation, it will be Iraqi troops doing the fighting,
it will be American troops in close support, calling in airstrikes, providing
intelligence, providing a number of the enablers and the logistical support
8      See Sydney J. Freedburg, Jr., “Trench Warfare With Wings: Can ISIL Airstrikes Go Beyond
Attrition?” Breaking Defense, April 9, 2015. In this article Deptula, a noted airpower theorist and
practitioner, argues for a return to first principles: Why is the road between Raqqa [the ISIL ‘capital,’
in Syria] and Mosul, for example, still open? Why is electricity not terminated in either city? Wouldn’t
shutting down the electrical grid harm the local civilian population? Yes, Deptula said, but not
to an extent that would violate the laws of war. “This is one of the problems, there’s been more
attention to the avoidance of collateral damage and civilian casualties than there has been to the
accomplishment of eliminating ISIL,” he said. In fact, he argued, “in an echo of long-ago airpower
theorist Giulio Douhet — that bringing the war home to ISIL-controlled populations might turn
them against their occupiers.”
9      Obama, “Letter from the President–Authorization for the Use of United States Armed
Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.”
10      Ibid.
11      Mattis, “Using Military Force Against ISIS.” General Mattis chafed at restricting the means in
the fight against the Islamic State, writing “When fighting a barbaric enemy who strikes fear into the
hearts of many, especially those living in close proximity to this foe, we must not reassure that enemy
in advance that it will not face the fiercest, most skillful and ethical combat force in the world.”
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that America is so good at, and it will enable the Iraqis to do the fighting
and the dying. So I am talking about the total force of some 10-20 thousand
American advisors—clearly, an insufficient number to occupy the country
the size of Iraq, but sufficient to provide a steel spine that will provide
support to an Iraqi military that collapsed under pressure last year and that
has not been completely rebuilt, that cannot conduct this fight on its own.12

Thus, the central assumption—and the Achilles’ heel—in the
current US strategy is this: with foreign training and assistance, the
ISF will eventually be able to provide sufficient on-the-ground military
means to achieve US strategic ends. The question yet to be asked and
answered (without spin) is: What if the ISF cannot be trained and advised
to achieve the level of competency necessary to roll back the Islamic
State?
Ironically, the way the United States defeated Saddam Hussein in
2003—destroying the enemy through joint combined arms maneuver—
is what is needed now. The flaw in the 2003 strategy was failing to plan
for what would replace the Hussein regime and letting Iraq descend into
chaos; but that is not the central issue now. There is an Iraqi government
in place that the United States intends to sustain. Yet, debates about the
way to defeat the Islamic State are frequently, and incorrectly, trapped in
the counterinsurgency model of the past decade, as can be seen in this
statement by Janine Davidson at a recent Council on Foreign Relations
event: “the people in Iraq feel like this civil war has insurgency-like elements, meaning people are embedded among the people, [if] the fighters
are embedded, then there are counterinsurgency-like approaches.” Max
Boot, Davidson’s fellow panelist at the event, agreed: “I think a COIN
[counterinsurgency] strategy is basically the only strategy that has any
track record of success. And it’s not an easy strategy, but it’s the only
strategy that has any track record of success in dealing with an enemy
that is entrenched among the people.”13
Will the ISF be able to drive the Islamic State out of Iraq? Operations
in Tikrit, which had to be stopped because of lack of progress and high
casualties and could only resume once US airpower was employed,
provide some indication of the lack of competence of the ISF for the
task of defeating the Islamic State.14 Furthermore, the brunt of the fighting was reportedly done by Shi’a militias as the ISF was not up to the
task. Nevertheless, the key test will be the retaking of Mosul, a much
larger Sunni city of some 1.5 million residents. As already noted, doubts
about the readiness of the ISF for this fight ostensibly pushed back plans
for an offensive to take Mosul from this spring to an undetermined date
in the future. There is likely to be a long wait: reports from US trainers indicate ISF is in bad shape. Lieutenant Colonel John Schwemmer,
a US Army officer training Iraqis at Camp Taji in Iraq, was recently
taken aback at the poor state of the ISF, observing: “It’s pretty incredible . . . I was kind of surprised. What training did they have after we
left?”15 Finally, there appears to be doubt among at least some senior
12      John Nagl, interview, “Americans Have to Die On Battlefield to Destroy ISIS—US Military
Strategist,” RT, February 16, 2015, http://rt.com/shows/sophieco/232635-us-isis-middle-east.
13      Council on Foreign Relations, “What to Do About ISIS,” transcript, March 31, 2015, http://
www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/do-isis/p36333, accessed April 15, 2015).
14      Morris, “Iraqi Offensive for Tikrit Stalls as Casualties Mount.”
15      Rod Nordland, “US Soldiers, Back in Iraq, Find Security Forces in Disrepair,” New York
Times, April 14, 2015..
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Iraqi officers whether ISF can take Mosul without US ground forces.
Major General Najim Abdullah al-Jubouri, the individual selected by
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to command operations to liberate Nineveh, said: “I think it would be very difficult to defeat ISIS in
Nineweh without American forces.”16
There is reason for concern. The ISF that fled in the face of the
Islamic State’s offensive in 2014 bolted because it was designed largely as
an internal security force that “did little more than staff checkpoints.”17
The ISF could only operate effectively with significant US assistance
when facing anything other than moderate-scale internal threats. It is
incapable of the combined arms maneuver required to defeat the Islamic
State. The tough urban fights in Iraq—Fallujah (2004) and Sadr City
(2008)—were dominated by US forces with modest ISF participation.
The battle for Basra (2008), while Iraqi conceived and led, required
massive US assistance to succeed. The US ground formations in these key
battles were not just “boots on the ground.” They were skilled, professional forces capable of something the ISF is not: the expert execution of
highly synchronized joint combined arms operations. This competence
is paramount in defeating determined adversaries and avoiding friendly
and unwarranted noncombatant casualties and collateral damage. This is
the ground force needed to defeat the Islamic State. US advisers cannot
transplant these competencies into the ISF in a relatively short time, if
ever, even if the ISF did not have all of its other challenges to overcome.
Indeed, eight years of large-scale efforts from 2003 to 2011 failed to do
so. Nor can it do the heavy lifting in intelligence, fires, and planning for
the ISF; it is not capable of this level of sophisticated synchronization of
joint combined arms.

The Singular Importance of US Ground Forces

The 2008 Battle of Sadr City is perhaps the most illustrative example
of the capability chasm between US ground forces and the ISF—or
almost any other military in the world, for that matter. In that battle the
US Army’s 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, destroyed
the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia in an intense ground fight. Sadr City
contained over 2 million Iraqi noncombatants, with an estimated 6,000
to 8,000 JAM fighters operating in their midst. The problem was similar
to that which forces trying to retake Mosul will face: How to defeat a
relatively small number of fighters without wantonly killing the civilians
amongst whom they are hiding and destroying the city.18 To reverse a
famous quote reported by Peter Arnett during the Vietnam War, “How
do you save the city without destroying it?”19
In the Battle of Sadr City, the US Army created a condition intolerable to JAM by sealing off the city with a concrete wall and using
the protected mobility and firepower of M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley
infantry fighting vehicles to maneuver against JAM. This threatened
16      Thomas E. Ricks, “Former FP [Foreign Policy] Roundtable Participant Tapped to Lead Iraqi
Offensive to Re-take Mosul — But Will He Ask for US Ground Forces?” Foreign Policy, April 22, 2015,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/22/former-fp-roundtable-participant-tapped-to-lead-iraqioffensive-to-re-take-mosul-but-will-he-ask-for-u-s-ground-forces.
17      Ibid.; and Nordland, “US Soldiers, Back in Iraq, Find Security Forces in Disrepair.”
18      David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, and Brian Shannon, The 2008 Battle of Sadr City:
Reimagining Urban Combat (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013).
19      “Major Describe Moves,” New York Times, February 8, 1968, 14.
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JAM’s source of sustenance and it came out to fight US forces to stop
the progress of the wall. When JAM fighters became visible they
were destroyed with discriminate firepower. This is not unlike Israeli
ground operations in Gaza during Operations Cast Lead and Protective
Edge—competent ground forces, enabled by a joint system, can create
conditions that force an adversary to fight at great disadvantage.
Simultaneous with the ground fight against the JAM militia, the
3rd Brigade executed a high-technology, complex hunt for JAM rocket
launcher crews who were firing from Sadr City into the Baghdad Green
Zone, where the US Embassy was located. The brigade staff, augmented
by Air Force officers, integrated multiple intelligence means, unmanned
aerial surveillance and attack systems (Predator and Shadow), Apache
helicopters, Air Force fighters, and artillery to hunt and destroy JAM
rocket launchers.
The ISF was also in the Sadr City fight, but it played a secondary
infantry role, assisted by US advisers, focused on consolidating gains
and occupying Sadr City once the fighting ended. That was all that could
be expected of the ISF, because it could not execute synchronized joint
operations, nor did it have the capabilities—the US military provided all
the joint fires, technical intelligence, and overhead surveillance. While
isolating Mosul might not be the best strategy, the fight for Sadr City
illustrates the unique effectiveness US ground forces in orchestrating
and executing a joint fight could have in the fight against the Islamic
State.
Competent ground forces are fundamental to the joint force equation for finding and defeating adversaries. Attempting to impart this
competence to another ground force is folly. The ISF of 2008, before
then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki riddled it with crony appointments and corruption, was more competent than the ISF that fled from
the Islamic State last year.
Still, it is unimaginable that the ISF of 2008 could have done what
US forces did in Sadr City or Fallujah, for that matter. It took years
of effort to create the ISF of 2008 and the adversaries they joined us
in fighting were less formidable than the Islamic State. Why would we
imagine the ISF ground forces will be able to take Mosul this year?

The Fallacy of the Advisor Option

This is a central fallacy in US advisory efforts in areas with ongoing
conflicts. Our advisory efforts may create infantry formations that can
operate within the context of a supporting US joint system that provides air, artillery, intelligence, logistical support—and ground combat
forces. Advisors are essentially a link for the local security forces into
that system, which also has US ground forces in the event of the need
for reinforcement. This is essentially the system we had in Iraq during
the surge. It is not dissimilar to the program of Vietnamization during
the Vietnam War. So long as the South Vietnamese had access to US
enablers, particularly airpower, they could endure as they did during the
North Vietnamese failed Easter Offensive in 1972. Three years later,
absent this US system and sustained security assistance support, the
South Vietnamese military deteriorated and collapsed under a conventional attack by North Vietnam. In the case of the ISF, the Islamic State
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(a much less significant foe than the North Vietnamese Army) was able
to overrun much of Iraq. Finally, in the past when the United States built
militaries that gradually became truly joint, combined arms-capable, the
US army provided military assistance and forces in largely benign security environments for decades (e.g., South Korea). It strains credulity to
believe we can create an ISF capable of effective operations in an urban
area like Mosul in short order, even if we provide intelligence, planning,
and fires.

The Perils of Sectarianism

Trying to take Sunni cities with combinations of Shi’a militias,
Peshmerga, and ISF forces would also present another challenge. None
of these forces would be trusted by the Sunni populations, which might
therefore continue to support the Islamic State. Nor would they trust
each other. In the eyes of the locals, US ground forces are least likely to
have sectarian agendas and, thus, are potentially trustworthy—or at least
honest brokers. The aftermath of the ISF victory in Tikrit reinforces this
view. As Reuters reported, “the looting and violence in Tikrit threaten
to tarnish [Iraqi Prime Minister] Abadi’s victory. It risks signaling to
Sunni Iraqis that the central government is weak and not trustworthy
enough to recapture other territory held by Islamic State, including the
much larger city of Mosul.”20 Future depredations against the Sunnis
also risk exacerbating the already deep sectarian divides that would
undermine a central pillar of our strategy in Iraq of creating an inclusive
Iraqi government.
This brings us back to the importance of having the means to achieve
our ends. If the ISF is incapable of defeating the Islamic State in the cities
where ISIL fighters have gone to ground, then the only reliable means
available are US ground combat forces. They have all the skills in joint
combined arms warfare the ISF lacks. US Army armor and mechanized
infantry formations should be at the heart of this joint task force, just as
they were in Sadr City, to provide US forces with the mobile, protected,
and discriminate firepower that will overmatch and quickly defeat the
Islamic State. If the United States is unwilling to deploy ground combat
forces, the end state of a “degraded and destroyed” Islamic State is at
risk.

Capacity Matters—Two Recent Examples

Two recent cases when the United States chose to embark on a new
strategy in the midst of failing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide
lessons about the criticality of providing sufficient means. The first
instance was when President George W. Bush announced on January
10, 2007 that he was sending 30,000 additional troops, including five
more US Army brigades, to Iraq. Quite simply, the strategy of turning
the war over to the Iraqis—“standing down as they stand up”—was not
working.21 These surge forces were the critical to a new strategy for Iraq
that made possible the establishment of a level of internal security that

20      “After Iraqi Forces Take Tikrit, a Wave of Looting and Lynching,” Reuters, April 3, 2015,.
21      Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq (New
York: Penguin Press, 2009), 74-128.
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the Iraqis could maintain independently and allowed the United States
to withdraw in 2011.22
The second case is the increased commitment in Afghanistan that
General Stanley McChrystal designed for the Obama administration in
2009. The ends for the campaign were clear: denying al Qaeda a safe
haven, reversing the Taliban’s momentum, and strengthening the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government for the long haul.
The ways were also understood—population-centric COIN. What was
inadequate were the means allocated to achieve the strategy. According
to US COIN doctrine, the number of security forces available to execute
the strategy was insufficient and the ends of the strategy were not
attained.23 Today, over four years after the surge in Afghanistan, the
United States has had to revisit its plans to withdraw US forces from
Afghanistan.24

Moving Forward

There is understandable reluctance to deploy US ground forces to
fight the Islamic State, given US experiences since 2003. However, the
military objective against the Islamic State would not be nation-building
or counterinsurgency, but rather removing the Islamic State from Iraq.
The surest means of attaining this strategic objective is with the introduction of US ground combat forces and the necessary sustainment
packages to support them. Politically, this will be extremely difficult
both domestically and internationally, given likely Iraqi objections and
the substantial Iranian presence in Iraq.
The most difficult political issue, however, is mustering American
political will for a US ground commitment against the Islamic State. The
President will have to make the American people understand why US
ground forces are the only sure means available to achieve our national
objectives. President Bush did this in 2007 for Iraq; President Obama
did it 2009 for Afghanistan. It is, however, clear the American people
understand the threat posed by the Islamic State. A recent CNN/ORC
Poll found:

22      Peter Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War
(New Haven: Yale University Press). It was not just the five US brigades that changed the situation in
Iraq during the surge. What mattered was the show of US resolve, which enabled the Sunni to stand
up to Al Qaeda in Iraq, along with JAM leaving the field for its own, separate reasons.
23      David E. Johnson, “What Are You Prepared to Do? NATO and the Strategic Mismatch
Between Ends, Ways, and Means in Afghanistan—and in the Future,” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 34, no. 5 (May 2011): 383-401. See US Department of the Army and US Marine Corps,
Counterinsurgency, FM 3–24/MCWP 3–33.5 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the
Army and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 2006), 1-13, which notes: “Twenty counterinsurgents per
1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.
. . . As in any conflict, the size of the force needed to defeat an insurgency depends on the situation.” There is an ongoing debate about the relevance of these ratios. See, for example, Jeffrey A.
Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine,”
Security Studies 20, no. 4 (2011): 556-591. One could argue that they were not met across Iraq during
the surge, but within Baghdad, considered by many to be the center of gravity of the war, there were
approximately 131,000 US-Iraqi security forces in a city with a population of some 7,000,000, which
came close to the doctrinal ratio. Interestingly, these ratios do not appear in the 2014 version of the
US Army-Marine Corps FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies.
24      Greg Jaffe and David Nakamura, “Obama Agrees to Slow US Troop Withdrawal from
Afghanistan,” Washington Post, March 24, 2015.
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Americans see ISIS as a bigger threat to the United States than Iran, Russia,
North Korea or China. . . . Overall, 68% say ISIS is a very serious threat,
compared with just 39% who say so about Iran, 32% about North Korea,
25% on Russia and 18% on China. Nearly 9 in 10 see ISIS as at least a
moderately serious threat.”25

The argument to the American people for greater US involvement in the fight to defeat the Islamic State is straight forward: Absent
the introduction of US ground forces, the success of the US strategy
is inextricably tied to means—the ISF, Shi’a militias backed by Iran,
and the Peshmerga— whose capabilities and competence for the task
is questionable, as are for some of them their increasingly retaliatory
methods against Sunnis. If the ISF fails, the Islamic State will receive a
boost in prestige and recruiting appeal, thus increasing its threat to the
region, US friends and allies, and possibly even the homeland. If we recognize the inability of the ISF to defeat the Islamic State, the alternative
approach to employing US ground combat forces would be continued
strategic patience and kicking the can down the road. This course is also
problematic, given that it will surely increase an already sizable Iranian
influence and presence in Iraq and create even more concern in the
region about US commitment and credibility.
In the words of retired Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger, “a broad
chasm gapes between what the United States accomplished and what it
aspired to do in the wake of the 9/11 attack.”26 Why is that? My sense
is that is the responsibility of the military to provide expert advice to
civilians on the necessary means to attain policy ends is either not being
fully expressed, being shaped in ways to make it palatable to the recipient, or being ignored because it conflicts with a broader policy agenda.
Nevertheless, whatever the reason, it boggles the mind that a commander could offer a plan to the president for Afghanistan that failed
to address the three critical mandates of our own doctrine: adequate
security force to population ratios, denial of sanctuary for the adversary,
and a legitimate host nation government. A “we will do the best we can
with what means we get,” is something other than expert military advice
and a formula for disaster.
But this caution was not put forward on Afghanistan. Indeed, the
opposite happened. President Obama specifically wanted an answer
to the fundamental question about the strategy: could it succeed with
the forces the president was willing to commit and in the timeframe
specified. Jonathan Alter, in his book The Promise: President Obama, Year
One, writes that President Obama specifically addressed these issues with
General David A. Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command and
General McChrystal’s commander:
[President Obama]: I want you to be honest with me. You can do this in
18 months?
[General Petraeus]: Sir, I’m confident we can train and hand over to the
ANA (Afghan National Army) in that time frame.
25      Jennifer Agiesta, “CNN/ORC Poll: ISIS a Bigger Threat Than Iran, Russia,” CNN, April 22,
2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/22/politics/cnn-orc-poll-isis-iran-russia/index.html.
26      Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, Harcourt, 2014), 420.
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Alter also writes that Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael G. Mullen agreed
with General Petraeus’s assessment.27
Every war college student learns about the tools available to policy
makers to meet strategic ends—Diplomatic, Information, Military,
Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL).”
When the critical moment in a policy occurs that the other than military elements are not achieving the policy ends, policy continues, as
Clausewitz reminds us, “with the addition of other means.”28 These
means are military capability and capacity. Absent a rigorous and
forthright assessment— and commitment— of the means required to
accomplish the strategic ends policy will be placed at risk. This is the
critical juncture we are rapidly approaching in Iraq and the broader
Middle East.
It is time for strategic clarity. An ISF military failure against the
Islamic State or a protracted delay in defeating the Islamic State could
unhinge US policy in the region and provide the Islamic State with a
significant boost in credibility. One option is to revise our policy goal
to accord with the means we have devoted to the strategy: degrade
and contain the Islamic State. Indeed, there are reasonable arguments
regarding cultural, political, and military considerations for doing just
that. If, however, our policy actually requires the defeat of the Islamic
State, which I believe it does, then we need to provide the necessary
means—competent US ground forces at the core of a joint, combined
arms team—to realize our policy objectives.
The advance of the Islamic State into Iraq should also force a
rethinking of our broader national security strategy and force posture.
The central issue is this: desired policy outcomes in the fight against the
Islamic State—and in the Middle East and elsewhere—are being compromised by the continued reluctance to put US “boots on the ground”
in a direct combat role. In part, this is because of the current strategy
of rebalancing to the Pacific to contend with a rising China. This is
important, but it should not divert our attention from the rest of the
world. The collapse of the Yemeni government, the chaos in Syria and
Libya, an ever present threat in North Korea, and Russian adventurism
in the Ukraine require a broader discussion about the military means
necessary to attain US policy objectives worldwide. Air strikes, counterterrorism with drones, and special operations raids against high value
targets create immediate, but transitory effects—what has been termed
by Israelis “mowing the grass.” They are also clearly less risky than committing ground combat forces. Nevertheless, while these stand-off and
small-scale operations might attain short term political objectives, they
most often do not achieve or support the longer term policy ends of
creating enduring conditions of stability and security we seek in the
world. Nor do they deter aggression and assure partners and allies. This
is the role of US ground forces.

27      Jonathan Alter, The Promise: President Obama, Year One (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010),
390. See also Peter Baker, “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan,” New York Times,
December 5, 2009.
28      Clausewitz, On War, 605.
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The decision to commit US ground forces to the war against the
Islamic State will be extremely difficult for US policymakers, given
the burden of our recent history in Afghanistan and Iraq. These counterinsurgency wars are not analogous to the challenges posed by the
Islamic State. It is the job of military professionals to explain why the
current ways and means in the war against the Islamic State will likely
lead to policy failure. They must also tell those they advise that strategic
success demands the commitment of US ground forces. These forces
are not merely “boots on the ground,” but the competent professionals
required to defeat the Islamic State. Accepting the nature the war we are
in, understanding the way in which it must be prosecuted, and undertaking a clear and comprehensive assessment of the means necessary for
strategic success will make apparent the need to commit US ground
combat forces. The clock is ticking and the stakes are high in Iraq—and
elsewhere.

Megacities: Pros and Cons

The Case for Megacities
Kevin M. Felix and Frederick D. Wong
Abstract: We cannot know for certain what the future operating environment will be, but we must prepare for it. To date, the US military has not paid enough attention to the rise of megacities. This
article argues the US Army must continue developing new concepts,
capabilities, and ultimately solutions for achieving national security
objectives within the current and future operational environments
of the megacity.

T

he 2014 Army Operating Concept (AOC) defines the term
complex as “an environment that is not only unknown, but
unknowable and constantly changing.”1 It goes on to claim that
“to win in a complex world, Army forces must provide the Joint Force
with multiple options, integrate the efforts of multiple partners, operate
across multiple domains, and present enemies and adversaries with
multiple dilemmas.”2 Nowhere is this more crucial or difficult to accomplish than in the complex urban environment of a megacity. Such cities
present the Army and joint force with a level of complexity for which
they are not fully prepared. However, many opportunities exist for the
Army and joint force to reinvigorate past research efforts, to consolidate
learning, and to prepare the current and future force for operations in
such environments.

Historical Context

Urban warfare is not a new phenomenon. For example, in the
ancient Syrian city of Hamoukar, archeologists have discovered evidence
of urban combat as early as 5,500 years ago.3 Throughout the ages, urban
conflicts have tended to be more the rule than the exception. Previous
wars centered on the sieges and defense of urban centers of all sizes,
while large battles have for centuries been the exception rather than the
rule. Contemporary reminders of urban warfare and its inherent challenges include the battles of Stalingrad and Aachen during World War II,
Hué during Vietnam, and Grozny in 1994-1995, and again 1999-2000.
There is little reason to believe future conflicts will not also require
some form of urban warfare. As such, the Army’s capacity to engage,
fight, and win major urban combat operations will determine the success
of future operational and strategic endeavors.
The Battle of Hué during the Vietnam conflict reflected the tendency for urban combat operations to blend the levels of war, creating
1      US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in A Complex
World (Fort Eustis: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2014), iii.
2      Ibid.
3      Owen Jarus, “Site of Earliest Known Urban Warfare Threatened by Syrian War,” LiveScience,
June 24, 2013, http://www.livescience.com/37672-ancient-urban-warfare-site-threatened.html.
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the situation where tactical outcomes had significant strategic implications. Arguably, the bloodiest battle during the Tet Offensive took
place in Hué, Vietnam’s third largest city, with significant operational,
cultural, and spiritual significance. The Battle for Hué involved 26 days
of intense street-to-street, house-to-house fighting against a determined
enemy established in a defense-in-depth. Major urban combat operations
occurred in the midst of a civilian population of around 140,000 people,
and against an initial enemy force estimated at 7,500 North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) troops, later reinforced to a divisionsized element. Facing them were three US Marine battalions and 11
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) battalions.4 Although the
United States employed Army units from the 1st Cavalry Division and
101st Airborne Division during the Battle of Hué, these forces focused
on the outlying areas to prevent NVA reinforcement. The US Marines
and ARVN conducted the majority of fighting inside the city.
When the fight for Hué ended, US and ARVN forces retook the
city. The US military suffered 216 killed and 1,364 wounded, while
the ARVN lost 384 killed and 1,830 wounded. Civilian casualties were
around 5,800 people killed or executed by NVA/VC due to their political allegiances. Estimated enemy casualties were 1,042 killed and 4,000
wounded.5
Despite the tactical gains from retaking the city and repelling enemy
forces across South Vietnam, the United States and Republic of Vietnam
faced the strategic repercussions of having laid in ruins an estimated 80
percent of the city, with over 116,000 persons left homeless. Moreover,
the Johnson administration lost the public’s confidence, and South
Vietnamese confidence in its government declined further, worsening
existing political issues adversely impacting US policy. In essence, the
risk of winning the battle only to lose the war is significantly higher in
an urban fight.

The Problem

Imagine if the US military had to conduct operations similar to Hué
in a megacity, a complex urban environment over 100 times larger and
with a population of nearly 10 million. Add in the challenges presented
by subterranean, cyber, and space environments against a determined
enemy, established in-depth, comprised of conventional and special
operations forces, paramilitaries, and terrorist and criminal elements
with access to a wide spectrum of advanced warfare capabilities. While
urban combat operations are not new, a megacity presents old challenges
at previously unimaginable scale and complexity.
Due to their increasing political, economic, and social significance,
megacities represent strategic key terrain interconnected to national and
even international centers of gravity. Megacities, due to their increasing
number, geographical locations, and crucial strategic importance, are
also the most likely environments where the US military will have to
execute its missions.

4      Norman L. Cooling, “Hue City, 1968: Winning A Battle While Losing A War,” Marine Corps
Gazette, July 2001, https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/hue-city-1968-winning-battle-while-losing
-war.
5      Ibid.
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Despite the crucial importance of megacities, the US military has
not yet made a concerted effort to prepare for combat in these ultracomplex environments. The operational challenge is in plain view, but
the Army and joint community have barely begun to climb the steep
learning curve. A requirement for additional in-depth research to determine how US forces could operate in and around such environments
remains in many areas. Discovering optimal organizational structures,
what specialized materiel and munitions are necessary, and how to best
adjust leader development and training programs, are just some of the
megacity challenges the US military must continue to address.
The Army Chief of Staff’s Strategic Studies Group recognized
these shortcomings in its analysis of megacities conducted in 2013-2014,
stating:
…the Army is currently unprepared. Although the Army has a long history
of urban fighting, it has never dealt with an environment so complex and
beyond the scope of its resources. A decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan
has taught the Army that it must shape itself to the complex environment
in which it is called to operate. This is a process that must begin now with
megacities.6

To examine further what megacities represent in terms of military
challenges and their implications for future military operations, this
article addresses the following areas: the strategic context of megacities with regards to social trends; the characteristics of megacities; the
operational challenges they present; and the current thinking is and
what studies of megacities have revealed to date.

Strategic Context

Cities have long been the focus of culture, politics, economics, religion, and many other characteristics of civilization.7 Not surprisingly,
the emergence of megacities and their massive increase in scale, population, and capacity to impact global events have magnified the already
significant role of cities. Furthermore, the pace at which megacities are
developing and enlarging is changing the strategic landscape faster than
strategists and policymakers are coping with them. As described in a
McKinsey Global Institute article published in Foreign Policy magazine,
“…over the next two decades, the world will see a burst of urban expansion at a speed and on a scale never before witnessed in human history.”8
Such a vast urbanization at an unprecedented rate will cause societal
disruptions and put stress on the global economic system.
Additionally, the era when the US could hope to avoid getting
pulled into an “infantry eating” urban fight has passed. In the future,
the combat environment US forces will most likely find themselves
engaged in is an urban one. Avoiding major urban areas is usually the
desired course of action, but the desirable is not always possible.
6      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army:
Preparing for an Uncertain Future (Arlington, VA: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic
Studies Group, 2014), 21.
7      Lou DiMarco, Attacking the Heart and Guts: Urban Operations through the Ages (Fort Leavenworth:
US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2014), 1.
8      Richard Dobbs, “Prime Numbers: Megacities,” Foreign Policy Magazine, McKinsey Global
Institute, October 2010, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/in_the_news/prime_numbers_
megacities.

22

Parameters 45(1) Spring 2015

In a recent National Intelligence Council study, Global Trends 2030,
social scientists and analysts assessed that by 2030, the estimated urban
population will grow by nearly 60 percent, or 4.9 billion people, from 50
percent today.9 Urban centers already generate an estimated 80 percent of
economic growth, a trend that will likely increase and continue to drive
more social migration towards cities.10 This social migration will likely
drive increasing demands for housing, public infrastructure expansion,
food, energy, water, and other basic natural resources.

Characteristics of Megacities

What is a megacity? Aside from being significantly larger, what
really distinguishes one urban area as a megacity? What makes Tokyo
and Rio de Janeiro megacities, while Pittsburgh is not?
As a start point, the characteristics common to megacities and
major urban areas are both physical (and virtual) across air, ground,
sea, and subterranean domains. Physically, both possess buildings of
varying size, age, and construction, complex networks of ground, air,
and/or sea transportations, formal governance structures, and support
infrastructures such as for power and water distribution. Both also have
the virtual environments of cyber and space that affect information flow
and informal governance structures, such as community activists and
religious leaders. Additionally, both are likely to be globally interconnected to national and international economic centers of gravity.
Given these common traits, what then distinguishes megacities from
major urban areas? The European Association of National Metrology
Institutes (EURAMET) defined megacities as, “metropolitan agglomerations which concentrate more than 10 million inhabitants.”11 Other
related studies conducted by RAND, McKinsey Global Institute, and
the French Ministry of Defense’s Strategic Horizons 2040 further describe
the characteristics of megacities in terms of two major inter-related
factors: explosive population growth and potential volatility.
Whereas population growth in major urban areas like St. Petersburg,
Russia, remains steady in the low percentiles and ranges in the thousands
over the course of several years, population growth in megacities like
Jakarta is extremely rapid, running in the millions within that same time
span. Rapid population shifts often lead to situations where the demand
for jobs, public services, and other resources exceeds the capacity of
existing physical infrastructure, and far outstrips the ability of many
states to add infrastructure at the pace of population growth.
Megacities promote economic growth for nations and regions, but
also represent potential nightmares of poverty, widespread disease, as
well as crime and other related tensions. The effects of an already existing wealth disparity amongst social classes can be further complicated
by infrastructure deficits, which often lead to ungoverned areas of urban

9     McKinsey Global Institute, “Urbanization,” http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/ urbanization.
10      National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington, DC:
National Intelligence Council, 2012), 26.
11      European Association of National Metrology Institutes, Mega Cities (Braunschweig:
EURAMET, 2013), 1.
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decay (i.e. slums). These areas create opportunities for illicit activities,
diseases, and economic dependence on governmental support.
Explosive population growth brings with it the potential for social
unrest, and in a megacity is likely to have international repercussions.
Megacities inherently contain the conditions for political unrest where
populations split along ethnic or religious lines into “cities within
cities.” Ineffective and/or corrupt state governance often results in the
creation of informal power structures and safe havens for illicit and
threat networks. For example, a lack of basic policing by the state in
the poorer regions of a megacity may result in a black market economy
run by a shadow government of criminal and/or terrorist networks.
Furthermore, threats can hide and operate more readily, and, unlike
the rural countryside, they have easy access to technology to mobilize
support and coordinate activities.
The 2011 uprising in Egypt as part of the Arab Spring led to the
end of President Hosni Mubarak’s 29-year regime in less than 30 days,
and exemplified a situation where a megacity’s potential volatility set
off a chain of events. On January 17, 2011, the video of an Egyptian
man setting himself on fire outside Cairo’s parliament building after a
dispute with local authorities over receiving his monthly coupons for
subsidized bread went viral. The event proved to be tipping point of
long-standing social grievances that galvanized protests in Cairo and
Alexandria. Information technology access enabled the video’s mass
distribution and mobilization of a broad-based coalition of opposition
groups (e.g. Muslim Brotherhood) that began and sustained a succession
of large-scale protests.
Despite Mubarak’s deployment of the military to restore his authority on January 30th, by February 6th the opposition leaders were holding
talks with the Egyptian Vice President and on February 11, 2011,
Mubarak resigned and surrendered his power to the military, ending
his regime. In 2015, Egypt is still dealing with the political conflicts
between Islamist and secular groups over government control, affecting
regional stability in the Middle East and US foreign policy.12 As evident
in Egypt as part of the Arab Spring, the global reach afforded through
technology and the sheer mass of resources available in megacities afford
threats a greater potential to escalate social unrest with local, regional,
and potentially international impact.
Social migration trends indicate the movement from rural areas
to cities will likely continue; life in urban areas, even in slums, is still
better than rural poverty where there are no opportunities for economic
advancement. Additionally, as inefficient as a poorly run megacity’s economic system may be, typically enough food arrives to feed populations
of 10 million people or more versus the rural areas where such resources
are unavailable. Likewise, even in slums there are economic systems that
maintain at least minimal degrees of order, and minimally sufficient
sanitation to avoid the entire area from becoming a giant cesspool.
Clearly, not all megacities are equal in this regard. Each possesses
unique physical, political, and social characteristics. Shenzhen is not like
Delhi, nor like Mumbai or São Paulo. Even cities within the same nation
12      Kelsey Jane Clark, et. al., “Timeline: Revolution in Egypt,” Los Angeles Times, June 19, 2012,
http://timelines.latimes.com/egypt/.
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demonstrate numerous crucial differences; consider Los Angeles and
New York City.
What distinguishes well-run megacities from poorly-run ones are
their capacities for maintaining economic systems, effective governance, and resilience. The people of New York City demonstrated such
resilience through their public resolve and emergency response operations following the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, and
Superstorm Sandy in 2012. In both instances, there was sufficient leadership and emergency response capacity to keep the city running and
commerce flowing. The people of Tokyo demonstrated similar resilience
in the wake of the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami that devastated
key infrastructure and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. By
contrast, a natural disaster in a megacity like Lagos, challenged by its
own ethnic tensions and internal governance struggles, might plunge
the Nigerian government into chaos due to the scale of death, disease,
and ensuing reconstruction costs, resulting in regional and international
economic consequences.

Operational Challenges Presented by Megacities

Megacities can be best described as systems of systems, comparable
to a living organism. They are dynamic environments that change not
only block by block, but day to day. While this is not a new idea, the
magnitude of the challenge to gain situational understanding is significantly greater due to the complexity, density, and scale of the physical
and human terrain. Future intervention within these unique environments will likely be brought about by their vulnerability to humanitarian
crises and suitability as safe havens for threats to the United States and
its allies.
Because of their interrelationship within a nation or region’s centers
of gravity, megacities will likely have greater strategic value beyond
material military advantage. The following complex challenges require
close coordination between tactical actions and strategic objectives:
•• Regional and international interconnectedness and centers of gravity
•• Extended urban infrastructures supporting dense, diverse populations
•• Formal and informal sources of power
•• Congested and constraining terrain
•• Interconnected, embedded threats across super-surface, surface, subsurface, and cyber/space
Mission execution in one megacity would be tough; working in
several across the range of military operations at the same time might
be horrendous. The US military could be conducting combat operations
in and around a megacity overseas while simultaneously, a natural disaster affects one in the United States, requiring extensive humanitarian
aid and disaster relief operations, analogous to Hurricane Katrina and
Operation Iraqi Freedom that coincided in 2005, but on a significantly
larger scale. At a minimum, mission planning in and around such environments involves the following considerations.
Strategically, leaders and planners must consider the rest of the
country and region when examining megacities. Regardless of the type
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of military operation, a primary objective is to provide safe and secure
environments to facilitate effective governance. US military forces will
likely support broader efforts directed by the US government or other
entities whose priorities may limit freedom of action (e.g. limiting collateral damage). Many of the problems associated with megacities are not
isolated, and are likely interconnected with national or regional problems. Such planning considerations are comparable to maintaining the
health of a whole body versus treating symptoms (i.e. megacity slums).
As an example, efforts to improve megacities will likely increase urban
migration, setting conditions for problems to recur. Planning efforts
may have to include options to improve conditions throughout the rest
of the country as part of a whole-of-government approach.
Additionally, megacities possess critical vulnerabilities that favor
an attacker due to the magnitude of resources needed to “keep them
running.” The effective disruption or denial of energy, water, and/or
food supply through isolation of key infrastructure nodes could affect
millions within the span of a few days. These vulnerabilities will be
areas for the US military to exploit or mitigate, depending on its role as
the attacker, defender, or occupier.
Operationally, a key consideration is the adversaries’ ability to
attack and exploit United States and Allied military vulnerabilities
from megacities due to the resources available and ability to hide and
operate within the population. Adversaries will continue to employ both
advanced and simple technologies to avoid US strengths, emulate US
capabilities, disrupt US technological advantages, and to expand operations to the US homeland.13 US and Allied vulnerabilities also might
include dependency on improved ports or intermediate staging bases to
deploy and employ forces, as well as an inability to secure lines of communication through extended urban areas. Population congestion and/
or a persistent threat environment may also prohibit basing, movement,
and maneuver within urban areas. In addition to the physical urban
terrain that would favor a defending conventional force, unregulated
cities with poor social services also provide havens for other threats
such as terrorists. While this is true of urban areas in general, the scale
of a megacity will likely exceed military capacity to execute operations
effectively.
Tactically, civil and environmental considerations will likely strain
governance and law enforcement:
•• Physical land constraints
•• Energy, water, and sanitation demands
•• Vehicular congestion
•• Aging infrastructure
•• Entrenched criminal networks
•• Political corruption/gridlock
Modern-day buildings and dense shanty-towns provide ample cover
and concealment for threats to maneuver, hide, and operate. Essentially,
13      US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in A Complex
World, 10.
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megacities have the potential to be developed by defenders into hundreds, if not thousands, of individual mutually supporting fortresses and
obstacles.14
Urban terrain significantly favors defense through streets, buildings, etc., that canalize maneuver and inhibit an attacker’s ability to
mass effects. As a result, small-scale attacks are more likely to impact
a significantly larger and more technologically advanced force. A few
dozen landmines and some concertina wire employed as minefields
in the desert would likely have minimal impact on a mechanized battalion’s ability to maneuver. However, in an urban environment those
same obstacles would likely block units in a column formation, making
them ripe for attack. While bypass opportunities will likely exist due to
the number of side streets available or since a megacity’s scale exceeds
a defender’s capacity, gaining situational understanding to employ multiple avenues of approach will be a challenge.
In addition to major combat operations, the planning considerations to execute and resource missions such as humanitarian aid and
disaster relief are equally formidable. As a reference point, Hurricane
Katrina in late August 2005 displaced upwards of one million people
across multiple states in the US Gulf Region. The search-and-rescue and
relief effort required the mobilization and employment of over 72,000
soldiers, sailors, and airmen across the Active, Reserve, and National
Guard forces in conjunction with federal, state, and local agencies. US
military forces supporting Joint Task Force Katrina helped distribute
and manage the delivery of over 1.7 million gallons of water, 3.6 million
meals, and 11.5 million pounds of ice, in addition to providing evacuation and emergency medical care for thousands of people.15 The logistics
to execute disaster relief operations was equally substantial, requiring
the following resources just to sustain the Active component forces:
•• 815,000 cases of Meals Ready to Eat (MREs)
•• 215,000 lbs of ice
•• 837,000 bottles of water
•• 1.3 million gallons of fuel
•• 142,000 gallons of potable water 16
A natural disaster in a megacity overseas, potentially impacting millions, would create a demand far exceeding both host nation support
capacity and the distribution capability of any realistic initial US military response. Other considerations involve priorities of effort: would
it be more advantageous to move international aid or focus on the host
nation’s capacity? To what degree should US forces utilize non-state
entities and organizations (e.g. tribal militias) that are more effective in
providing security and essential services than the host nation? There are
no easy answers to those questions.
For example, the initial US military response will likely not have
the capacity to execute a humanitarian aid/disaster relief operation in
14      DiMarco, Attacking the Heart and Guts: Urban Operations through the Ages, 21.
15      James A. Wombell, Army Support to the Hurricane Katrina Disaster (Fort Leavenworth: Combat
Studies Institute Press, 2009), 173.
16      Ibid., 174.
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a megacity unilaterally and require host nation interaction. However, a
corrupt or ineffective host nation regime would likely hoard or skim off
US humanitarian aid for distribution to its ruling elites, driving existing
social tensions further towards violence or worse yet, increase the risk
of loss of life due to privation and disease as experienced in Haiti 2010
from corrupt police and government officials.17 Conversely, US military
utilization of an effective but ethnic minority runs the risk of the host
nation interpreting the action as an endorsement of a political threat and
strain US relations with the country.

The Search for Ideas

Studying the challenges that megacities present in order to turn
new ideas into concepts capable of addressing urban operations is not
new to the Army. In fact, megacities were the basis of Unified Quest in
2004. Prompted by dynamic changes in the operational environment, in
particular the impact of technological advances and their global proliferation during the past 10 years, as well as enduring operational problems
related to complex urban environments, the Future Warfare Division of
the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) once again focused
on megacities for Unified Quest 2014. Over 300 subject matter experts
from across the military, government, academic, and scientific community participated in a series of studies and seminar wargames over the
course of the year to reveal the following insights, operational approach
ideas, and their implications for consideration:
Planning operations in and around the megacity must incorporate
the capabilities of all unified action partners, requiring the Army to
re-evaluate and modify current information sharing and communications interoperability procedures and regulations such as AR 380-5,
Department of the Army Information Security Program and AR 380-10, Foreign
Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives.18 Current trends indicate
the United States will likely not unilaterally respond to an international
crisis without support and authority from the international community.
Some partners will remain traditional, such as government agencies,
allied military forces, and the host nation. However, examining the
megacity environment revealed the need for the Army to consider
non-traditional partners as potential sources of support and not just
opposition, even if some have an aversion to working with the military
(e.g. non-governmental aid organizations) and some that US government
may be averse to engaging (e.g. shadow governments, tribal militias).
While many potential partners will be influential, they will also be the
most difficult to understand. Timely, comprehensive coordination and
information sharing to gain and maintain understanding and dialogue
with these of types of partners will be vital, but likely remain contested
under current policies and procedures such as the vetting process for
releasing information that can take several weeks or even months.
17      Jonathan Strong, “Haitian Corruption and Graft Delay Earthquake Relief Efforts, Punishes
Destitute Refugees,” The Daily Caller, April 21, 2010, http://dailycaller.com/2010/04/21/haitian-corruption-and-graft-delay-earthquake-relief-efforts-punishes-destitute-refugees; and Patricia Zengerle,
“Will Endemic Corruption Suck Away Aid to Haiti?” Reuters, January 26, 2010.
18     US Department of the Army, Department of the Army Information Security Program, Army
Regulation 380-5 (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, 2000); and US Department of the
Army, Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives, Army Regulation 380-10 (Washington,
DC: US Department of the Army, 2013).
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Additionally, future land forces require the capability and capacity to
gain and maintain situational understanding of the incredibly complex
environment (physical, human, information, etc.) of megacities. The
Army must therefore reconsider the units and capabilities allocated for
its Regionally Aligned Forces to enable more persistent engagement and
civilian-to-military planning in that region, in particular that region’s
megacities, with intelligence collection capabilities adapted to the
complex urban terrain. Mass collection and big data analysis will be
critical to handle the volume of information, in addition to enhancing
human intelligence capabilities, with an emphasis on developing social
networks. The Army should consider either developing this big data/
human intelligence analysis capability internally within its intelligence
and cyber communities, or resourcing it through contracts supporting
Department of Defense agencies.
Maneuvering in megacities involves crossing multiple physical and
virtual domains simultaneously, requiring the Army, as part of the joint
community, to re-evaluate current policy on offensive tactical level
cyber towards developing that capability. Currently, the employment of
offensive cyber is under US Code Title 50, War and National Defense, not
US Code Title 10, Armed Forces. Granted, while having great potential,
offensive cyber at the tactical and operational level also possesses several
potential repercussions and unintended consequences if employed (e.g.
cyber-attack affecting both enemy and friendly systems) and methods
to accurately conduct battlefield damage assessment from a cyber-attack
still need to be developed. Nevertheless, it remains highly likely adversary threats will continue developing and employing offensive cyber,
and defensive cyber countermeasures will likely not be enough in the
future.
The Army, in conjunction with the joint community, needs to
develop more operational approaches to conduct missions in and around
megacities to give commanders and their staffs more options. Current
doctrinal models for conducting major combat operations in urban
terrain apply methods consistent with a siege where the attacking forces
isolate the city to “starve the defenders out” or attrition-based warfare
where attacking forces seize control through street-to-street fighting
against the defending force. While the Army has several capabilities
suitable for urban operations, the Army needs options beyond either
siege or attrition based approaches or bypassing because the scale of
requirements presents a capacity challenge for future forces. The Army
will likely not have enough force to seize an entire megacity and will
have to focus on a specific mission area and apply different approaches
for access and maneuver. Congestion in all domains will significantly
impede traditional forms of movement and maneuver that may not even
involve armed enemy threats; anti-access and area denial of a seaport
or airfield could be achieved through sheer mass of humanity from displaced persons and refugees.
As an example, the following six proposed operational approaches
for joint urban operations by the team supporting the Joint Advanced
Warfighting Program at the Institute of Defense Analyses may warrant
further examination towards concept development:
•• Precision Strike involves the employment of highly accurate attacks
through remotely delivered smart munitions, special operations direct
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action, and/or ground attack by fire to destroy, fix, and suppress
detected adversary capabilities from stand-off distance to isolate them
from resupply and reinforcement sources without occupying ground.19
•• Nodal Capture involves the control of critical nexus points (structural
and non-structural) in the city to deny adversary sources of support
and freedom of movement, and prevent contact between adversary
forces.20
•• Nodal Capture and Expansion builds on the Nodal Capture approach
through leveraging control of the critical nexus points to facilitate
capture of the entire city.
•• Soft Point Capture and Expansion employs seizure of undefended areas
of the city and uses them as bridgeheads for decisive, multiple attacks.
•• Segment and Capture employs counter-mobility to fix adversary forces to
the extent that they lose the ability to mass for offensive or defensive
purposes and can be defeated piecemeal.
•• Nodal Isolation is the approach to psychologically and/or physically seal
off critical nexus points (structural or non-structural) from adversary
forces to deny them sources of support and freedom of movement,
and prevent contact between adversary forces.21
The search for ideas and their development into viable concepts,
capabilities, and ultimately, solutions should be an ongoing process
requiring extensive study, engagement, dialogue, wargaming and experimentation cross the military, government, scientific, and academic
communities. While not an easy task to accomplish, the operational
necessity to prepare the future force outweighs the institutional challenges associated with collaborative learning efforts.

The Way Ahead

The operational challenges inherent in megacities are significant,
and given strategic trends, somewhat predictable. The Army must
conduct additional research to determine how US forces can and will
operate in and around such environments and develop the means to
execute as part of a comprehensive improvement of the current and
future force. Essentially, megacities epitomize complexity through
physical and virtual environments that are dynamic, interconnected,
and congested while spanning multi-dimensions in a scale that exceeds
military capacity. For consideration are the following proposed actions:

Reflect and Assess

As this article argues, the study of urban terrain is clearly not a
new endeavor, nor is the idea of megacities. The Army has the responsibility to reflect on work of the past (JFCOM, and others partners),
assess lessons learned, and carry that understanding forward through
the development of running estimates of past learning. For instance,
Unified Quest assessed its own internal work in 2004 before reinvigorating its efforts addressing megacities in 2014. This approach ensures the

19      Alec Wahlman, Mark Bean, et al., Exploring New Concepts for Joint Urban Operations (Arlington:
Institute for Defense Analyses, 2003), S-2.
20      Ibid., S-3.
21      Ibid., S-4.

30

Parameters 45(1) Spring 2015

Army does not relearn in areas where there are volumes of data, and use
resources wisely to focus learning into the future.

Learn and Test

Wargaming and experimentation remain critical virtual components in the Army’s modernization strategy: Force 2025 and Beyond
Maneuvers is the Army’s Campaign of Learning.22 As described,
numerous wargaming efforts of the past (Unified Quest 2004, 2014)
have addressed megacities from a strategic and operational context, supporting concept development. The next step is to drive experimentation
which, at the operational, down to tactical and entity-based level, can
further expand capabilities development in the critical areas necessary to
win in this multi-domain environment (surface, sub-surface, maritime,
air, cyber, and space).

Build

The Army lacks appropriate live-training areas that properly replicate the scale required to train at both the operational and tactical
levels, platoon and above, in a megacity. The Joint Readiness Center’s
Shughart-Gordon complex is useful for squad and below training, but
lacks the multi-dimensional requirements for training in a megacity. As
part of the physical component of Force 2025 and Beyond Maneuvers, the
Army must build a live training environment to support the operational
force as new concepts and capabilities develop into doctrine, training
and material and other Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
Leadership, & Personnel (DOTMLP) solutions requiring appropriate
“F” - facilities to insure units are prepared. US Forces Command is
developing options but the effort is understandably challenging given
the fiscal environment. It is also understandable that Congress, with
tough budget decisions ahead, will choose to support more current
issues rather than to fund more mid and far-term projects. Thus, the
Army should consider funding through other means, such as publicprivate ventures or federal-state options that can create value not only
for the military, but for the public and private service sector as well.
Overall, this kind of investment has the potential to pay great dividends
and will move the Army forward more quickly in this endeavor.

Collaborate

The Army is connected with many academic institutions and government organizations thinking hard about the challenges of dense
urban spaces. The Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), Chief
of Staff of the Army (CSA) Strategic Studies Group (SSG), Research,
Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), and the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology (ASAALT) are all working to link concept and capability
development. However, the Army needs to create an even greater collaborative research network to increase overall urban research capacity.
This will allow for quicker identification of the critical needs of the
Army today and in the future. Learning and collaboration can also be
increased more rapidly through relations with our Allies and partners.
22    Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Force 2025 and Beyond,” http://www.arcic.army.mil/
Initiatives/force-2025-beyond.aspx.
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One example of a major opportunity for increased learning in this
space is via collaboration with the Singaporean Army, and its access to
the Urban Redevelopment Center in Singapore. This center includes
advanced urban development ideas and an extensive terrain model of
the entire country, which is an example of the kind of terrain model
extremely useful for the Army’s table-top wargames, needed to develop
and assess new operational approaches to this emerging strategic trend.
Collaborative research networks can assist the Army in moving forward
more quickly with insights to help develop concepts and capabilities
necessary to operate in megacities of the future.

Establish

The Army must establish a Megacities Center for Advanced Research
and Collaboration, composed of strategists, concept and capability
developers, academics, scientists, and international partners, as part of
either the core component of this center, or as part of an advisory panel
uniquely focused on this challenge. While megacities are unique environments, and centers are normally organized around functions, this
challenge is so significant it requires focused effort. This center would
help develop operational theories and approaches, test them, and track
academic progress at all institutions within the Army’s collaborative
network. It would also work closely with operational commanders to
educate them on the possibilities for satisfying their unique, geographically specific urban challenges through the integration of learning across
the Army’s functional Centers of Excellence (Maneuvers, Fires, etc.).
The center will also educate leaders and support their development, and
increase focused learning through wargaming and experimentation. It
could also establish professor and student exchanges with other partners
and interorganizational labs and centers to create more engagement,
thinking and solution development for the unique, challenging operational environment of the megacity.

Sustain

Finally, sustaining collaboration, learning and testing is important
to ensure the Army is constantly assessing current assumptions and
identifying new challenges within the operational environment, and
new opportunities from the science and technology community. There
are many tools to accomplish this task. Arguably, one of the most useful
tools is Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFCs). AWFCs are enduring
first order problems, the solutions to which improve the combat capability of the current and future force. This tool is proving very effective
today in creating unity of effort around solution strategies within the
Army’s Campaign of Learning. AWFCs will ensure sustained collaboration and drive unity of effort in support of concept and capability
development for dealing with the challenges of the megacity.

Conclusion

Although efforts such as Unified Quest and studies by the Institute
of Defense Analyses and other related organizations examined the
challenges of urbanization and megacities over the years, the problems
they identified were far from solved and still require extensive work.
Megacities represent the most likely and most dangerous aspects of the
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current and future operational environments, requiring the Army, as
part of the Joint force, to develop new approaches, concepts, and, capabilities, and ultimately, solutions.
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Abstract: Certain kinds of urban areas may become increasingly
common for armed conflict in the 21st century. However, current
notions that the megacity will emerge as a primary battlespace for
advanced armies is an unproven hypothesis. US strategists need to
avoid rushing to replace population-centric counterinsurgency with
a paradigm of population-centric megacity operations. A preferable
path is to develop a long-term and systematic interdisciplinary urban warfare lens based on careful research and analysis that is both
historically informed and future-oriented.
It has generally proved easier to demonstrate that defense has played an important role in
many aspects of the city than to show that the city has played a role in military science.
~ G. J. Ashworth, War and the City (1991)

O

ne of the major weaknesses of recent American strategy
is its relative neglect of an urban imperative. The study of
urban warfare continues to remain little more than a sub-field
of strategic studies with a literature largely unrelated to the world of
contemporary security policy.1 For these reasons, it is a great pity the
publication of the US Army’s June 2014, Megacities and the United States
Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future is such a disappointing
attempt to invigorate the relationship between strategy and the city.2 The
report’s central premise that megacities – defined as cities with populations over ten million – now represent “the epicenters of human activity
on the planet and, as such, they will generate most of the friction which
compels future military intervention” is a selective interpretation of the
highly complex process of 21st century global urbanization. Moreover,
the suggestion that the scale of megacities “defies the military’s ability to
apply historical methods” and therefore is “fundamentally a new operating environment to which the Army must shape itself and discover
new approaches” is exaggerated. Such a view overlooks the continuing
value of a body of post-Cold War military research, some of which was,
ironically, commissioned by the US Army itself. A final flaw in Megacities
and the United States Army is its typology, which by focusing mainly on
a systems-analysis methodology illuminates the document’s neglect of
1      For discussion, see Michael Evans, “Lethal Genes: The Urban Military Imperative and
Western Strategy in the Early Twenty-First Century,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 4 (August
2009): 515-552, and Michael Evans, City Without Joy: Urban Military Operations into the 21st Century,
Occasional Paper No. 2 (Canberra: Australian Defence College, 2007).
2      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities Concept Team, Megacities and
the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future (Arlington, VA: Office of the Chief
of Staff of the Army, June 2014).
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relevant research material on cities emanating from the long-established
field of urban studies.3
In light of the above weaknesses, this article argues the US Army
would be ill-served to concentrate overly on megacities as a primary
strategic environment for three further reasons. First, megacities are not
necessarily the principal urban areas in which American forces may be
called upon to fight in the future. Rather, middleweight and smaller cities
remain just as likely to provide important operational environments in
the years ahead. Second, megacities are not sui generis; they do not represent a novel military phenomenon. The military processes of operating
in any city are drawn from fundamentals of urban warfare tried and
tested by land forces since at least the middle of the twentieth century.
Future technological developments notwithstanding, most fundamentals of urban warfare are likely to remain relevant for general-purpose
forces even in a conglomeration on the scale of a megacity. Third, the US
Army needs to embed the study of megacities into a rigorous program
of long-term urban war research that is both interdisciplinary in theory
and interagency in practice. Such a program must systematically integrate military concerns with relevant aspects of municipal management,
urban geography, and city planning.

Cities as Strategic Sites: The Growing Importance of the
Middleweight City

In terms of demographic disposition, the greatest revolutionary
shift of the first quarter of the twenty-first century is the movement
of people from countryside to city. In 2007, half the world passed the
benchmark of fifty percent of its population being located in urban areas
while urban demography now grows at some 65 million every year – a
breakneck rate of speed equivalent to the creation of seven new Chicagos
annually.4 Not surprisingly, the urban revolution has spawned a debate
on the meaning of this transition for the world’s future economic structure and geopolitical stability.5 For some analysts, mass urbanization
is a prescription for growing anarchy, violent political breakdown, and
ecological decline in the developing world. Pessimists foresee a coming
era of “feral cities” in which conflict will be “crowded, connected and
coastal” and occur in failed megalopolises from Karachi and Dhaka in
Asia, to Kinshasa and Lagos in Africa.6

3      Ibid., 4-5, 8-9.
4      Shlomo Angel, Planet of Cities (Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2012) and
McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of Cities, March 2011, www.
mckinsey/insights/urbaniztion/urban_world, and McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Cities
and the Rise of the Consuming Class, June 2012, www.iberglobal.com/Archivos/MGI-Urban-world.
5      See special report: “Metropolis Now,” with notable articles by Parag Khanna, “Beyond City
Limits: The Age of Nations Is Over: The New Urban Era Has Begun,” Foreign Policy, no. 181
(September/October 2010): 122-28; Joel Kotkin, “Urban Legends: Why Suburbs Not Cities are the
Answer,” Foreign Policy, no. 181 (September/October 2010): 128-131; and Joel Kotkin, et. al., The
Problem with Megacities (Orange, CA: Chapman University Press, 2014), www.chapman.edu/wilkinson/_files/MegaCities; Roy Woodbridge, The Next World War: Tribes, Cities, Nations and Ecological
Decline (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 78.
6      Richard J. Norton, “Feral Cities,” Naval War College Review 56, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 97-106;
Roy Woodbridge, The Next World War: Tribes, Cities, Nations and Ecological Decline (Toronto: University
Press of Toronto, 2004), 78-80; David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban
Guerrilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), chapter five.
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While such a dystopian future is certainly a possibility for some nonWestern cities, much urban studies research tends to view the transition
from a rural to an urban world as one of the twenty-first century’s most
positive developments since it will drive economic growth and social
mobility. Urbanization is seen by many scholars as a solution to alleviating long-term poverty and political instability in regions from Asia
through Latin America to some parts of the Middle East and Africa.7 It
is important to note that over 40 percent of urbanization is occurring
in Asia, particularly in China and India. As Richard Dobbs has noted,
“the new era of cities will actually be the era of Asian cities.”8 By 2025,
1.6 billion Asians – 50 percent of the global total will live in cities; nine
of the world’s wealthiest twenty-five cities will be in Asia with Shanghai
and Beijing expected to outrank Los Angeles and Paris, while Delhi and
Bangkok will come to surpass Detroit and Barcelona. By the late 2020s,
some $30 trillion, or 65 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP),
will be generated by some six hundred cities, over a third of which will
be in the developing world.9
A crucial point for US military strategists to grasp is most projected
urban growth in the developing world is not centered on a few megacity
“population bombs,” but on a far more dispersed grouping of diverse
middleweight cities whose populations range from between 150,000 to
ten million.10 In 2011, the McKinsey Global Institute, a leading authority on global urbanization, observed:
Contrary to common perception, megacities have not been driving global
growth for the past 15 years. In fact, many have not grown faster than
their host economies and we expect this trend to continue. We estimate that
today’s 23 megacities will contribute just over 10 per cent of global growth
to 2025, below their 14 percent share of global GDP today . . . Instead we
see the 577 fast-growing middleweights in the City 600 contributing half of
global growth to 2025, gaining share from today’s megacities.11

In 2012, McKinsey further identified an “Emerging 440” cities
grouping projected to generate 47 percent of global growth, or $17.7 trillion to 2025 and beyond. Significantly, of this number, only twenty are
categorized as megacities with the remainder being middleweight urban
centers. Of these middleweights, over 200 are in China; fifty more are
located in Latin America; while 39 are found in Africa and the Middle
East. In many of these middleweight cities, growth is driven less by
population density than by per capita GDP; the size of households actually tends to decline in many developing cities even while the number of
households actually rises.12
7      See for example, Saskia J. Sassen, ed, Cities in a World Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge
Press, 4th Ed., 2011); Joel Kotkin, Cities: A Global History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005),
part six; Neil Brenner and Roger Keil, eds., The Global Cities Reader (New York: Routledge, 2006).
8      Richard Dobbs, quoted in Susan Glasser, “Letter From the Editor,” Foreign Policy, no. 181
(September/October 2010): 1, emphasis in original.
9      McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of Cities, 17-20; 27-28; 30;
and McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class, 1.
10      P. H. Liotta and James F. Miskel, The Real Population Bomb: Megacities, Global Security and the Map
of the Future (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012), 9.
11      McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of Cities, 4.
12      McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class, 5-6; 19, and
Mathew Burrows, The Future Declassified: Megatrends that Will Undo the World Unless We Take Action,
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 89-90.
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Contrary to the US Army’s 2014 report, over the next ten to fifteen
years, it is by no means inevitable that “megacities will be the strategic
key terrain in any future crisis that requires US military intervention.”13
Instead, the real magnets for urbanization are a “new breed of vigorous middleweights.” For example, over the next decade, the thriving
textile city of Surat in India and the Nigerian oil refining center of Port
Harcourt are likely to become more important than megacities such as
Mumbai or Lagos.14 None of this means new megacities will not develop
from fast-growing middleweights – such as Chennai in India, Lahore in
Pakistan, Tianjin and Shenzhen in China, or simply emerge from scratch
in a “blank slate” high-technology or “smart city” approach.15
However, the point for military strategists to grasp is that, in terms
of long-term demographic migration, household size and income distribution, it is the maze of middleweight cities that are poised to be
the key urban sites for the next two decades. An alternative structure
of urbanization is rapidly emerging, and as the leading social scientist,
Saskia J. Sassen, has pointed out, what really matters when analyzing
cities is less their demographic size than their politico-economic influence both regionally and globally.16 In terms of such influence many
middleweight cities are likely to become as strategically important as
megacities and may even eclipse the latter in terms of economic power
and geopolitical significance. By 2025, middleweight-city share of global
GDP is expected to jump from 15 to 45 percent and their populations
will grow from 430 million to 1.5 billion.17 Referring to West Africa,
the McKinsey Global Institute notes, “we expect large middleweights
and some small middleweights to outperform the region’s largest city
of Lagos.”18
While some writers, such as P. H. Liotta and James F. Miskel, view
megacities as unprecedented phenomena, “overwhelmed, dangerous,
ungovernable . . . unlike anything the earth has ever seen,” other analysts are more skeptical.19 As the urban specialist, Joel Kotkin, argues,
“the rise of the megacity is by no means inevitable and it might not
even be happening.” He points to the evolution of more dispersed urban
migration in the developing world based on diversity rather than concentration.20 It is certainly true that recent patterns of city development
are distinguished less by centralization than by decentralized clusters
and networks such as those around the metropolis of Shanghai in the
Yangtse River Delta in China.21 Sprawling megacities such as Mumbai,
Lagos and Dhaka may well be shambolic, poverty stricken, and crimeridden, but these features do not necessarily make them centers for
future military crises. As Jonathan Kalan points out, given the variations
13      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army, 5.
14      McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class, 48.
15      Burrows, The Future Declassified, 89-90.
16      Saskia J. Sassen, “The Urban Complex in a World Economy,” International Social Science Journal
46, no. 1 (February 1994): 43-62; Kotkin, The Problem with Megacities, 17.
17      McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of Cities, 14-17; 28-31.
18      Ibid., 31.
19      Liotta and Miskel, The Real Population Bomb: Megacities, Global Security and the Map of the Future, 7.
20      Kotkin, “Urban Legends: Why Suburbs Not Cities are the Answer”,131, and Kotkin, et al,
The Problem with Megacities, 16-17.
21      McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of Cities, 10-11; and
McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class, 20-21.
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at play in global urbanization, we need to beware simplistic representations of megacities as “the looming development crisis of this century.”22
On closer examination, megacities such as Mumbai, which appear to
Westerners to be fragile tinderboxes, may prove to be far more complex,
resilient, and functional when judged in terms of their indigenous dynamics. For example, despite its poverty and slum living, Mumbai, scene
of a devastating seaborne-terrorist attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in
2008, has sought to focus on increasing social mobility by developing
decentralized municipalities and promoting surburbanism. Moreover,
Mumbai contributes six percent to India’s GDP despite having only 1.5
percent of the national population.23 Similarly, Dhaka in Bangladesh,
reputedly “the least livable city on the planet,” has a per capita GDP
three times that of the average Bangladeshi peasant and is, in national
terms, relatively prosperous.24 Finally, we should remember a city in
crisis in one era is not necessarily doomed to a dystopian future. A good
example is Medellin in Colombia which, in the 1980s and 1990s approximated a failed city dominated by drug lords, vast criminal networks
and socio-political alienation. In the second decade of the twenty-first
century, Medellin has transformed itself by reforming a civic leadership
that overhauled policing and developed an innovative urban infrastructure program which increased the size of its middle class and reduced its
murder rate by sixty percent.25
For the US Army, some cities may well become future operating
environments. However, the idea that megacities will become a primary
strategic environment for American land power is, to date, an unproven
hypothesis. It may be an uncomfortable truth for the authors of Megacities
and the United States Army, but in the years ahead megalopolises may be
of far less strategic significance than clusters of decentralized, middleweight metropolises. The available evidence certainly points to the need
for military researchers to avoid falling prey to any single form of urban
determinism.

Extending the Fundamentals of Urban Warfare

Contrary to the view expressed in Megacities and the United States Army,
megalopolises do not “def[y] the military’s ability to apply historical
methods” nor are they “fundamentally a new operating environment”
that invalidates past research.26 Even a cursory examination of the history
of industrialized urban warfare yields a set of enduring characteristics
that must be studied by today’s military professionals irrespective of the
size of any urban conurbation.27 These enduring characteristics include
a dynamic, non-linear environment defying easy military command and
22      Jonathan Kalan, “Think Again: Megacities,” Foreign Policy, no. 206 (May/June 2014): 70.
23      Ibid.; and Kotkin, “Urban Legends: Why Suburbs Not Cities are the Answer,” 128-131.
24      Kalan, “Think Again: Megacities,” 73-74.
25      Ibid.
26      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army, 8.
27      John Antal and Bradley Gericke, eds., City Fights: Selected Histories of Urban Combat from World
War II to Vietnam (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003); William G. Robertson and Lawrence A.
Yates, eds., Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KA: US Command
and General Staff College, 2003); Michael C. Desch, ed., Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations in Urban
Terrain (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000); Michael Dewar, War
in the Streets: The Story of Urban Combat from Calais to Khafji (Devon: David & Charles, 1992); and G. J.
Ashworth, War and the City (London: Routledge, 1991).
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control; the frequent fragmentation of combat due to the density and
scale of modern city architecture; the importance of direct-fire weapons
in clearing streets and buildings; the problem of large civilian populations in cities; the rapid absorption of troops in built-up urban areas; the
psychological-physical strain on soldiers engaged in urban fighting; and
the need for a combined arms approach to operations.28
None of these features is likely to be rendered obsolete in future
years. After all, if one accepts that a megacity is itself an extension of a
smaller or middleweight city, then, it stands to reason that urban military
operations are highly unlikely to be conjured from scratch but are themselves extensions and applications of known methods. Despite steady
technological advances in precision munitions, robotics, and thermobaric weapons, little that is revolutionary appears to be occurring in
urban warfare operational research.29 Potential operations in megacities
remain likely to differ only in scale and density from those of the past.
Megalopolises will, like all city types, continue to confront military
professionals with the time-honored challenge of “an endless variety of
structures and facilities the seizure or control of which demands esoteric
plans, programs, and procedures, since no two cities are quite alike.”30
For these reasons, most military planners of modern urban operations
have wisely focused on the role performed by troops rather than the
environment inhabited by them. It is no accident the armies that have
succeeded in modern urban warfare – from the Russians in Stalingrad
and Berlin through US forces in Manila, Hue and Fallujah to the Israelis
in Gaza – have been general purpose forces with a high degree of experience in small unit tactics and combined arms operations.31
If the past of urban warfare remains important to understand, then
the interdisciplinary research completed in the years between 1991 and
2004 represents yet another important foundation for future study. It is
worth noting that military analysts such as Paul van Riper, Roger Spiller,
Robert H. Scales, Alice Hills, and Robert C. Owen published findings
on the role of the city in future warfare.32 Much of this work occurred in
the early years of globalization and the information revolution, but it is
notable for its intellectual rigor and insight and it deserves to be consulted
closely in any project concerning the role of megacities in future conflict.
28      Evans, City Without Joy: Urban Military Operations into the 21st Century, 6-12.
29      Ian Kemp, “Urban Warfare: Complete Guide,” Supplement in Armada International 32, no.
4 (August-September 2008): 1-24; and Paolo Valpolini, “Urban Warfare: High Tech Take-Over,”
Compendium Urban Warfare Supplement, Armada International 34, no. 4 (June/July 2010): 1-24.
30      John Collins, Military Geography for Professionals and the Public (Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, 1998), 195.
31      Daryl Press, “Urban Warfare: Options, Problems, and the Future,” Marine Corps Gazette
83, no. 4 (April 1999): 14; and Evans, “Lethal Genes: The Urban Military Imperative and Western
Strategy in the Early Twenty-First Century,” 534-535.
32      Paul van Riper, “A Concept for Future Military Operations on Urban Terrain,” Marine Corps
Gazette 81, no. 10 (October 1997), Special Insert, A-1-A-6; Roger J. Spiller, Sharp Corners: Urban
Operations at Century’s End (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Command and
General Staff College 1999); Robert H. Scales, Jr., Future Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army
War College, 1999); Robert H. Scales, Jr., Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Urban Warfare: A
Soldier’s View,” Military Review 85, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 9-18.; Alice Hills, “Hearts and
Minds or Search and Destroy? Controlling Civilians in Urban Operations,” Small Wars and Insurgencies
13, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 1-24; Alice Hills, “Continuity and Discontinuity: The Grammar of Urban
Military Operations,” in War and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics, Stephen Graham ed. (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 231-246; and Alice Hills, Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma
(London: Frank Cass, 2004).

Megacities: Pros and Cons

Evans

39

Accordingly, some of the main ideas of the urban warfare scholars of the
1990s and early 2000s are worth re-emphasizing here.
The British scholar, Alice Hills, whose 2004 book, Future War in
Cities was a milestone in interdisciplinary urban warfare research, has
highlighted the reality that military operations in cities remain highly
diverse and heterogeneous. She argues that strategists have failed to
provide an interdisciplinary, higher-level conceptual framework for
policy makers and military practitioners:
Developing a [Western] strategic understanding of urban operations . . .
requires the reconciliation of contradictory and stressful relations, such as
those existing between the security imperatives of coercion, warfighting
and destruction on the one hand, and humanitarian relief, globalisation and
technological development on the other. And it needs the imagination to
look beyond current scenarios and interests.33

For Hills, while a “strategic grammar of urban warfare” has emerged,
a strategic logic determined by politics to guide future military operations
in cities remains elusive.34 Other analysts in the years between the fall of
the Soviet Union and the post-9/11 wars became concerned that populist notions of urban warfare would distort realistic research. Robert C.
Owen warned Western military establishments against falling prey to a
fascination with Blade Runner-style visions of “barbarian megalopolises,”
which he believed owed more to Hollywood visions of dystopia than
to hard-headed strategic analysis.35 Writing in 2001, Owen argued the
real problem facing advanced militaries confronted by urban operations
was the paradox that “the [non-state] groups most willing to fight in
cities will have the least capabilities to do so, while the ones most able
to fight large-scale urban battles will be least willing to do so.”36 Owen
drew an interesting parallel between urban operations and maritime littoral warfare which has continuing resonance. He suggested a strategic
approach to fighting in large cities might be fashioned from viewing
these conurbations as “urban archipelagos” requiring skilled maneuver,
containment, or isolation by joint forces.37
Themes of containment and maneuver were also evident in the work
of Robert H. Scales and Paul van Riper and are still useful to consider
today. As former senior military practitioners, both writers sought to
synthesize operational and strategic concerns in urban operations. Scales
advocated a highly discriminate strategy of urban warfare embracing
containment of cities and the exploitation of high-technology assets for
selective strikes and the seizure of decisive points and nodes using joint
forces.38 He suggested high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles and precision munitions used against point targets might deplete a surrounded
city’s resources and wear down an enemy force’s will.39 Scales recom33      Hills, “Continuity and Discontinuity: The Grammar of Urban Military Operations,” 246.
34      Ibid., 244-246 and Hills, Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma, 26, 225.
35      Robert C. Owen, “Urban Warfare in the Future: Balancing Our Approach,” British Army
Review 128 (Winter 2001-2002): 25-32.
36      Ibid., 29-30
37      Ibid.
38      Robert H. Scales, “The Indirect Approach: How US Military Forces Can Avoid the Pitfalls
of Future Urban Warfare,”; and Scales, Future Warfare, 177-178.
39      Scales, Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military, 118-120; and Scales,
“Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View,” 9-18.
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mended an economy of force approach remarking that, in future urban
military operations, strategic planners needed to be constantly aware of
one central truth: “America’s treasure house of close-combat soldiers is
only marginally larger than the New York City Police Department.”40
Given contemporary challenges of downsizing and fiscal austerity this
warning is arguably more relevant than ever. Similarly, van Riper, an
experienced Marine general, was wary of grinding frontal assaults in
urban warfare. He argued in favor of applying a “chameleon” style
of urban maneuver in city fighting (blended movement into the city
environment) using concepts such as “multi-spectral mobility” (the
capability to move combat power rapidly through three-dimensional
urban terrain); and “measured firepower” (integrating fire and movement within given rules of engagement).41
By the mid-2000s, as America and its allies became engulfed by
irregular conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, generic urban warfare
research declined in the United States. Much of the urban conflict
research agenda after 2004 was subsumed by the avalanche of material on
counterinsurgency, the stabilization of fragile states, and hybrid warfare
at the operational level of war.42 As a result, in 2015, the major problem
facing military thinkers when considering urban military contingencies,
namely synthesizing the variance and divergence of urban environments
into a usable strategic framework for policy makers, continues to remain
unresolved.

An Inter-Disciplinary Urban Lens

While an urban strategic lens remains underdeveloped in American
studies of armed conflict, the solution to this challenge is not to turn the
megacity into a single “unit of analysis,” but rather to study the etiology
of city development.43 Such an endeavor requires a multi-disciplinary
research program in which to situate analysis of varied cityscapes with
their interactive spatial dynamics and heterogeneous populations.
In short, the real novelty in operating in twenty-first century cities
lies less in new military methodologies for megacities than in the essential task of integrating and adapting established doctrine and concepts
into a systematic interdisciplinary strategic-level engagement with the
field of urban studies. As one major international study notes, “no single
disciplinary perspective can capture the inherent complexities of using
military force in urban areas.”44 The effort to develop an urban strategic
lens needs to embrace military history, human geography and sociology;
city planning and architectural design; municipal management procedures; criminology, policing and the employment of emergency services.
Systems-theory as outlined by analysts such as David Kilcullen and
favored in Megacities and the United States Army may have its uses. However,
such an approach represents only one avenue of inquiry for researchers
seeking to understand the military implications of the modern urban
40      Scales, “Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View,” 10.
41      Van Riper, “A Concept for Future Military Operations on Urban Terrain,” A-1-A-6.
42      See essays in Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency
and Counterinsurgency (New York: Routledge, 2012).
43      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army, 9.
44      Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Small Arms Survey: Guns and the City
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 188.
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environment’s mixture of demographic and topographical features. 45 It
is this unique combination which makes any city environment multidimensional – at once a social organism, a human-made physical form and
an economic system.46
The integration of urban studies into strategy needs to be conducted
with intellectual care and discrimination. Analysts need to distinguish
between high-intensity crime by urban gangs and syndicates concerned
with profit and forms of low-intensity warfare by armed urban activists driven by politics; and between mass-casualty urban terrorist acts
on the Mumbai, Nairobi, and Paris models and well-organized and
prolonged campaigns of urban warfare on the Hamas or Hizbollah
models. Military strategists also need to treat current postmodernist
ideas of a “new military urbanism” based on an ideology of Western
“orientalism” that pits “their sons against our silicon” with skepticism.47
Such work owes more to the science fiction of Judge Dredd – in which
megacities replace nations as the world’s dominant political units, and
high-technology Street Judges battle low-technology urban hordes for
supremacy – than it does to mainstream military art.48
Integrating aspects of urban studies into strategic considerations has
the potential to improve our knowledge in at least three areas relevant to
future warfare: examining cities as strategic sites, understanding global
and regional city variations, and deriving procedures for city operations
from municipal principles of security control. In examining cities as
strategic sites, military practitioners and policy makers need to begin to
view metropolises as human conurbations reflecting all the complexities
of large-scale urban planning. In effect, to master cities, the military
strategist must assume much of the mindset of an urban planning
executive. In city operations, control of civil infrastructure from water
purification and electricity through garbage removal to securing medical
infrastructure and public transport are all invested with strategic significance.49 If city operations are to be a common future environment
for American and allied forces, then an urban strategic lens must be
developed, which can help determine policy choices on the practicality
and size of interventions in cities, formulate rules of engagement, and
provide advice on the roles military forces might play in those urban
contingencies.
The second area of relevant research, namely, assessing the global
and regional variation between cities, has the potential to put megacities into a balanced strategic context. As already noted earlier, a diverse
web of middleweight cities is likely to develop in regions such as Asia,
Latin America, and Africa as a counterpoint to sprawling, ill-governed
megalopolises. Such a process represents a complex pattern of urbanization and requires the closest strategic analysis by defense specialists. In
45      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army,
10-11; David Kilcullen, “The City as a System: Future Conflict and Urban Resilience,” The Fletcher
Forum of World Affairs 36, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 19-39.
46      Max Neiman, “Urban Operations: Social Meaning, the Urban Built Form and Economic
Function,” in Desch, Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain, 139-147.
47      Stephen Graham, Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism (London: Verso, 2010), passim..
48      Mike Butcher, The A-Z of Judge Dredd: The Complete Encyclopedia from Aaron Aardvark to Zachary
Zziiz (London: St Martin’s Press, 1995).
49      Evans, City Without Joy: Urban Military Operations into the 21st Century, 28-30. Graduate Institute
of International Studies, Geneva, Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City, 196-197.
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this area, military researchers can draw profitably on the work of a range
of urban theorists. The latter include Robert Neuwirth and Thomas
Sieverts whose work on “shadow cities” and the Zwischenstadt or “cities
without cities” respectively highlights the replacement of many centralised urban conglomerations by clustered “city webs” in a checkerboard
of dense enclaves and social networks.50 If the city is to be understood
accurately as a future strategic environment, then the US Army must
invest in research that distinguishes between the global city of influence,
the megacity of sprawl, and the emerging middleweight city and between
peri-urban, semi-urban, and inner-urban forms of human habitation.
A third area requiring military attention is a study of municipal principles of security control. Evidence suggests in decentralized conditions
or in urban areas lacking governance, military efforts to control violence
are best concentrated on creating municipal or community-level forms
of security.51 For command and control purposes, military professionals
can gain insights into cities by studying a law-enforcement typology of
coercion, compliance, and voluntarism at local community level. Such
a typology reveals control methods ranging from coercive “gated communities” and forcible disarmament; through compliance measures that
involve community policing; to voluntarism involving amnesties and
citizen neighborhood watch schemes.52

Conclusion

The modern city remains the least understood of potential conflict
environments, and strategic theory clearly lags behind military practice.
However, classifying one form of urbanization in the form of megacities
as primary strategic sites for future American military intervention is not
viable. Indeed, such an approach may turn out to be misleading because
global urbanization is highly diverse and is, in fact, producing far more
middleweight cities than megalopolises. In the developing world, some
of these vibrant middleweight cities with their migration clusters and
economic hubs may come to assume more strategic importance than
stagnant megacities with declining populations. Moreover, having just
experienced over a decade of war, the US Army is now entering a period
of downsizing and reorganization driven by the demands of domestic
fiscal austerity. The American profession of arms therefore needs to be
wary of replacing the controversial experiment of population-centric
counterinsurgency with the equally untested hypothesis of populationcentric megacity warfare.
The quickest way to degrade American combat power will be to
deploy large numbers of troops into a megacity without a thorough
examination of how the complex dynamics of global urbanization are
likely to unfold.
When it comes to cities, large and small, security analysts need to
understand there will always be a natural set of tensions between the
general purpose role of modern landpower and the unique features of

50      Robert Neuwirth, Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, A New Urban World (London: Routledge,
2005), passim; and Thomas Sieverts, Cities Without Cities: An Interpretation of the Zwischenstadt (London:
Spot Press, 2003), passim.
51      Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the
City, 178-188.
52      Ibid.
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urban environments stemming from the combination of demography
and topography.
There are many diverse kinds of urban contingencies to consider
in a wide-range of urban localities: from all-out combat operations
through humanitarian relief and the creation of protected enclaves and
evacuation corridors to littoral operations. Given such diversity, military
professionals need to be careful they do not pursue any single avenue
of research that might prove to be a policy cul-de-sac. A close study of
the phenomenon of urbanization as a future conflict environment is
justified, but a convincing case for the megacity as a primary strategic
environment for US forces has yet to be made.
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Abstract: The urban environment is a known vulnerability for US
forces, and it grows more acute as megacities increase around the
world. This article describes past research and joint experimentation
efforts concerning urban environments and identifies critical gaps
for further research and experimentation. A more committed Joint
Force constituency, led by the US Army, can lead to better readiness in this area.

T

he US Army is currently examining the topic of megacities and
how to train, organize, and equip itself for successful operations
in them. As a recent report from the Army Chief of Staff ’s
Strategic Studies Group stressed, “it is inevitable that at some point the
United States Army will be asked to operate in a megacity and currently
the Army is ill-prepared to do so.”1 As other authors have noted, Army
researchers have determined megacities, urban concentrations exceeding
10 million people, will be the most complex environments for future land
operations. Global growth trends also suggest the importance of such
complex environments is increasing, “…since the places where people
live are getting increasingly crowded, urban, coastal and networked, the
wars people fight will take on the same characteristics.”2
Given such trends, the Army is justified in asking whether current
urban operating concepts and capabilities will suffice to accomplish
future national security objectives. Numerous studies related to urban
operations exist, all with different focus areas and outcomes, some of
which are inconsistent or incomplete. In fact, as this article maintains,
the current Department of Defense (DoD) urban strategy is on an
uncertain trajectory and is in need of new leadership.
Until its closure in 2011, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) supported
other geographic combatant commands advocating for, and developing,
future concepts for joint warfighting. However, the closure of JFCOM
and its inability to obtain approval of a Joint Capabilities Document
stalled urban concept development. Perhaps JFCOM was never the best
choice for this endeavor but merely a pragmatic one, given the Army’s
preoccupation with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless,
DoD needs another organization to refresh its dated urban strategy and
capitalize on JFCOM’s prior work.
1      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army:
Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future (Arlington, VA: Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic
Studies Group, Megacities Concept Team, June 2014), 3.
2      David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla (New York: Oxford
Press, 2013), 27-28.
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What organization is best suited for addressing this projected challenge? Establishing yet another ad hoc joint task force is neither optimal
or desirable. Giving responsibility to the Joint Staff seems misplaced
because it is not charged with organizing, training, and equipping the
force. Creating a joint program office is an option, but only desirable
if one of the military services is willing to lead as the Joint Executive
Agent. The Title X statute prescribes that the three services organize,
train, and equip their respective forces. It is unlikely the Air Force or
Navy would give priority to this effort. The Marine Corps contributes
greatly to urban concept development; however, the Marine Corps as an
amphibious force does not view urban operations as a core competency.
Among the services, the Army provides the largest share of the capability and capacity for operating in urban environments. As the nation’s
predominant land force, the task of reviving DoD’s dormant urban
strategy logically falls to the Army.

Originating Directives

The 2014 Army Operating Concept (AOC) builds a narrative of
future warfare describing urban operating environments as likely to
have “significant impact on land force operations.”3 Clearly, land forces
must prepare for all future operating environments and cannot organize, train, and equip exclusively for urban battle-spaces. Forces should
be tailored to provide the maximum flexibility to deal with a wide range
of operating environments, conflicts, and contingencies. The Army
must transform current forces with new capabilities for urban operating
environments. In short, the central problem for the Army is: how to
balance envisioned requirements for urban operations with other future
demands.
In 2000, a Government Accounting Office report stated: “despite
a growing unease that the urban environment is a known vulnerability
of US forces, DoD has not made a major commitment to dramatically
improve urban capabilities.” It thus recommended, “the Secretary of
Defense designate a focal point for developing strategy for improving
US urban operations capability; identifying doctrine, training, and
equipment shortcomings; proposing and prioritizing investments; and
coordinating service and Joint efforts in this regard.”4
In the wake of this recommendation and directives issued in the
2001 Defense Planning Guidance, US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
commissioned the Institute for Defense Analyses to develop a roadmap.
This roadmap provides “directions to pursue in order to improve significantly the capabilities of future Joint Force Commanders to conduct
military operations involving urban terrain.”5 The 370-page document
took eight people, eighteen months to draft.6 The Joint Urban Operations
3      US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex
World 2020-2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: US Army Training and Doctrine
Command, 2014), 12.
4      US General Accounting Office, Military Capabilities: Focused Attention Needed to Prepare US
Forces for Combat in Urban Areas, NSIAD-00-63NI (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office,
February 25, 2000)
5      US Joint Forces Command, Joint Urban Operations (JUO) Master Plan 2012-2017 (Washington,
DC: US Joint Forces Command, February 2006)
6      Dr. Bill Hurley (Institute for Defense Analysis), interview with author, January 8, 2015.
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(JUO) Master Plan 2012-2017 followed.7 The Master Plan is a DoD-wide
strategy from the Secretary of Defense to all DoD components. JFCOM
became the DoD Executive Agent forming a Joint Program Office to
lead DoD concept development and experimentation. Executive agency
gave JFCOM technology-transfer authority allowing it to structure
partnerships with industry, exchange technical data, make technology
assessments, and collaborate on research and development efforts. Any
organization charged with similar responsibility would benefit greatly
from this type of arrangement.

JFCOM’s Urban Roadmap

JFCOM held a human-in-the-loop, concept-based experiment
to explore new concepts in urban operations.8 This joint experiment,
Urban Resolve, ran from 2004 to 2006. The Army Dismounted Battle
Lab examined key elements of the Army Concept and Capability
Development Plan using Urban Resolve as its capstone event for US Army
Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) 2006 Experimentation
Program. The exercise asked two questions:
1. How can we fight in urban terrain against an intelligent, determined,
well-equipped adversary and win quickly without unacceptable casualties
to ourselves or our allies, unacceptable civilian casualties, or unacceptable
destruction of infrastructure? and;
2. How can we determine which concepts, materiel, tactics, techniques, and
procedures are most effective for fighting in urban terrain?9

Both questions remain relevant today - the latter particularly for the
Army.
Following the exercise, conceptualizing an intellectual framework
for further analytical and planning activities became a key task. The
central problem became: “How to operate in an urban environment to
defeat adversaries embedded and diffused within populated urban areas
without causing catastrophic damage to the functioning of the society
there.”10 The moral imperative to protect noncombatants anticipates
two additional doctrinal limitations for military forces: (1) minimize
collateral damage to noncombatants; (2) preserve the urban network as
much as possible so the human inhabitants not suffer needlessly.
JFCOM’s experimentation led to a Joint Integrating Concept which
acknowledged: (1) “The distinctive features of cities – artificial terrain,
human density, and supporting infrastructure – tend to negate Joint
force strengths, and, (2) the future urban fight is – perhaps more than
any other context of warfare – conditioned by the “battle of narratives”
among combatants to secure legitimacy and authority in the eyes of
a target population.”11 Subsequently, Joint Publication 3.06, Joint Urban

7      US Joint Forces Command, Joint Urban Operations (JUO) Master Plan 2012-2017.
8      Mike Postma (COL US Army), Urban Resolve 2015, Senior Executive After Action Review
October 27, 2006, presented as part of After Action Review to Phase 2 of Urban Resolve 2015.
9      Ibid.
10     US Department of Defense, Joint Urban Operations: Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1.0 (Suffolk,
VA: US Department of Defense, US Joint Forces Command, 2007), 5.
11     Ibid.

48

Parameters 45(1) Spring 2015

Operations (2013) grew from to the Joint Integrating Concept completed
six years earlier.
Additionally, in 2008, the Joint Readiness Oversight Council
reviewed a Joint Capabilities Document for Battlespace Awareness in
Joint Urban Operations. This document mapped 212 tasks to achieve 12
capabilities; 141 of the tasks had one or more gaps. To identify possible
solutions for closing these gaps, several analytic projects were proposed
each with recommended sponsors. The council did not approve the
document because proposed project sponsors, including the Army, were
unwilling to participate.12
Shortly after the council’s decision, further urban experimentation
stalled due to a shift in priority. The JFCOM Commander established a
Joint Irregular Warfare Program Office, transferring primacy for urban
operations and a portion of the budget to this new office. In 2011,
JFCOM was deactivated, its documentation was archived, and staff reassignments diluted its expertise and intuitional knowledge. Consequently,
JFCOM experimentation has had little influence on Army decisions with
regard to urban operations.

Army Megacity Experimentation

Besides JFCOM’s efforts, the Chief of Staff of the Army sponsored
a series of “think-tank” exercises called, Unified Quest, which explored
operations in megacities as part of its future study program in 2003.
Unified Quest 2003 took a joint operational perspective for planning
offensive operations in a fictional city of 17 million people defended
by conventional, state-sponsored forces and popular forces.13 Notable
insights included:
•• The need for strong information operations;
•• Special Operations Forces and indigenous allies are invaluable;
•• Joint and Army sensors and precision strike weapons optimized for
open warfare in uncluttered terrain are of limited value in cities;
•• Stability and support activities will be inseparable from combat
operations.
Following Unified Quest in 2003, the current version of Army Field
Manual 3-06, Urban Operations, was revised. The new edition, published
in October 2006, appears to need further review and updating.
In 2014, Army research fellows from the Chief of Staff of the Army’s
Strategic Studies Group developed an appreciation for large urban
populations by using case-study vignettes of megacities from around
the world. Their white paper claimed megacities occupy strategic key
terrain “making their stability necessary for global connectedness and
order.”14 The paper continues, “The Army is currently unprepared…the
Army must lead.”15
12     US Department of Defense, Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Urban Operations, Draft
(Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, September 25, 2009), 4.
13     Don Holder (LTG US Army, Ret.), “Operations in a Megacity: Blue Commander’s
Perspective,” presented at Unified Quest After Action Review, 2004.
14     Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army:
Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future, 5.
15     Ibid, 22.
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Again in 2014, Unified Quest reassessed the issue of the US Army’s
ability to conduct operations in megacities. This theme continues into
2015. Most of the observations made in 2014 focus on understanding
the population, getting higher quality situational awareness information before and during operations, as well as a requirement to consider
all aspects and methods of transportation. Concept development
has focused on the operational environments: physical, social, and
informational.16

Other Experimentation and Research

Along with the Army Strategic Studies Group white paper, other
joint and interagency work began in 2014. The Strategic Multi-Layer
Assessment Program, an ad hoc group accepted by the Joint Staff,
provides planning support to commands with complex operational
imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are
not within core service / agency competency. Solutions are being sought
from across the US Government and academia.
In addition, a 2014 investigation explored megacities for Pacific
Command.17 The objective was to prototype a relevant, low-cost and
effective method of producing early indication and tracking of the social,
political, environmental, and economic sources of state and population
fragility and failure in large urban environments. The intention was to
provide a prototype assessment methodology broadly applicable to other
commands and agencies. The Army now sponsors an off-shoot of the
2014 program through the Corps of Engineers.
The Urban Security Project is a methodology to develop geo-temporal
map layers representing socio-cultural analysis indicators necessary for
planning, assessment, and situational awareness. It uses spatio-temporal
representation of populations and offers long-term monitoring of urban
conditions.18 Such analysis benefits ground forces during planning and
execution of urban operations. One valuable resource for obtaining
local information comes from indigenous law enforcement. The nexus
of military ground forces and indigenous law enforcement further supports the Army as the pragmatic choice to implement urban strategy at
the tactical level and test concepts in cities. Recent experience provides
additional supporting evidence for designating the Army as executive
agent.
The Army’s tactical familiarity with local law enforcement in Iraq
provides another tangible and practical example of why the Army is best
suited to lead urban operations. In most military operations, perhaps
other than full-scale combat, land forces gain local knowledge and
benefit from a close relationship with local law enforcement. Some resist
the idea of US ground forces teaming with police forces. Corruption,
16     Andrew Bell, email message to author, December 10, 2014. Preliminary Report of Unified
Quest 2014: Megacities and Army Capability Needs Observed at Unified Quest 2014. Bell served
on the JFCOM Joint Urban Operations Office staff.
17     Charles Ehlschlaeger, ed., Understanding Megacities with the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and
Intelligence Paradigm, Topical Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) and US Army Engineer
Research Development Center (ERDC) Multi-Agency/Multi-Disciplinary White Papers in Support
of National Security Challenges (Champaign, IL: US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research
and Development Center, April 2014).
18      Charles R. Ehlschlaeger (US Army Engineer Research Development Center), interview with
the author, December 3, 2014.
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jurisdictional restrictions, and interference with military operations
are some of the concerns. However, this reluctance must be overcome.
Police forces provide “ground-truth” through their local knowledge
and human intelligence through their informants. Just as a beat cop
gains better situational understanding of neighborhoods, intelligence
preparation of the battlefield must provide a keen sense of ground-truth.
Indeed, indigenous police forces can become force multipliers when the
US commits “boots-on-the-ground.”
Army Strategic Study Group researchers did not reference previous
joint experimentation or joint concepts in their 2014 white paper on
megacities; nor were Army researchers familiar with past joint work.
The main reason for this omission was the demise of JFCOM, resulting
in an incomplete integrative approach and inconsistent staff expertise.
JFCOM’s documents now reside in the National Archives.
Knowledge from the results of past joint experimentation could prevent
unnecessary duplication by Army staff officers now resuscitating urban
concept development. Fortunately, lack of contextual, joint background
is not slowing Army efforts.
The human domain and urban operating environments may redefine
how the Army organizes, equips, and operates its formations and how
it trains and educates its leaders. The Army is considering establishing
an urban studies program, possibly at West Point, to educate leaders on
societal and cultural nuances of the urban-based human domain.19 New
Army leaders will enhance their cultural knowledge and language skills
and refer to joint concepts that emphasize hybrid warfare, peace operations, and counterinsurgency as primary Army missions. The evolving
paradigm is a big departure from the combined arms maneuver mantra
mentioned earlier, “close with and destroy the enemy.”
Rather than a maneuver brigade combat team as the foundational
organizing structure, concepts for conventional force formations in
urban spaces could experiment with using tailored, smaller units possibly company-team size with embedded interagency and indigenous
enablers. The full range of military operations into tactical urban operating environments could employ scalable, capabilities-based formations.
The small unit organizing concept works well for Special Forces and
is faster and easier to deploy to a theater, less cumbersome to maneuver and sustain in an urban environment, and values adaptive, flexible
leaders – all current Army hallmarks. How willing are current senior
Army leaders, raised on combined arms maneuver, to invest in this new
paradigm? The dialogue is intensifying now.

The Army as DoD’s Executive Agent

The 2014 Strategic Study Group white paper convinced Army
leadership that megacities (a term no longer in vogue with many in the
Army–dense urban population centers appears to be the preferred term
now) are a challenge uniquely relevant to land forces. The 2014 Army
Operating Concept envisions urban areas as central to the Army’s future

19      Patrick Mahaney (COL, US Army, Chief of Staff for CSA’s Strategic Studies Group, AY
2014/15), interview with the author, January 15, 2015.
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operational environment.20 However, after 15 years of urban study, it
appears US land forces are still vulnerable in those environments.
Given this premise, seeking DoD executive agency and the requisite
authorities it provides is warranted. By pursuing executive agency Army
leadership signals commitment to joint urban concept development and
permits the Army to provide an integrative, functional leader for the
Joint Force. The Joint Chiefs should promote the restoration of DoD
executive agency for Joint Urban Operations and recommend shifting
JFCOM’s former role to the Army. As Joint Executive Agent the Army
should regain DoD authority, responsibility, and funding curtailed after
JFCOM’s disestablishment. Updating DoD’s Joint Urban Operations
Master Plan will result in better collective joint readiness under Army
leadership.
Developing a narrative for a renewed urban strategy that resonates
with senior DoD executives is a critical next hurdle. Army options for
future structure and risk center on what kind of warfighting they will
encounter. Army leadership should advocate for a Secretary of Defense
approved urban campaign as part of a defense planning scenario to
establish a valid program requirement in a future Army program objective memorandum.
The Army must evaluate urban force capability needs across the full
range of military operations, determine how that capability differs from
traditional conventional force needs for other operating environments,
and make force development investment decisions to organize, train,
and equip the force. However, there is a shortfall in solid analysis supporting assessment of force capability options and definition of Army
requirements. Preparing for urban operations will become vital for
land forces and should be the purview of the Army. Concept development within the Army transitions to Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), and will become the responsibility of Army Capabilities
Integration Center by June 2015.21

Comparing JFCOM’s and the Army’s Approaches

Once the Army succeeds in establishing joint executive agency,
it must resolve discrepancies between Army and joint concepts.
Comparative analysis finds that with few exceptions, current Army
Strategic Studies Group thinking aligns well with joint concepts. One
example of a critical disparity between joint and Army concepts stems
from an Army doctrinal requirement to isolate an urban area and to
approach it incrementally from the periphery of the city.
In contrast, the Strategic Studies Group white paper stated, “For
megacities, both of the assumptions [isolation and operating from the
periphery] are flawed. By virtue of their scale, megacities cannot be
physically or virtually isolated.”22 However, JFCOM’s experimentation
validated the guiding principles—isolation and control. A clear disparity

20      US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex
World 2020-2040, 12.
21      Patrick Mahaney, interview with author.
22      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army:
Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future, 8.
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thus exists between Joint and current Army concepts. This conceptual
difference must be overcome.
This conceptual disconnect may be situational. Service doctrines
must be broad enough to cover the full range of potential operations, yet
flexible enough for commanders to adapt to ground truth. Urban environments come in many forms so there is no single, scalable solution.
Control of the entire city may not be a realistic objective and need
not be an essential task. Stopping adversaries from damaging sociocultural and financial networks and protecting other urban networks
such as key city infrastructure may suffice. Future experiments must
determine if, or how, Joint Forces could virtually or selectively isolate
adversaries when physical isolation of an entire city is not achievable.
In addition, it may be wise not to fixate on population size as a
qualifier for operational analysis. A megacity is but one variation of an
urban system. Though an important metric for scale and determining
force-size, population size does not drive force capability or technology
requirements. Decision-makers should not restrict analysis to megacities
– determining analytic priority should be threat-based. The determining
factors for force capability this research recommends follow:
•• Mission–humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation, counterinsurgency, combat, etc
•• Threat–terrorism, paramilitary, insurgency, state-sponsored conventional force
•• Urban typology–highly, moderately, or loosely integrated, or some
combination thereof
•• Population density and fragility
•• Physical built environment–subterranean, above ground (high-rise),
infrastructure, etc
•• Understanding how to manage the behavior of city inhabitants
Urban concept development needs analytic tools that support
the development and visualization of these complex environments as
part of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process. Industry
and academia can contribute much. Modeling urban systems relies on
field-based research, remote and local sensing, local networks, and big
data analysis. With Combatant Command sponsorship research could
commence now. The Strategic Multi-layer Assessment Program offers
social science research and analysis techniques suited for urban shaping
operations. One promising area is data collection. Techniques employing
indigenous surveyors offer the most accurate information and should be
expanded.

Urban Metrics Needed

As mentioned earlier, strategic landpower leadership promotes a
security strategy focusing on the human domain to prevent war and
shape security environments.23 It follows, then, that a security strategy

23      Raymond Odierno, James Amos, and William McRaven, Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash
of Wills (Washington, DC: US Army, US Marine Corps, and US Special Operations Command, May
2013).
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based on the human domain and conflict prevention requires metrics to
gauge the effectiveness of shaping and engagement activities. Ultimately
metrics must reveal the will of populations. “Make the important measurable,” as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reportedly
urged, “instead of making the measurable important.”24
But, measuring prevention is difficult, if not impossible. How can
one prove or measure whether something was prevented from occurring? Metrics tend to focus on inputs.25 Measures of effectiveness for
shaping and engagement activities are unclear and determined by individual geographic commands.
Given the complexity and interconnectedness of urban environments, assessing the effectiveness of shaping and engagement activities
is impossible without first having an understanding of the desired
end state. This requires formulating likely objectives under a variety
of missions and then empirically determining factors most likely to
be associated with those objectives. In order for land forces operating
in populated urban spaces to achieve strategic effect, they ultimately
must rely on direct connections between real people – friendly, hostile,
and noncombatant. Current Army shaping activities reflect deterrence
through forward stationing and the Regionally Aligned Force initiative.
Neither focuses on cities, but both rely on the presence of land forces
for their deterrence value.
Land forces cannot adequately prepare for what they do not understand, so some priority cities should become units of analysis. Now is
the time to identify candidate cities for developing specific urban-based,
human domain metrics. Each is unique. There is no better place to start
than in Korea.
Seoul, South Korea is a megacity which by Mutual Defense Treaty
the US will protect and defend. It is an excellent first candidate to develop
specific metrics for an urban operating environment. The rationale for
selecting Seoul is multifaceted. The Army presence in Seoul spans over
60 years. The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the US are in the process
of a historic transfer of operational control from US-led military readiness and preparedness to ROK control. The ROK-US Alliance permits
superb cooperation for collaboration and study of urban environments.
The defense of the ROK requires a large commitment of land
forces. The 23 million people living in the Greater Seoul Metropolitan
Area constitute the economic, political, and cultural center of gravity of
a staunch US partner. Actions needed to defend Seoul could span the
full range of military operations. With approximately 200,000 US citizens residing in South Korea, the vast majority in Seoul, noncombatant
evacuation of US citizens and humanitarian assistance for ROK civilians under threat of attack by North Korean sleeper agents and Special
Forces would stress early contingency response.

24      Sarah Bessell, “Behind the Numbers: Assessing Indices of Peace, Conflict and Instability,”
United States Institute of Peace, November 1, 2007, http://www.usip.org/publications/behind
-the-numbers-assessing-indices-of-peace-conflict-and-instability.
25      Janine Davidson (Former OSD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, currently
Senior Defense Fellow for Policy with the Council on Foreign Relations), e-mail to author, January
22, 2015.
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Contingency scenarios involving the North Korean regime link to
Pyongyang, another excellent choice for assessment, although a far more
difficult place to survey. The inhabitants of Pyongyang are loyal regime
disciples, tens of thousands belong to the Pyongyang’s Supreme Guard
Command and Kim Jong-un’s Bodyguard Corps. Clearly there are a
plethora of candidate cities, but Seoul and Pyongyang, a priority for
contingency planning, offer several practical advantages for initiating
city analyses.

A Way Forward

A thorough qualitative understanding of urban operating environments should precede anticipated quantitative analysis. Charting a path
forward requires accelerated attention to several areas. Defining a set of
actionable tasks from the insights and lessons from the past 13 years of
conducting urban operations, counter-irregular warfare, and a decade of
joint urban concept development would be a worthy early deliverable for
Army concept developers. To gain a better sense of how new research
might treat capability gaps with objective analysis the effort needs a new
roadmap. The following actions are thus recommended:

Recommended OSD Actions

•• Restore JFCOM’s Executive Agent responsibility with the Army
•• Support programming requirements by approving an urban campaign
as part of a Defense Planning Scenario
•• Designate cities as units of analysis

Proposed Army Actions

•• Gain Joint Readiness Oversight Council approval for a Joint
Capabilities Document
•• Formulate likely Army objectives under a variety of urban missions
•• Determine priority cities for analysis
In sum, JFCOM’s prior Joint Urban Operations mission is similar
to the Army’s current challenge, the Army should become DoD’s Joint
Executive Agent for urban operations. Ultimately, the Army must
evaluate urban force capability needs across the full range of military
operations, determine how that capability differs from traditional
conventional force needs for other operating environments, and make
force development investment decisions to organize, train, and equip
the force.

Culture and the US Army

Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future
Matthew Morton
Abstract: This article offers a framework to aid uniformed strategic
leaders in reflecting on the last decade of conflict. This framework
takes into account emerging historiography, time-tested military theory, and a holistic understanding of military history to help prepare
officers to offer strategic advice in the future.

A

s the black flags of the Islamic State appear in more and more
places in Iraq, a new generation of officers will likely reflect on
what has and has not been accomplished, and what is and is not
possible through the force of arms. Conclusions about the recent era of
conflict will affect US officers as they ascend to higher ranks and provide
the best military advice they can to the nation’s civilian leadership. These
future senior leaders should not allow emotion to affect their introspection.1 Future senior leaders must place their past service in a context that
takes into account emerging historiography, time-tested military theory,
and a holistic understanding of military history, as this foundation will
allow them to provide better strategic advice.
This article explores emerging historiography before revisiting just
a few of the military theorists who continue to transcend time. It will
then offer a brief overview of American military history by examining
the popular outliers in the conscience of military professionals before
turning to what the US military has done more often. Penultimately, it
offers recommendations for how senior military leaders should approach
historiography as they consider the future, and how a grounding in
theory benefits them in the politically dominated realm of strategy. Last,
this article suggests how to use historical context when providing advice
and “speaking truth to power,” even when the message is not popular.
As it has in the past, the US military will have to execute campaigns that
lack strategic clarity or coherent policy objectives. Some campaigns will
be, in the words of Andrew Bacevich, “fool’s errands.”2 However, armed
with an inclusive view of the past, not just the highlight reel, future
strategic leaders may be better able to fulfill their roles.

Historiography

Historiography matters because it shapes approaches used at professional military education (PME) institutions. Iconography and personal
views present intellectual minefields students and faculty must navigate
with civility even when dealing with interpretations of the increasingly
1      The author uses the terms senior leader, general, and strategist interchangeably throughout.
2      Andrew Bacevich has used this term in many of his pieces, most recently in Andrew Bacevich,
“Even If We Defeat the Islamic State, We’ll Still Lose the Bigger War,” Washington Post, October 3,
2014.

Colonel Morton is a
general staff officer
and author of Men on
Iron Ponies: The Death
and Rebirth of the Modern
US Cavalry.

56

Parameters 45(1) Spring 2015

distant American Civil War. At one time, a walk through the halls of the
US Army War College could have caused one to wonder who won the
war, or how the profession has chosen to remember its past. Military
professionals might have to work harder to distill the lessons of emerging narratives seeking to explain the less than decisive outcomes in Iraq
and Afghanistan, events in which many of them participated.3 Easily
digested Manichean explanations for enormously complicated issues
deserve attention only in helping to define the extreme boundaries of
the entire field.4 How the profession remembers the last decade of conflict will likely influence the way it approaches the use of force in the
future.5 Remembering the past can be painful and complicated, as the
Civil War illustrates, thus reminding the profession of the care it should
take in capturing and interpreting various perspectives of recent events.

Anti-COIN

Gian Gentile and Douglas Porch each used historical analysis of a
variety of campaigns to reach the same conclusion: counter-insurgency
(COIN) doctrine rarely works, especially in the context of carrying out
tasks related to nation-building for a third party. To their credit, both
authors offered these perspectives before the recent emergence of ISIL.
Although there seems to be little stomach for another COIN campaign,
Gentile, to be certain, offers his critique for the good of the profession.
His overarching fear stems from the belief the nation might try a similar
venture again should it follow Field Marshal Montgomery’s dictum that
armed with a good plan (as prescribed by doctrine) and the right general,
anything is possible.6 Gentile and Porch need not worry as current fiscal
constraints have senior Army leaders more worried about the institution’s ability to carry out the full scope of its Title 10 responsibilities, at
least about taking on another open-ended task in Iraq or Afghanistan.7

Initial General Officer Introspection

In a recent article intended to generate dialogue and discussion,
Lieutenant General Bolger (retired), takes his share of the credit for what
he saw as the failure of American generalship during the last decade
of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reminiscent of Harry Summers
poignant recollection of his conversation with a North Vietnamese
counterpart, Bolger attests to the tactical proficiency of the United States

3      In few instances do the Air Force and the Navy have such a distinct advantage over the
Army with respect to their corporate memory as when it comes to Civil War iconography and
historiography.
4      For a chapter-length address of historiography on the broader topic of the American way of
war, or lack thereof, see Antulio J. Echevarria, II, Reconsidering the American Way of War, US Military
Practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014).
5      Ibid., 5. Echevarria is referencing the belief held by historian Russell Weigley when he prepared his seminal work, The American Way of War, the thesis of which Echevarria sets out to disprove,
but on this particular issue agrees with Weigley.
6      Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn, America’s Deadly Embrace of Counter-Insurgency (New York: The New
Press, 2013), 6; Douglass Porch, Counterinsurgency, Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), xi-xii. Porch states clearly his intent to attack the emerging
hagiography of David Petraeus while at the same time trying to head off efforts in the vein of Lewis
Sorely’s “better war” thesis about Vietnam before they manifest themselves into a “stab-in-the-back”
explanation for US failure in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the Field Marshal Montgomery quip, Greg
Daddis, Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2014), 7.
7      Cheryl Pellerin, “Service Chiefs Detail 2014 Sequestration Effects,” DoD News, US Department
of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120825.
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Army. Ultimately, this did not matter because of a failure at the operational and strategic levels of war. His Army was one built and trained for
short, sharp, decisive wars, and not well suited for being “backed into”
generational exercises in nation building.8 Bolger is disappointed in his
and his peers’ willingness to accept a strategy of attrition rather than tell
the truth as he sees it now. When the tools (means) did not match the
task at hand (ends), they pursued a victory that always seemed to be just
around the corner and, but for an additional bit of time, would be theirs.
The objectives given the Army were beyond the resources allocated
to the task and military leaders met the nation’s strategic overreach with
passive approval. The result has been “unlimited irregular conflicts
with limited forces.” Not unlike Gentile and Porch, Bolger concludes
there is little hope COIN will work unless the host nation wants it to
work—a condition beyond the control of the United States and its generals. Bolger’s prescription, that the Army should return to what it does
best—short, sharp wars against defined opponents—comes with its
own challenges.9 The Army does not pick its wars, the nation’s civilian
leaders do.

Pro-COIN

Peter Mansoor’s memoir of his service with David Petraeus provides readers chapter titles such as “A War Almost Lost,” as if the United
States, because of the “Surge,” had attained its stated objectives using
COIN doctrine. Petraeus’ “surge of ideas” thesis hardly acknowledges
the foundational work underpinning his campaign, not to mention
the decidedly different political context in which he waged it.10 Within
Bolger’s construct, Petraeus is no hero since his successful surge of ideas
did not deliver victory.11 Petraeus was the ultimate “just a little more
time” general, but even a little more time was not enough for the Iraqis
to establish a representative government capable of standing on its own
beyond the redeployment of US forces. By attempting to set the record
straight when the easy to digest surge-narrative was beginning to come
under attack, the author illustrated the challenge of writing about events
even as they continue to unfold in the media.12
In 2014, it became clear even Petraeus, armed with the COIN
manual, could not save Iraq from itself. To wit, Colin Gray has concluded the conduct of COIN, in the modern era, “reveals a history of

8     Daniel Bolger, “How We Lost In Iraq and Afghanistan,” Harpers (September 2014): 63-65;
Daniel Bolger, “The Truth About the Wars,” New York Times, November 10, 2014, http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/11/11/opinion/the-truth-about-the-wars-in-iraq-and-afghanistan.html.
9      Daniel Bolger, “A 3-Star General Explains ‘Why We Lost’ in Iraq, Afghanistan,” National Public
Radio, November 9, 2014, transcript, http://www.npr.org/2014/11/09/361746282/a-3-star-generalexplains-why-we-lost-in-iraq-afghanistan.
10      Peter Mansoor, Surge, My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War
(New Haven, CT: Yale, 2013), x. For example, Petraeus suggests it was his team that solved issues related to detainees as if none of his predecessors had addressed critical issues related to this
topic. See Lieutenant General John D. Gardner (Ret) interviewed by Colonel Matthew D. Morton,
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group, Carlisle Barracks, PA, January 2, 2014, held at the Military
History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, for a detailed explanation of the reforms that took place
throughout 2005 and 2006, two years in advance of Petraeus’ arrival as the Multi-National Force
Iraq commander.
11      David Petraeus, foreword to Surge, x; Bolger, “The Truth About the Wars,” New York Times,
November 10, 2014. Bolger is even more critical of Petraeus in his book, comparing him to General
Douglas MacArthur and his overweening ambition.
12      Mansoor, Surge, xxvi.
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persistent, or at least repeated political unwillingness to respect empirical knowledge of the past.”13 Simply put, COIN just does not work when
the real tool or mechanism to achieve America’s ends depends largely on
indigenous forces.14 With regard to historiography, Surge, is an excellent
example of assigning agency for ephemeral success too soon. Although
there is much for readers to learn from Mansoor’s account, it does not
offer an example of a path to victory. It does provide valuable insight to
one phase of a war that has yet to achieve its intended objectives.

The Limits of American Power

In response to the recent era of conflict, Andrew Bacevich espouses
the limits of American power.15 With the bona fides of a soldier and a
scholar, his work merits the attention of military professionals lest they
too see all the world’s problems as ones military power alone can solve.
In his review of Bolger’s book, Bacevich generally agrees with the author.
Nevertheless, Bacevich notes Bolger’s failure to address more comprehensively the responsibility of senior officers when providing political
leaders their military advice.16 In his mind, those senior leaders should
heed the warning in the most recent edition of Reinhold Niebuhr’s
classic, The Irony of American History. Bacevich introduces the work with
four truths worth considering: (a) the sin of American exceptionalism,
(b) indecipherability of history, (c) false allure of simple solutions, and
(d) the imperative of appreciating the limits of power.17 The nation
has stumbled over these issues during the last ten years, and Bacevich
reminds readers that stability, rather than remaking the world in the
image of the United States, best serves the nation.18 Neibuhr, speaking enduring truth from the past, reminds all Americans, “the paradise
of our domestic security is suspended in a hell of global insecurity.”19
Therein lies the rub for generals who must maintain paradise at home
while acting abroad. Fortunately, for them, a dead Prussian soldier, who
happened to be a bit of an intellectual, still offers sage advice on how to
connect domestic and foreign interests.

13      Colin Gray, Defense Planning for National Defense: Navigation Aids for the Mystery Tour (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2014), 44. For another criticism of
a recent offering by one of COIN’s biggest proponents, John A. Nagl, see Dexter Filkins’ review
of his latest offering, John A. Nagl, Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice (New
York: Penguin, 2014), in which Filkins also concludes COIN, at least as practiced by Americans,
does not work. Dexter Filkins, review of Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice,
John Nagl, New York Times, November 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/books/
review/knife-fights-by-john-a-nagl.html?_r=0.
14      Lewis Sorely’s, Better War (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1999) suggests that General
Abrams could have achieved victory in Vietnam if given more time to develop the South Vietnamese
security forces.
15      Recent books by Andrew Bacevich include: The New American Militarism How Americans Are
Seduced by War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); The Limits of Power: The End of American
Exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan, 2008); Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War (New
York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt, 2010).
16      Andrew Bacevich, review of Why We Lost, A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan
Wars, by Daniel Bolger, New York Times, November 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/
books/review/daniel-bolgers-why-we-lost.html.
17      Andrew Bacevich, introduction to Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 2008), x.
18      Ibid., xvii.
19     Niebuhr, The Irony of American History, 7.
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Enduring Theorists through a Contemporary Lens

The stalwart military theorists of professional military education—
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu—continue to be relevant even when examined
through the lens of recent events. Future strategists should not discount
them in the mistaken belief the true nature of war has changed. Just as
historiography offers a lens to review historic events, some theorists
continue to offer enduring advice with which to consider conflict. In
his recent work, Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Practice
from the Revolution to Afghanistan, author Antulio Echevarria argues there
is no single American way of war. Unsurprisingly given his reputation
as a scholar of Carl von Clausewitz, he concludes, “the American way of
war was, and still is, thoroughly political.”20 He reaches this conclusion
in the same manner Clausewitz used to draw his own conclusions about
the nature of war, through the lens of historical analysis. Clausewitz
offers the familiar:
No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—
without first being clear in the mind what he intends to achieve by that war
and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the
latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set
its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and
make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.21

Echevarria’s conclusion applies to all wars, not just the big ones
with clearly defined objectives. Senior military leaders will continue to
bear the responsibility for helping civilian decision makers understand
what will be required to “achieve” their ends through war. They should
remember civilians take the decision to go to war in a unique domestic
political condition ever subject to change. As Clausewitz cautions, “certainly the exhaustion or, to be accurate, the fatigue of the stronger has
often brought about peace. The reason can be found in the half-hearted
manner in which wars are usually waged.”22 This is particularly important
in the context of Echevarria’s other conclusion that the United States,
in the past, sought minimalist solutions and resisted the expenditure
of too many resources.23 Future generals should try to avoid the risk of
imbalance between ends and means no matter how good they think they
are at designing ways to balance the equation.

Sun Tzu through the Lens of Bolger and Tuchman

Bolger suggests the military has struggled to identify the real enemy
of the nation’s stated objectives. Renowned author and historian Barbara
Tuchman observed the US Army’s predilections contribute to its inability to know its enemy. In doing so, both authors allude to Sun Tzu’s
dictum to know oneself and know the enemy to avoid defeat. At the
beginning of an inflection point as the Army emerged from Vietnam,
Tuchman spoke to the US Army War College in 1972. She addressed a
blind spot in the American approach to war; it was the same one Bolger

20     Echevarria, Reconsidering the American Way of War, 2.
21     Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. by Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1989), 579.
22     Ibid., 613.
23     Echevarria, Reconsidering the American Way of War, 135.
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addressed forty years later. One passage bears full citation given its timeless advice and recognition of American military habits.
In the arrogance of our size, wealth and superior technology, we tend to
overlook the need to examine what may be different sources of strength in
others….we now need another voice of wisdom to tell us, “Technology is
not enough.” War is not one big engineering project. There are people on
the other side—with strengths and will that we never bother to measure…
we have been drawn into a greater, and certainly more ruinous, belligerent action than we intended [Vietnam]. To fight without understanding the
opponent ultimately serves neither the repute of the military nor the repute
of the nation.24

Bolger seized on the fact that recently the military has struggled to
identify the real enemy of the nation’s stated objectives. Simply, those
who shoot at American soldiers—the Taliban, Sunni insurgents in Iraq,
or the Mahdi Army—do not necessarily represent the enemy the United
States went to war to fight. They are enemies the United States created
along the way.25 A technological overmatch of opponents has not always
allowed the United States to discern its enemy well, especially when
the enemy chooses not to fight in a manner that serves the strengths
of the US military. Echevarria also points out that the United States’
historic reliance on technology allowed it to offset numeric advantages
as policy makers pursued strategies underwritten by just enough, but not
too much, means. While this worked historically, the proliferation of
modern small arms has changed the equation particularly at the tactical
level—the enemy now bears RPGs, not spears and crude firearms.26

A Holistic Approach to History

The study of history provides future generals means to learn vicariously from the mistakes of others. Because history is replete with wars
fought with remarkable tactical and operational acumen, but which did
not achieve strategic victory, future generals should open their apertures.
The sweep of American military history is much broader than its most
well know wars—the American Civil War and World War II—which
dominate the canon of professional military education for good reasons.
Future strategic leaders ought not to forget history records victory in
the strategic column and does not award style points for tactical and
operational acumen. Were one to score Nazi performance during each
discrete year of WWII, most would accord Hitler’s generals victories in
1939, 1940, and probably a draw in 1941. Nevertheless, for all their battlefield success, they ultimately failed in the realms that matter, strategy
and achieving national objectives. One could say the same thing about
the United States in Vietnam.27 To be certain, “the ultimate outcome
of war is not always to be regarded as final,” and “the defeated state”
24      Barbara W. Tuchman, “Generalship,” Parameters 11, no. 2 (1972): 2-11.
25      Bolger, “A 3-Star General Explains ‘Why We Lost’ in Iraq, Afghanistan.”
26      Echevarria, Reconsidering the American Way of War, 167-168, 170, and conversation with LTC
Matt Hardman (Hardman served as an airborne-infantry company commander in Afghanistan in
2003 and Iraq in 2004 and again in Afghanistan as a BDE Chief-of Current Operations in 2010-2011
and BDE XO in 2013. He currently commands an Airborne-Infantry Battalion). Hardman contends
that in his experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, squad versus squad fights are evenly matched until
the US force can employ its enablers. Gone are the days that a single Marine battalion was adequate
to maintain control or defend US interests in a Latin American country.
27      Gray, Defense Planning for National Defense, 14; Robert Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The
Evolution of Operational Warfare (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2004), 226, 246, 254, 264.
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may only consider it “a transitory evil” until it can remedy the outcome
at a later date; however Americans expect their generals to provide the
nation more than ephemeral ends.28 Fortunately, the United States has
a rich and varied military history, including many dark chapters that
hardly qualify as the stuff of American exceptionalism, upon which to
reflect as they contemplate future challenges.

Big and Exceptional—Outliers

The American Civil War and World War II are the outliers in
American military history with respect to the objectives sought and
the resources the nation was willing to expend to achieve them. The
sweep of American military history is much broader than these arguably
best known and often studied wars. Between 1861 and 1865, the United
States fought its bloodiest war. The existential threat of Confederate
rebellion resulted in the deaths of 360,000 Union soldiers. In defense
of the institution of chattel slavery, the Confederacy was willing to sacrifice 260,000 soldiers. In total, preserving the Union and freeing four
million African-Americans cost the nation 620,000 soldiers drawn from
a population of 30 million.29 A proportional cost today would amount
to no less than seven million dead Americans.30 Full mobilization of
the Union effort took years. Once mobilized, generals such as Ulysses
S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman translated the might of the
nation into victory, but victory at great cost. One will not find even a
hint of this kind of mobilization and expected sacrifice discussed in any
of the nation’s guiding strategic documents today.
The Second World War continues to provide a nearly bottomless pit
of issues for study ranging from tactical to strategic in nature, hence its
utility in the canon of professional military education. In the modern
era, it represents the closest approximation of Clausewitz’s concept of
absolute war. The final Götterdämmerung inflicted by “Little Boy” and
“Fatman” meant it would be the last global war on such a scale short of
Armageddon.31 Nazi Germany had more than territorial ambitions as it
sought to remove entire races of people from the face of the earth while
losing four million of its own citizens. Its ally, Imperial Japan, lost two
million people subjugating and defending the “Co-prosperity Sphere”
it created. The Soviet Union lost more than twenty-five million soldiers
and civilians resisting Hitler’s quest for Lebensraum. While the world collectively suffered an estimated 60 million deaths directly attributable
to the conflict, the United States lost only 300,000 service members
and suffered almost no losses at home.32 Nevertheless, the United States
placed millions of citizens in uniform, fed and equipped its allies, and
willingly suffered a degree of disruption in the lives of its 132.2 million
citizens. A similar military effort today would require 18.5 million
28      Clausewitz, On War, 80.
29      Bureau of the Census Library, 1860 Compiled for the Original Returns of the Eighth Census, Under the
Direction of the Secretary of the Interior (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1864), http://
www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html.
30      “The Civil War By the Numbers,” PBS, American Experience, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
americanexperience/features/general-article/death-numbers/.
31      Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 920.
32      Ibid., 44, 894, 898-899 for war aims, Lebensraum, and total casualties; John W. Dower, War
Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 7-8.
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soldiers to fill the Army’s ranks alone, not to mention what it would do
to the paychecks of the wealthiest Americans should they be asked make
a sacrifice on a par with their forebears to support such a force.33 Again,
today’s guiding strategy documents do not allude to anything similar
with regard to force structure or fiscal requirements to field such a force.
Since gaining independence, the United States used force 280 times
between 1789 and 2009.34 In these instances, the nation only fought two
wars to decisive outcomes, the two already mentioned, in which entire
systems of government ceased to exist and unconditional surrender was
the objective. George Patton, Jr. was correct, “Americans love to fight,”
but they have only gotten the satisfaction of decisive victory two times.35

Beyond the Outliers

In contrast to the “big ones,” where everything was at stake and the
nation responded accordingly, the American Army played a variety of
roles in a wide range of military dramas. The Army, cast as an unrelenting underdog, against all reason defeated a global hegemon not once,
but twice in less than fifty years. It served as the tool of manifest destiny
by defeating Mexico and taking large swaths of territory by force and
occupation until a fig leaf of postwar negotiation clarified what the feat
of arms already accomplished. The Army in support of the Navy, served
as a tool in the hands of American imperialists determined to seize colonies—better the United States grab the Philippines from Spain lest the
Germans get there first. In short, the Army did many things that looked
nothing like short, or sharp, or even decisive. As always, the military
responded to orders and with the exception of five instances, it did so
without so much as a declaration of war.36

Vietnam

It is easy to forget the war in Vietnam was a limited war—despite the
commitment of more than 500,000 troops and enough jet-era bombing
to make the war in the air over Europe and Japan look amateurish in
comparison. The main theater was in fact Western Europe where the
threat of Soviet invasion remained constant. Recently, some pundits
used the American experience in Vietnam as an analogy to the long
slog in Iraq and morass that the United States once again found itself

33      See “Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, Inflation Adjusted (Real 2012 Dollars)
Using Average Annual CPI During Tax Year, Income Years 1913-2013,” Tax Foundation, http://
taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/fed_individual_rate_history_adjusted.pdf
to gain some sense the disparity in tax rates between the recent decade of conflict and WWII,
especially for the wealthiest Americans; “Profile America Facts for Features,” United States Census
Bureau, http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/
cb12-ffse01.html; Kent Roberts Greenfield, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington:
Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947). The US population was approximately 132
million in 1940 and by 1945, more than 8 million citizens wore the uniform of the Army. Including
all services, the nation put 12 million citizens in uniform. Americans paid for roughly half of World
War II with tax revenue and financed the other half through the sale of bonds, something not seen
during the last decade of conflict. I.C. B. Dear, ed., The Oxford Companion to World War II (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 923.
34      Richard F. Grimmett, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2010
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 10, 2011).
35      Martin Blumenson, ed., The Patton Papers, 1940-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1974), 429, 457.
36      Barbara S. Torreon, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2010
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, September 15, 2014).
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unable to escape. Others did their utmost to disassociate the recent era
of conflict with the last war America lost.37
However, in other respects, Vietnam provides an excellent example
for considering the American approach to war in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It continues to offer something for students inclined to study what is
more likely than the exceptional conflicts discussed above. In Vietnam,
the Army moved faster and generated more firepower than any time in
its history. Every tactical movement was in effect a movement without
a rear area during which the enemy might attack from any direction.
Urban battles in Hue and Saigon afforded the rare opportunity to concentrate military efforts against what was normally an elusive foe who
sought to avoid such battles since they led to disproportionate casualties.
Despite the ability to mass effects in time and space, strategic victory
remained as elusive in Vietnam as it did in Iraq. Despite the narrative
suggesting the Army turned its back on Vietnam and never looked back,
the reality was it learned quite a bit, just not the answer the Army was
looking for in 2003, as it received the task to fight insurgencies in Asia
in support of questionable governments.38

Vietnam as a Bridge

Historical research always bears the imprint of current events even
if historians and uniformed strategists attempt not to look backward
to events, but rather to see them from the perspective of the participants marching forward in time. To that end, Greg Daddis asked and
answered an important question: is it possible to have a comprehensive
strategy and still lose a war? In his largely successful effort to rehabilitate
General William Westmoreland, he concludes, yes, it is.39 In arriving at
this explanation, Daddis offers a number of observations relevant today,
especially while reflecting on recent events. Westmoreland struggled to
communicate the complexity of the situation in Vietnam. He realized
military power and its application was but one facet of a problem requiring equal, if not more, attention on social and political ills in South
Vietnam.40 There were no shortages of “can do” generals in Vietnam.
General Paul Harkins promised in 1963 Saigon could lead its own war
effort and that the United States would be starting to depart by 1965.41
Perhaps most importantly, the United States did a lot in Vietnam: it
created an army, it did nation-building, and it fought homegrown insurgents from South Vietnam and conventional units from the north. Even
so, the Army was unable to do all three tasks simultaneously to the levels
demanded to achieve the nation’s overall objectives.42 Perhaps Bolger’s
current frustration stems from the fact he knew all of this having taught
history at West Point, but failed to see the parallels until the United
37      Robert Dallek, “Iraq Isn’t Like Vietnam—Except When It Is,” Washington Post, May 20, 2007;
Ronald Bruce St. John, “Parallels Between Iraq War and Vietnam War Are Piling Up” The Progress Report,
April 28, 2004, http://www.progress.org/tpr/parallels-between-iraq-war-and-vietnam-war-are-piling-up/; Heather Marie Stur, “Stop Comparing Iraq to the Vietnam War” The National Interest, July
1, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/stop-comparing-iraq-the-vietnam-war-10788.
38      Citino, Operational Warfare, 226, 237, 246, 254, 264.
39      Daddis, Westmoreland’s War, xx, 14.
40      Ibid., 90-91.
41      Ibid., 163.
42      Ibid., 169.
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States was already “backed in” to objectives beyond the grasp of the
Army.

Conclusions on the Use of History

If there is but one lesson for future strategists to take away from
their study of military history it is this: there are almost no instances
of the United States successfully waging a war, signing a peace treaty,
and immediately redeploying. There has usually been a gap between
the attainment of an end by military means and the ultimate political
outcome in the form of a peace treaty. An American way of battle dependent on technology and shock and awe cannot bridge the intervening
gap.43 Soldiers conduct occupations. Even the American Civil War and
World War II, with their decisive conclusions, demanded occupations to
translate military victory into enduring end states.

Recommendations

Senior leaders and future strategists are entitled to their opinions
and interpretations of the past, but their professional obligations demand
they form them in a critical context. Rather than drinking their own
intellectual “bathwater”—doctrine, white papers, professional military
education curriculum, and professional journal articles—future senior
leaders should look beyond this elixir as they attempt to reflect on what
has occurred, how it is likely to be remembered, and how it might affect
their approach to war. A narrow interpretation runs the risk of acting
like self-imposed blinders in the search for the best advice in situations
that do not lend themselves to a narrow base of understanding. In addition, as Daddis has shown with his recent work on Westmoreland and
Vietnam, soldiers can continue to learn new things when considering
a war gone awry. The glancing overview of emerging historiography
is but the bow-wave of a larger body of evidence and interpretation to
follow. Enduring theory should help underpin much of it as it travels its
path into the American military conscience as part of a larger tapestry
of corporate memory.

The Recent and Not So Recent Past

In Desert Storm, Colin Powell and his generation got the war
they wanted, but the next generation of strategic leaders stung by the
outcome of recent events may not be so lucky. Future strategists may
lead the military anywhere along the spectrum of conflict, so it remains
in their best interests to think hard about current scholarship emerging
from the last decade of conflict. Gian Gentile’s concern the nation might
be tempted to wage another counterinsurgency beyond the borders of
the United States seems unlikely now. However, even Powell could not
avoid it, albeit while fulfilling a very different role. Part and parcel of
the emerging scholarship on the recent decade of conflict are the vicissitudes of political priorities, which speak to enduring nature of war and
the utility of those who well captured it in theory.

43      Echevarria, Reconsidering the American Way of War, 175.
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Political Context

Generals should never forget strategy will always be a slave to what
is politically possible.44 What general would not want to refight the Civil
War or World War II? Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt standout as
great American strategists and more importantly, great political leaders
who were able to convince the American people to go “all in.” As Bolger
and Bacevich both describe in their own ways, American generals cannot
expect their civilian leaders to be good strategists.45 Modern generals
should rise to the task of fulfilling their professional obligations—rendering professional military advice—in all circumstances. Doing so
will at times require them to assume the role of mentor, even within
the context of their subordinated role as prescribed by the American
construct of civil-military relations, but ever cognizant of the political
conditions that directly affect their masters.

Moral Courage

Strategic thought demands the long view, not the best immediate
work-around for the challenge at hand. Few generals became generals because they told their senior raters on a recurring basis that what
their boss asked them to do was a bad idea. Generals get to be generals
because they consistently demonstrated superior tactical competence,
regardless of their discipline. In essence, they achieved missions in a
fashion deemed superior to their peers. Getting the job done “now,”
whatever that job might be, runs the risk of influencing a general’s temporal horizon. Clausewitz was not writing about tactics, he was writing
about war with a big “W.” Understanding a broader sweep of history will
help strategists adjust their temporal horizons.
Armed with a longer view, they should also be willing to share that
experience in the role of a teacher. It surprised a senior general with
years of experience in the Middle East that he had to spend so much
time educating leaders, about “what was going on in one of the most
complex battle spaces on earth.”46 Domestic political acumen does not
necessarily equip senior civilian leaders with an adequate foundation
for making strategic choices that rely heavily on military resources. As
senior strategists, generals should embrace their role in the education
process.
Uniformed strategists, with tact, ought to find their voices when
their political masters are treading on the thin ice of exceedingly poor
historical analogy as it relates to war. In some cases, they may have to
help guide the conversation and process back to the path of strategy. It
is particularly important that senior officers understand the history of
their own profession, in a national context, if for no other reason than
a little history can be a dangerous thing. Bush policy makers had it in
their mind that invading Iraq was going to be like liberating France in

44      Gray, Defense Planning for National Defense, 49-50.
45      Although Bolger and Bacevich each say this in their own way, a conversation about the recent
war in Iraq with Dr. Lance Betros, Provost, US Army War College, on the same topic inspired this
part of the paper.
46      Senior Officer Exit Interview, non-attribution, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,
PA, 20-21.
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World War II.47 It was lost on them that unlike France, Iraq had no Free
Iraqi Army in being, battle hardened and ready, or a legitimate government in exile with a string of battlefield successes to its credit, rather
than a collection of expatriates and little else. Civilian policy makers
are not required to study history, but Army officers are, and what they
study shapes their outlook and understanding of war. Unfortunately, the
senior officer who recounted these observations could not, or chose not
to, find his voice and dispel his civilian masters of their misconceived
assumption based on a wrongheaded interpretation of historical events.48
What flowed from these assumptions has been nothing less than tragic.

Speaking Truth to Power

Senior leaders should draw on what they have learned through
experience, professional military education, and the self-directed study
of history when the time comes to find their voice. History also offers
senior leaders examples of their peers having the moral courage to speak
truth to power. As Barbara Tuchman pointed out after Vietnam, the
West Point motto of “Duty, Honor, Country,” that is, to follow orders
unflinchingly, may no longer be the best policy lest the nation “undercut
[its] own claim at Nuremberg and Tokyo,” when Nazis and Imperial
Japanese went to the gallows using the same excuse.49 Recent history
offers the example of General Eric Shinseki. Looking back a little further
provides the example of General Matthew Ridgway. Shinseki gave
Congress his best military advice. It just so happened that his best advice
was not consistent with the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s
view of the world and the coming war with Iraq.50 Rumsfeld’s efforts to
discredit Shinseki have only enhanced his example of a serving officer
rendering his duty regardless of the consequences. As Army Chief of
Staff, General Ridgway paid an even stiffer price when he did the same
thing. Ridgway’s sin was to speak out against the belief air power alone
could play a decisive role in Vietnam in 1954, based on his interpretation
of what it had accomplished in Korea. This advice put him at odds with
the Eisenhower administration’s desire to test its “New Look” policy in
a proposed attempt to save the French at Dien Bien Phu. Ridgway kept
the United States out of Vietnam as the French lost, but he lost his job in
1955 in a forced early retirement.51 History suggests the advice rendered
by both generals was probably correct. The occupation of Iraq required
more troops than suggested by planners in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. The introduction of air power in South Vietnam led to the
commitment of ground forces.

Conclusion

Modern strategists would be wise to remember the observation of
Colin Gray when he wrote, “It is no disgrace to fail in an attempt to

47      Ibid.; Similar accounts can be found in Gordon Rudd, Reconstructing Iraq: Regime Change, Jay
Garner and the ORHA Story (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, Press, 2011), 28, 382-383.
48      Ibid.
49      Tuchman, “Generalship.”
50      Rudd, Reconstructing Iraq: Regime Change, Jay Garner and the ORHA Story, 140-141.
51      Conrad Crane, “Killing the Vulture: The Impact of the Korean Airpower Experience on
American Involvement in Indochina in 1954” unpublished manuscript, copy in possession of author
used with Dr. Crane’s permission.

Culture and the US Army

Morton

67

achieve the difficult and demanding, but persistence in an effort to do
the impossible is an affront to the Gods of strategy.”52 Doing more of
the same in the same places, after a decade and billions of dollars, is
unlikely to bring about a different result, nor will doing the same in
new places with the same characteristics have much hope of achieving
national objectives. High-minded notions of American exceptionalism
should come with the same warning as “hope;” neither is a method.53
There was nothing exceptional about imposing dictatorships in South
and Central America in the service of domestic political agendas any
more than the hubris of toppling the regime in Iraq with an underlying
assumption that it could made right quickly and on the cheap.
How then to do it better? Emerging historiography, and to a lesser
extent hagiography, will shape the way the Army as an institution
remembers the recent era of conflict. It will influence future uniformed
strategists who have never been to Iraq or Afghanistan although their
service will carry baggage from those conflicts for years to come. Simple
“surge” narratives have proven too good to be true, but at least some
senior leaders have started the process of deep introspection, such as
Bolger, and doing so have reminded the profession of the relevance
of theorists such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu as enduring touchstones
for the profession of arms, particularly at the highest levels of service.
The use of military forces in operations short of war will continue to
demonstrate the nation’s values as it attempts to avert larger conflicts.54
Fortunately, American military history provides a rich tapestry of
conflict for consideration. Senior officers should approach this study in
the context of understanding that the two most significant monuments
of American martial pride are outliers. It seems unlikely that the United
States will unleash the powers to terrorize entire civilian populations,
conduct ethnic cleansing, or make the heavy hand of war touch the lives
of men, women, and children in the nations that are the object of its
military attention.
Therefore, as ever, it will remain the burden of the senior uniformed strategist to convey the art of the possible and the associated
risk inherent in every variation of the use of force to achieve national
policy objectives. This will never be easy, but studying the recent past
as institutional memories form in the manner prescribed in this paper is
far less expensive than the cost of blood and treasure already expended.
The avoidance of a single “fool’s errand” would be something indeed.

52      Gray, Defense Planning for National Defense, 44.
53      Taken from the eponymous title of Gordon Sullivan’s, Hope is Not a Method (New York:
Broadway Books, 1996).
54      Louis Caldera and Antulio J. Echevarria, “The US Army is the Nation’s Premier Global
Engagement and Operation-Other-Than-War Force,” Armed Forces Journal International (March 2001):
32-34.
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Ethics and Army Leadership: Climate Matters
Charles D. Allen
Abstract: As US news and media reports continue to expose unethical behavior within the American profession of arms, it is important to explore how Army leaders—and their organizations—have
lapsed into questionable ethical conduct. This article addresses the
tension between competence and character within the Army’s culture, offers lessons from the business world on ethical behavior and
leadership, and critiques current Department of Defense (DoD)
and Army approaches to assessing ethical climates.1

U

S news and media reports continue to expose unethical behavior within the American profession of arms.1 Some observers
may claim this exposure is nothing new. Recently, however, the
Army revealed 129 commanders of brigades and battalions have been
relieved since 2003.2 Of that number, 25 were relieved in combat zones.
More troubling (and paradoxically reassuring) is the Army’s disclosure
that seven general officers were relieved and two court-martialed. In
2005, for instance, the four-star commander of US Army Training and
Doctrine Command, General Kevin Byrnes, was relieved for disobeying
a lawful order from the Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker.
In addition, “since 2001, the Army vice chief of staff has issued 100
memoranda of reprimand, 147 memoranda of concern and conducted
45 verbal counselings of general officers” for myriad behaviors contrary
to good order and discipline in the Army.3
This article explores how Army leaders and their organizations have
lapsed into questionable ethical conduct. Among other things, such an
examination enables one to discern lessons for senior leaders and stewards of the Army profession. Rather than offering tabloid exposés (there
are plenty), the following analysis focuses on systemic organizational
assessments and solutions to ethical situations, not on the details of any
specific recent case. This article concludes with two recommendations
for Army leadership: 1) develop evidence-based developmental programs on individual character and moral development, and 2) develop
empirically validated research instruments to assess ethical climates as
part of the DoD or separate Army organizational climate survey. Strong
ethical foundations are essential for the Army profession and the nation
it serves.
While the number of reported occurrences of unethical behavior is
relatively small compared to a large DoD population of nearly 3 million
1     This manuscript was initially prepared for and presented at a conference for the International
Society for Military Ethics (ISME), October 12-15, 2014, University of Notre Dame, South Bend,
Indiana.
2      Ray Locker, “Pentagon Keeps Covering Up Officers’ Dirty Laundry,” USA Today, August 8,
2013; and Michelle Tan, “129 Army Battalion, Brigade Commanders Fired Since 2003,” Army Times,
February 2, 2015.
3      Ibid.
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active, reserve, and civilian members, even isolated cases receive a high
degree of media attention and undermine public trust in the profession.
As one reads the reports of investigations and courts martial, the root
causes of such behavior are invariably attributed to individual failings—
the senior leader’s lack of character and the lack of moral courage of
those around the leader to challenge questionable behavior. However,
these assessments rarely consider differing levels of analysis: individual,
organizational, and institutional.

Concerns about the Profession

In some cases, relieving high-level military officers was part of the
civil-military relations exchange, which often requires a delicate balancing act between civilian officials and uniformed officers. Striking
examples during the Global War on Terror are the cases of Commander
of US Central Command Admiral William “Fox” Fallon, Air Force Chief
of Staff General T. Michael Moseley, and Commander of US Forces and
International Security Forces Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal,
in their clashes with senior civilian leaders—the president and defense
secretary.4 Of greater concern are those cases in which behavior contrary
to professional ethics is the issue. There have been high-profile investigations of senior officers for violations of Joint Travel and Joint Ethics
Regulations like US Africa Command’s General William “Kip” Ward
(substantiated), and US European Command’s Admiral James Stavridis
(unsubstantiated). The media also took particular interest in the extramarital affair of retired General David Petraeus, the former commander
of US Central Command and later of International Security Forces
Afghanistan, as well as the court-martial charges for sexual assault by
Army Brigadier General Jeffrey Sinclair.
Accordingly, at the end of 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
initiated a review of general officer ethics. It included a survey of compliance with standards put forth in several Department of Defense policies
such as the Joint Federal Travel Regulation, Joint Ethics Regulation,
Financial Management Regulation, other DoD Instructions, and certainly the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. In December 2013,
his successor, Chuck Hagel, ordered a second review to be completed
and briefed within sixty days. These perfunctory assessments of noncompliance and violations by individual general officers and their staffs
did not reveal the deeper causes of these problems; thus, further actions
were needed.
To underscore the importance of understanding and resolving such
problems, in March 2014, Hagel appointed Rear Admiral Margaret
“Peg” Klein as his Special Advisor for Military Professionalism to
report directly to him on “issues related to military ethics, character, and
leadership.”5 Hagel charged Klein to “coordinate the actions of the Joint
Staff, the Combatant Commands, and each of the military services…on
4      Specific cases are addressed in Don Drechsler and Charles D. Allen, “Why Senior Military
Leaders Fail: And What We Can Learn from Their Mistakes,” Armed Forces Journal (July/August
2009): 34-37, 44-45; Marybeth P. Ulrich, “The General McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in CivilMilitary Relations,” Parameters 41, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 86-100; and Charles D. Allen, “Lessons not
Learned: Civil-Military Disconnect in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Journal (September 2011): 30-33.
5     “Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel Announcing His Senior Advisor for Military
Professionalism,” US Department of Defense, March 25, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/Releases/
Release.aspx?ReleaseID=16599
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DoD’s focus on ethics, character, and competence in all activities at all
levels of command….[as] a top priority for DoD’s senior leadership.”6

Professional Competency or Character?

After more than a dozen years in Afghanistan and Iraq, DoD senior
leaders are concerned with the perception the competence of our senior
leaders is valued over their character—especially with the ongoing series
of senior officer misconduct—hence, the appointment of Klein. The
reported misbehavior ranges from a combination of illegal, immoral,
and unethical actions across services and components.7 In alignment
with Hagel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin
Dempsey stressed “the military must pay as much attention to character
as it does to competence.”8 In his June 2013 graduation address to the
National War College, Dempsey cautioned, “As with Vietnam, negative impressions about our character [during the Global War on Terror]
eclipsed the courage and sacrifices of the many men and women who
served honorably.”9 To document the nature and scope of the problem
throughout the uniformed and civilian ranks, the Department of
Defense published its Encyclopedia of Ethical Failures.10 One would expect
the Army has its own compendium of ethical misconduct cases spanning the operating and generating forces in deployed and home-station
environments.
Donald M. Snider, an expert on the nature and role of the Army
profession, argues military leaders improperly focus “on developing
individual and unit military competence, when it should have been all
along more equally divided between developing their moral character
and their military competence.”11 Journalists and government civilians
alike have speculated “the military valued ‘competence over character’
during wartime, and that it needs to place a higher priority on personal
rectitude.”12 Three criteria – competence and character combined with
commitment — emerged from the Army Profession of Arms campaign
as official doctrine, which specified the broad developmental goals
essential for its members to be professional.

Initial Assessment and Remedy

In response to a 2012 Secretary of Defense directive, the Army conducted a review of senior-leader training with two objectives: 1) Review
the current state of senior leadership training, particularly ethics training and character development, and 2) Consider the impact(s) of power
and the dilemmas that arise from increasing levels of responsibility,

6      Ibid.
7      Mark F. Light, “The Navy’s Moral Compass: Commanding Officers and Personal Misconduct,”
Naval War College Review 65, no. 3 (Summer 2012): 136-152; Craig Whitlock, “Military Brass, Behaving
Badly: Files Detail a Spate of Misconduct Dogging Armed Forces,” Washington Post, January 26, 2014,
8      Jim Garamone, “Hagel, Dempsey Stress Leader’s Role in Ethical Issues,” DoD News, March
26, 2014, www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121905.
9      Amaani Lyle, “Chairman Champions Character in Graduation Address,” DoD News, June 13,
2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120281.
10      Office of General Consul, Encyclopedia of Ethical Failures (Washington, DC: US Department
of Defense, 2012).
11      Don M. Snider, “The Moral Corrosion Within Our Military Professions.” Strategic Studies
Institute, November 27, 2012, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles//
The-Moral-Corrosion-within-Our-Military-Professions/2012/11/27.
12      Amaani Lyle, “Chairman Champions Character in Graduation Address.”
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authority, and control.13 The Army’s findings claimed “Senior Leader
character is not lacking…not a systemic problem” and there was not
a “widely held negative perception of Army Senior Leaders based on
interviews and focus groups.”14 These findings seem, however, to ignore
other sources of information.
Assessments claiming there was no “systemic problem” or “widely
held negative perception” lead one to conclude these ethical lapses
have been no more than individual failings. Thus, the assertion that
“Checks and balances are key—include front office staff, spouses, and
IG [Inspector General], SJA [Staff Judge Advocate], CH [Chaplain]” to
prevent incidents that could be seen as unethical behavior by senior leaders.15 The findings attribute as least part of the blame to those around
the leaders. Accordingly, the review’s recommendations proposed three
lines of effort: training the staffs of senior leaders, mentorship of senior
leaders, and programs of assessment and feedback for senior leaders. Of
these pillars, the Army has once again focused on training programs
for individuals—not on education and self-development. That focus is
problematic since training does not usually mean gaining new knowledge and exercising the reflection essential to development.

Assumptions Regarding Individual Character Development

The process, findings, and recommendations of the Army’s review
of senior-leader training validate COL Brian Michelson’s concerns in his
assessment of the Army approach to character development. Michelson,
author of “Character Development of US Army Leaders,” examined
Army leadership doctrine for its definition of character—“the sum total
of an individual’s moral and ethical qualities”—and its expectation of
leaders to be the “‘ethical standard bearer[s]’ [who] set a proper ethical
climate.”16 Hence, Army doctrine implies an individual’s lack of character leads to ethical failings; accordingly, corrective actions should be
focused on individual leaders. Michelson cautions against such a simple
fix. Instead, he identifies and then questions three underlying assumptions for the Army’s institutional strategy:
•• Army soldiers and leaders inherently know what is right and want to
live ethically.
•• Consistent ethical conduct develops strong character.
•• Leaders will develop personal character commensurate with their
increasing responsibilities through self-guided study, reflection, experience, and feedback.17
Michelson extracts data from the 2010 and 2011 Center for Army
Leadership’s Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) reports, as
well as from its report on Toxic Leadership, to effectively challenge each
assumption. He then arrives at four conclusions, two of which inform
this analysis:
13     “Review of Current Senior Leadership Training,” Briefing Slides, Washington, DC: US
Department of the Army, March 2013.
14      Ibid.
15      Ibid.
16     Brian M. Michelson, “Character Development of U.S. Army Leaders: The Laissez-Faire
Approach,” Military Review 93, no. 5 (September/October 2013): 31, 38.
17      Ibid., 31.
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•• The Army’s three primary assumptions about the development of
personal character are questionable at best, are potentially seriously
flawed, and should be immediately reexamined.
•• The Army does not know, and cannot know with confidence, if the
current method of character development will achieve its desired
institutional goals.18
If the underlying assumptions in Army doctrine regarding individual behaviors cannot be validated, then developing strategies and
plans on them is imprudent. Perhaps an examination of organizational
factors is more appropriate. Such factors are organizational culture,
organizational climate, and ethical climate, which can be used to gain a
better understanding of the ethical issues within the Army. That understanding can be gained from findings in scholarly research in ethics,
behavioral ethics, and ethical leadership.

The Call for an Army Ethic

Since the Army Profession campaign commenced in December
2010, there have been several calls for a statement of The Army Ethic.19
Army senior leaders have been aggressively acting on the recommendations from this yearlong study through several initiatives and programs.
In the final report of the Profession of Arms campaign, now captured in
doctrine, the Army Ethic encompasses the “evolving set of laws, values,
and beliefs, deeply embedded within the core of the Army and practiced by all members of the Army Profession to motivate and guide the
appropriate conduct of individual members bound together in common
moral purpose.”20
In July 2014, Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno released
“The Army Ethic White Paper.” It declares the “foundation of our profession is centered on trust…it will take every measure of competence
and commitment to forge ahead and above all it will take character.”21
A one-page draft Ethic charges Army professionals to fulfill three roles,
serve as “Honorable Servants of the Nation – Professionals of Character,
[Army] Experts – Competent Professionals, [and] Stewards of the Army
Profession – Committed Professionals.”22

Ethical Leadership: Learning from Business

General Dempsey’s release of “America’s Military—A Profession
of Arms” to the joint force preceded the Army’s White Paper by nearly
eighteen months. In it the Chairman asserted: “Our profession is
defined by our values, ethics, standards, code of conduct, skills, and

18      Ibid., 37.
19      Clark C. Barrett, Finding ‘The Right Way’ Toward an Army Ethic, Carlisle Papers (Carlisle, PA: US
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2012); IBM Institute for Business Value, Capitalizing on
Complexity: Insights from the Global Chief Executive Officers Study (Somers, NY: IBM Institute for Business
Value, 2010); Don M. Snider, “To Renew the Power of the Army’s Professional Ethic,” Parameters
44, no. 3 (Winter 2014-2015): 7-11.
20      US Department of the Army, The Army Profession, Army Doctrine Reference Publication
No.1 (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, June 14, 2013).
21      Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, The Army Ethic White Paper (West Point, NY:
Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, July 14, 2014).
22     Ibid., 11. “Army Experts” replaced “Military Experts” during the Secretary of the Army
Symposium held in Fall 2014.
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attributes;” furthermore, he designated “Leaders as the Foundation [to]
Strengthening our Profession of Arms.”23
Thus, both the Army Chief of Staff and the Chairman have included
leader development among their top priorities. Appropriately, leaders
in the grades of colonels and flag officers—and their civilian equivalents—are designated the senior stewards of the profession. They have
special responsibilities: command of units, staff headquarters, and
running the institution. They are also susceptible to what has been
well-documented in organizational research: “Older and longer tenured
managers had lower moral judgment than did younger and less experienced employees.”24 Although current professional military education
programs for field grade and senior officers provide instruction on the
philosophies of ethics (teleology, deontology, and consequentialism) and
moral reasoning, business and behavioral ethics scholars have introduced concepts such as “ethical fading” and “moral blindspots” into
the military’s awareness.25 Ethical fading occurs when lawyers “become
inured to problems such as corruption in the justice system, and their
ethical enthusiasm slowly dies.”26
Before service members dismiss such findings from business
organizations by citing stress and cultural value placed on mission accomplishment, they should attentively consider why moral reasoning has
also been found to be “lower when individuals respond to work-related
dilemmas compared to non-work dilemmas.”27 Equally applicable to the
military profession, a 2005 Business Ethics Survey cited the following
five factors most likely to compromise ethical behavior:
1. Pressure to meet unrealistic business objectives/deadlines
2. Desire to further one’s career
3. Desire to protect one’s livelihood
4. Working in an environment with cynicism or diminished morale
5. Ignores that the act was unethical 28
Each of these factors could plausibly affect Army leaders’ ethical
obligations to their organizations: “Protection of brand and reputation;
The right thing to do; Customer trust and loyalty; Investor confidence,
and Public acceptance/recognition.”29 In 2013, Military Review published
a special issue exploring threats to the Army Profession that would
betray the trust of its constituents, clients, and stakeholders. In one of the
articles, authors identified four components of trust from their literature
review: “Credibility of competence, benevolence of motives, integrity with a
23      Martin E. Dempsey, America’s Military-A Profession of Arms White Paper (Washington, DC: US
Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 12, 2012), 4.
24      Linda K. Trevino, Gary R. Weaver, and Scott J. Reynolds, “Behavioral Ethics in Organizations:
A Review,” Journal of Management 32, no. 6 (2006): 956.
25     Max H. Bazerman, and Anne E. Tenbrunsel, Blind Spots: Why We Fail To Do What’s Right
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 61-76.
26      Ping Jiang cited in Roderick O’Brien, “Ethical Numbness: Glimpses of Some Lawyer Across
Asia and the South Pacific,” Journal of International Business Ethics 5, no. 1 (2012): 41.
27      Ibid., 956.
28      Jay J. Hamrog and James W. Forcade, The Ethical Enterprise: Doing the Right Things in the Right
Ways, Today and Tomorrow: A Global Study of Business Ethics (New York, NY: American Management
Association, 2006).
29      Ibid.
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sense of fairness and honesty, [and] predictability of behavior.”30 These
components are inextricably linked to the character, competence, and
commitment the Army expects of its leaders. While the senior stewards
of the profession, Generals Dempsey and Odierno, recognize the value
and need for ethics as an integral part of the culture of the profession
of arms, it is imperative leaders also consider the lessons from business. The ethical challenges and obligations identified in the corporate
domain are wholly applicable to our military’s obligation to sustain the
trust vested in its profession.

Institutional Culture of the Army

As senior leaders seek to develop effective approaches to redress
ethical misbehavior, voices of junior officers are joining the discourse
on the Army profession.31 At the conclusion of Solarium 7 – a gathering
of one hundred captains at Fort Leavenworth – company-grade officers
contributed to a change in the recently published Army Ethic White
Paper. Rather than being “Trustworthy,” they aspire to be “Trusted
Army Professionals.” As younger professionals, they experience firsthand the influences of Army’s culture captured in the annual surveys
of the force.
Organizational scholar Edgar Schein defines culture as “a pattern
of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems…that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore
to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and
feel in relation to those problems.” 32 While the Army culture espouses
commitment to the Seven Army Values (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless
Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage) the perception within
the force is that not all members are faithful adherents. The Center for
Army Leadership recently reported integrity was the most frequently
cited of the Army’s Values in assessing leader effectiveness. This finding
is consistent with the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior
Effectiveness (GLOBE) results which found integrity and inspirational
as the most universally desirable leadership characteristics among fiftyeight countries.33 Many of the organizational values in the business
world apply across industries and national cultures. In this case, the
same values are reflective of the Army culture and thus applicable to its
leadership.

Expectations for Ethical Leadership

Clearly, as found in the GLOBE and IBM CEO studies, leaders of
integrity are consistently sought and valued.34 While often conflated with
moral and principle-centered leadership, ethical leadership is defined as
30      Charles D. Allen and William G. Braun, “Trust: Implications for the Army Profession,”
Military Review 93, no. 5 (September/October 2013): 73-85; see also Roger C. Mayer, James. H. Davis,
and F. David Shoorman, “An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust,” Academy of Management
Review 20, no. 3 (1995): 709-734.
31      Kevin Lilley, “The Solarium: Proposals from Young Army Leaders,” Army Times, August 3,
2014, http://www.armytimes.com/article/20140803/CAREERS/307280052/.
32     Edgar Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 373-374.
33      Michael H. Hoppe and Regina Eckert, Leader Effectiveness and Culture: The GLOBE Study
(Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 2012).
34      IBM Institute for Business Value, Capitalizing on Complexity: Insights from the Global Chief
Executive Officers Study, 24.
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the “demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such
conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement,
and decision-making.”35 Organizational scholars have found “employees’ perceptions of their supervisors’ ethical leadership were associated
with followers’ willingness to report problems to management.”36 For
the Army, this finding means the influence of its culture must drive
self-monitoring and self-regulation of the Army profession. Thus, Army
leaders should be models of ethical conduct, and service members
should hold each other accountable.
The Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership
(2013) provides data about the willingness to report problems within the
Army. Among uniformed officer and enlisted members, 81 percent rated
leaders as effective in leading by example and building trust, while 8
percent disagreed. Of note, civilians rated 72 percent of their immediate civilian leaders as “effective in setting standards for integrity and
character.”37 Center for Army Leadership researchers found this factor
was “positively related to competency, leads by example, and demonstrating Army Values.”38 Some readers may be encouraged to learn that
78 percent rated civilian supervisors as effective in upholding ethical
standards, while only 8 percent disagreed. Likewise, active duty uniformed members rated 85 percent of supervisors as effective with 5
percent disagreeing.39
The cultural gap between civilian and uniformed members’ perceptions of leadership is revealed in the Center for Army Leadership Annual
Survey of Army Leadership findings. Among civilians, 75 percent
agreed if they reported an ethical violation their senior would act to
address it, while 12 percent disagreed. For uniformed members, 85 and
81 percent of active and reserve components responded positively, with
6 and 9 percent responding negatively.40 While any negative response is
problematic, around 10 percent seems reasonable, if not acceptable.
In aggregate, the Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of
Army Leadership provides indicators of the influences of the Army’s
current culture. Further, it shows organizational culture is one of the
antecedents to organizational climate, along with environmental factors
and individual values.41 The data from uniformed and civilian members
capture their perceptions of the ethical behavior of Army leaders. If
leaders are seen as ineffectual in setting and upholding ethical standards, it is easy to understand why members of the profession would
35      M. Brown, L. K. Trevino, and D. Harrison, “Ethical Leadership: A Social Learning Perspective
for Construct Development and Testing,” cited in Trevino, Weaver, and Reynolds, “Behavioral
Ethics in Organizations: A Review,” Journal of Business Ethics 32, no. 6 (December 2006): 967.
36      Ibid.
37      Center for Army Leadership, 2013 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership
(CASAL) Army Civilian Leaders, Technical Report 2014-02 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army
Leadership, 2014), 14.
38      Ibid.
39      Ibid., 22.
40      Center for Army Leadership, 2013 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership
(CASAL): Main Findings, Technical Report 2014-01 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army
Leadership, 2014), 31.
41      Steven M. Jones, Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate: A Strategic Imperative
(Carlisle PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003).
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be reluctant to report ethical violations. Such a culture would have an
undeniable influence on behavior of leaders within Army organizations.

Organizational Climates within the Army

One consistent Army commentator on organizational climate has
been LTG (retired) Walt Ulmer. In a 1987 article, he surmised the most
probable source of unhealthy command climates to be “simply the
lack of finely honed skills among senior leaders in diagnosing, creating, and maintaining the necessary climate for sustained excellence.”42
Concerning ethics, Ulmer suggested junior officers “expect and are
prepared to support high ethical standards but are sometimes confused,
frustrated, and disappointed by what they see as unethical behavior on
the part of some of their seniors.”43
Given the emphasis the Army places on being a values-based institution, its leaders must remain aware of how those values are manifest in
the day-to-day experiences of junior professionals. Rather than focusing
primarily on individual senior leaders, assessing the collective view of
ethics within Army units and activities is instructive. More appropriate
is the focus on an ethical climate as “a shared perception among organizational members regarding the criteria…of ethical reasoning within
an organization.”44
In the past, specific focus on ethics as a component of command
climate was limited to actions of Army company-level commanders
within the first 90 days of assumption of command. Then a follow-on
survey assessed effectiveness of action plans to address identified issues.
As the Army sought to resolve challenges of leadership and unit morale
during the drawdown of the 1990s, it introduced the Ethical Climate
Assessment Survey (ECAS) in 1997, and then included it as an appendix
to Field Manual 22-100 Army Leadership. Developed by the Army, it has
four components with associated questions: Individual Character—Who
are we?; Unit/Workplace Policies & Practices –What do we do?; Unit Leader
Actions—What do I do?; and Environmental/Mission Factors—What
surrounds us?45 Clearly, this survey focused on the company commander
as the standard setter within the unit. Its questions are pertinent.
Unfortunately, the ECAS is not valid as a research instrument: it was
not rigorous in measuring what it was intended to measure.46 Rather, it
offers a first-look “freebie” assessment for junior unit leaders and the
Army of a given unit’s ethical climate.
Not surprisingly, as General Walter Ulmer noted in 1998, the Army
was behind in measuring organizational climate. He suggested its senior
leaders embrace the optional ECAS. Ulmer noted “[had] a climate survey
been routinely administered, many of the derogatory headlines of 1997
might have been avoided, or the severity of the problems attenuated by
42      Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., “The Army’s New Leadership Doctrine,” Parameters 17, no. 4 (December
1987): 13.
43      Ibid., 15.
44      Ibid.
45      US Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Field Manual 22-100 (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
US Department of the Army, 1997).
46      In other words, “instrument validity is the extent to which an instrument measures what it
is supposed to.” See Susan Carroll, “Instrument Validity,” Dissertation-Statistics, http://www.dissertation-statistics.com/instrument-validity.html.
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timely command intervention.”47 His advice rings true for the Army
of today—especially since established and validated assessment instruments have been available for the Army.
One such instrument is the Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ)
developed by Bart Victor and John Cullen.48 Their initial research sought
to identify the types of ethical climates in organizations. They identified
five types:
•• Instrumental: Decisions based on selfish interests (individual/group)
•• Caring: Emphasis on care and concern for others
•• Law and Order: Adherence to external criteria—professional codes
•• Rules: Governed by policies, rules, procedures developed within
organization
•• Independence: Members have wide latitude to make own decisions49
While the original research focused on organizational categories, subsequent analysis discerned these as five dimensions of ethical climate
capable of being assessed independently. More recent research has identified five different ethical climate type groups or clusters. This new
grouping combines Law and Order with Rules and adds Efficiency as
“the degree to which employees are expected to place efficiency above
all other issues.”50 In one study, researchers found that a climate characterized by high scores in Instrumental and low scores in Law & Rules,
Caring, and Efficiency was correlated with increased likelihood of ethical
dilemmas and ethical non-compliance.51 Likewise, researchers also identified climate types that were correlated with positive outcomes, such
as either correspondingly high assessments in Law & Rules and Caring
combined with low assessments in Instrumental and Independence, or
high assessments in Independence and Efficiency.52 Climate researchers
have noted that patterns of relevant dimensions will differ with types of
organizations, even within a particular industry.53 Given its import, it is
unfathomable that neither the Army nor Department of Defense have
valid assessment tools for ethical climates.

DoD Approach to Ethics Issues

During the DoD review of ethical training programs, it became
clear each armed service has its own approach to climate assessment,
relying on various instruments, processes, and requirements. In
December 2013, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel mandated all commands above company grade and across the armed services conduct an

47      Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., “Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another ‘Bridge Too Far?’”
Parameters 28, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 13.
48      Bart Victor and John B. Cullen, “A Theory and Measure of Ethical Climate in Organizations,”
Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy 9 (1987): 51-71; and Bart Victor and John B. Cullen,
“The Organizational Bases for Ethical Work Climates,” Administrative Science Quarterly 33 (1988):
101-125.
49      Joan B. Cullen, Bart Victor, and James W Bronson, “The Ethical Climate Questionnaire: An
Assessment of its Development and Validity,” Psychological Reports 73 (1993): 667-674.
50     Arthur Shacklock, Mark Manning, and Linda Hort, “Ethical Climate Type, Self-Efficacy, and
Capacity to Deliver Ethical Outcome in Public Sector Human Resource Management,” Journal of
New Business Ideas & Trends 9, no. 2 (2011): 36-37.
51      Ibid., 47.
52      Ibid.
53      Ibid., 36-37.
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organizational climate survey.54 Subsequently, DoD suggested the use
of the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI)
Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS). Like the ECAS, the DEOCS
has four components reflecting specific areas of interest: Military Equal
Opportunity (EO), Civilian Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO),
Organizational Effectiveness (OE), and Perceptions of Discrimination/
Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault Prevention & Response (SAPR).55
The DEOCS also gives organizations the opportunity to add a
section to address local concerns. Unlike the ECAS, it is not a purely
developmental instrument provided to individual leaders for their selfmanagement and improvement. Its results are briefed to the rater of the
commander or activity leader. Appropriately, the DEOCS data will be
aggregated for trend analysis within services. While it has the advantages
of a readily available and standardized assessment tool capable of providing a common baseline, it does not specifically address ethical climates
within the US military. It appears DoD has once again succumbed to
seizing what is known and readily available, rather than seeking the most
appropriate tool for the task. Given the current scrutiny of senior leader
ethics within DoD, it would be prudent to include an instrument like the
ECQ as an ethical component of the DEOCS.

Army Approach to Ethics Issues

To their credit, Army senior leaders have persisted as stewards
of the Army Profession with the establishment of the Center for the
Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE), the implementation of the Army
Profession Campaign, and the publication of first-time doctrine for
the profession in ADRP-1. The CAPE Master Army Profession and
Ethics Training (MAPET) program to “train-the-trainers” has been
well received within the operational and functional force. CAPE is also
charged with developing, refining, and publishing The Army Ethic for
the June 2015 edition of ADRP-1. The Army Chief of Staff’s use of
Solarium 7 with junior officers and the Army Profession Symposium
with general officers and their sergeants majors demonstrates the Chief’s
focus on socializing and embedding these efforts within the Army
culture. Army Secretary John McHugh hosted a similar symposium
last fall for over one hundred civilian leaders in the Senior Executive
Service. A review of recent articles in Military Review and Parameters, as
well as US Army War College research papers, shows renewed interest in
character and moral development for Army members—both uniformed
and civilian. For example, analysis of the “Values-to-Virtue” gap has
been offered to better align virtuous behavior with espoused Army
Values. Emerging themes focus on building moral courage through
developmental programs that enable members to “ethically accomplish
the mission despite adversity, obstacles and challenges.”56

54     Jessica L. Wright, “Command Climate Assessments,” Memorandum (Washington, DC:
Under Secretary of Defense, July 25, 2013). See also John McHugh, “Army Command Climate
Assessments. Army Directive 2013-29,” Memorandum (Washington, DC: Secretary of the Army,
December 23, 2013).
55      US Department of Defense, “DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS),” Defense
Equal Opportunity Management Institute, January 1, 2014, http://www.deocs.net/DocDownloads/
Question_FactorBreakout_2014Jan.pdf.
56      “The Army Profession: Keeping the Service on the Right Path,” Soldiers, June 27, 2013,
http://soldiers.dodlive.mil/tag/gen-ray-odierno/.
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However, Army leaders must also consider the untested assumptions challenged by COL Michelson as well as his conclusions. At the
core of the Army’s current approach is the inference that ethical failures
are the results of individual shortcomings, so more training will fix the
problem. Research from the field of behavioral ethics provides substantial evidence to the contrary. Consider that “Organizational culture and
practices also can normalize unethical behavior, so that organizational
members’ unethical acts are committed thoughtlessly. In such situations….considerations of ethics never enter into the cognitive, affective,
and behavioral process leading up to unethical acts.”57 As Schein notes,
it is important to understand that culture is neither right nor wrong, but
it may be misaligned with the environment and stated organizational
principles. And misalignment leads to poor and unacceptable performance by individuals and the collective. Critically important, culture
influences the day-to-day behavior of individuals in their organizational
context.
Given that organizational climate is localized and linked to leaders,
the ethical climate set by leaders “in which they convey ethical expectation, implications, and consequences” does “help employees make sense
of behaviors that are morally equitable and morally inequitable.”58 Thus,
ethical climates should be routinely monitored to strengthen the organization, including the profession. Snider clarifies the profession’s quest:
“Ultimately, virtuous behavior that is self-motivated and policed by the
individual and the institution is the goal.”59 Strategic leaders establish
and influence culture, so they should understand specific organizational
climates, especially the ethical climate within Army organizations.
When ethical leadership is demonstrated as the norm among organizational members, the conditions for a positive ethical climate have been
set. Use of the ECQ within the Army to determine the ethical climate
type and accompanying outcomes (positive and negative) would enable
senior leaders to be proactive rather than reactive to ethical incidents.
In its doctrine, the Army recognizes the value to be gained from the
social and behavioral sciences. Its Human Dimension Concept calls for
the “Use [of] cognitive, physical, and social assessments that measure
abilities,” to enhance individual and organizational development along
those specified components.60 Given the Army’s inherently lethal capabilities, building ethical resilience “to cope with and overcome adversity
in optimally ethical ways” is of paramount importance for the profession
of arms.61

57      Trevino, Weaver, and Reynolds, “Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review,” 968.
58      Christian J. Resick, Michael B. Hargis, Ping Shao, and Scott B. Dust, “Ethical Leadership,
Moral Judgments, and Discretionary Workplace Behavior,” Human Relations 66, no. 7 (2013): 18.
59      Don M. Snider, “Addressing the Army’s Values-to-Virtues Gap,” ARMY (June 2014): 36.
60      US Department of the Army, The US Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full Spectrum
Operations – 2015-2024, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7 (Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine
Command, Army Capabilities Integration Center, Human Dimension Concept, June 11, 2008),
http://www.arcic.army.mil/Concepts/human-dimension.aspx.
61      Alan C. Tjeltveit and Michael C. Gottlieb, “Avoiding the Road to Ethical Disaster: Overcoming
Vulnerabilities and Developing Resilience,” Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training 47, no. 1
(March 2010): 101.
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Training is Not Enough

Without doubt, the Army knows how to train. Training programs,
however, are necessary but not sufficient to address the current challenges. Ethical climates provide leading indicators of potential problems,
but unfortunately they are not assessed in the Army. Despite the central
roles of honor codes in cadets’ lives, US service academies’ training in
morals and values have not precluded periodic scandals within those
esteemed institutions. Rather than identifying purely individual failures,
post-mortem analyses have identified organizational cultures and climates from which ethical dilemmas have emerged. The final report on
the West Point cheating scandal in 1976 cited “unrestrained growth of
the ‘cool-on-honor’ subculture at the Academy, the widespread violations of the Honor Code, the gross inadequacies in the Honor System,
the failure of the Academy to act decisively with respect to known honor
problems, and the other Academy shortcomings.”62 In effect, cadets and
their leaders had become “numb” and “blind” to espoused ethical principles. Nearly forty years later, it appears the findings of the Borman
Commission are still applicable to the larger Army and the other services.
Regardless of the drive to inculcate core military values of honor
and integrity, other service academies have not been spared from
ethical scandals over the succeeding decades. The United States Naval
Academy endured its own honor scandal in 1994 with the revelation
that 134 midshipman cheated on a take-home exam. In 2012, the United
States Air Force Academy reported nearly 80 of its cadets cheated on an
online test. Clearly training is not enough. Special Advisor for Military
Professionalism Admiral Klein asserted “Training is about five to 10
percent of we how develop our character” as she addressed the Navy’s
Recruiting Training Command on ethics and professionalism.63
Unethical behavior extends well beyond academic cheating to the
mistreatment of others by sexual harassment and assault. As the 2005
report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault & Violence at the
Military Service Academies concludes:
...the leadership, staff, faculty, cadets and midshipmen must model behaviors
that reflect and positively convey the value of women in the military. In addition we recommend the Academies use modern survey and management
tools on a permanent basis to provide information to oversight bodies.”64

A decade later, this conclusion compellingly affirms the implicit principles of leadership, values, ethical behavior as well as the need to assess
and monitor climate and culture of military organizations, however elite.

A Way Ahead for the Profession

Army strategic leaders are the senior stewards of the profession—
those entrusted with an invaluable national asset. Accordingly, they shape
and influence culture as well as set direction for the force by establishing

62      Frank Borman, Report of the Special Commission to the Secretary of the Army on the United States
Military Academy (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, December 15, 1976), http://www.
west-point.org/users/usma1983/40768/docs/borman.pdf.
63      Sue Krawczyk, “Rear Adm. Klein Discusses Ethics, Professionalism During RTC Tour,”
America’s Navy, December 15, 2014, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=84878.
64      G. L. Hoewing, and Deliah Rumburg, Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault &
Violence at Military Service Academies (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, June 2006), ES-1.
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priorities aligned with the Army’s ethical principles. These principles
are captured explicitly in The Army Ethic. Senior leaders should direct
two actions:
First, collaborate with and use research from social and behavioral
sciences to develop evidence-based developmental (training and educational) programs with measures of effectiveness for individual character
and moral development.
Second, incorporate or develop empirically validated research
instruments to assess ethical climates and include them as part of the
DoD or separate Army organizational climate survey. Accordingly, the
Center for Army Leadership (CAL) and the Army Research Institute for
the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) should adopt current climate
methodology to its assessment of the Army’s organizational climate and
its ethical climate. The Army has a categorical obligation to develop and
use valid techniques and instruments, making it imperative that valid
assessment instruments are developed and administered throughout the
force.
Currently, the services are using the DEOCS, which is designed to
address particular areas for which the secretary of defense is responsible to provide reports to the Commander-in-Chief and Congress:
the current area of focus is Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
(SAPR). As the DEOCS has evolved, each service will have a servicespecific component of the survey of up to 25 questions (currently at 16
questions). Understandably, OSD would like to maintain consistency
in data collection and reporting—however, the short-term focus precludes inclusion of other important areas like the assessment of ethical
climates within the service. The survey of ethical climates will provide
leading and reinforcing indicators of the four DEOCS components of
EO, EEO, OE, and SAPR.
As OSD designated DEOMI as its proponent to administer service
climate surveys, an executive agent should be assigned to research and
develop ethical climate assessment instruments that are valid within the
services and across the Department of Defense. This may entail taking
existing instruments, such as the ECQ, and testing their validity and
applicability to service populations. If existing assessment instruments
are not generalizable to the service, then research efforts must be undertaken to develop either service-specific or DoD-wide instruments. Each
service has its own research activities—for example, ARI—that could be
directed to develop a research-based assessment. Once the instruments
are developed, OSD must provide new or modify existing policy for
its administration within the operational force and across the services.
Within the Army, its Commanding General, Training and Doctrine
Command (CG, TRADOC) has designated CAL as the proponent for
surveys like the CASAL.

Conclusion—Leaders as Stewards of the Army Profession

Senior leaders do matter. They play a critical role in every organization, especially the Army. Only the senior stewards of the profession
can design and implement the changes needed to meet the US military’s
ethical challenges. For the today’s military profession, the 2005 Defense
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Task Force conclusions should be modified to provide direction and
guidance.
The Army’s organizations should have leaders at all levels who
understand the strength of the Army’s culture; they should redress the
unbalanced focus on competence that is contributing to a weakening
of the trust the Army needs from its members and the society it serves.
Effective assessments and programs aimed at developing ethical climates
will enable leaders to take the necessary actions to make the Army the
trusted profession our nation needs.

Culture and the US Army

Military Innovation and Military Culture
Andrew Hill

Abstract: This article examines the significance of culture as a moderator of innovation, and criticizes monolithic accounts of military
resistance to innovation. It then describes a dimension of military
culture focused on the concept of the ideal combatant, and how that
concept relates to innovation. Military culture can be improved by:
(1) engineering the competitive context for innovation, and (2) creating career paths in which new kinds of personnel have a means of
advancing, while preserving enduring organizational values.

F

or modern militaries, innovation is not a scientific or technical
problem; it is an organizational challenge. Some observers of
innovation speak of “revolutionary” versus “evolutionary,” or
“radical” versus “incremental” innovation.1 These approaches to innovation predict the success or failure of an organization’s adoption of
something new based on how difficult the technology is to adopt. Such
constructs are flawed, because they treat as an independent variable
(the organization’s difficulty in adopting whatever it is that is new) the
very thing we are trying to predict, the theoretical equivalent of a dog
chasing its tail. Furthermore, the magnitude of a technological advance
is not a good predictor of whether an organization will struggle with it.
Militaries may succeed at rapidly adopting new platforms that involve
major technological change, yet fail (or be unforgivably slow) to adopt
innovations that are incremental improvements. Terms like “radical” and
“revolutionary” have little use when applied to predicting the organizational response to an innovation.
Bureaucracies thrive on consistent, standard approaches to resolving
familiar problems. Militaries are bureaucracies that depend on standardization of tools, training, methods, and organization. Innovation
subverts this standardization and consistency, first, in the exploration
of a new approach (the introduction of variance into the system), and
then (if the innovation is successful enough) in the eventual replacement
of the existing approach throughout the organization. The generalization of an innovation requires organizational change, which in turn may
require cultural change. “Culture” is a notoriously vague term, sometimes used as a catch-all to account for behavior in organizations that is
1      Williamson Murray, “Innovation: Past and Future,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period,
ed. Williamson Murray and Allan Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 306310. Michael Tushman and Charles O’Reilly III, “The Ambidextrous Organization: Managing
Evolutionary and Revolutionary Change,” in Managing Strategic Innovation and Change: A Collection of
Readings, 2nd ed., Michael Tushman and Philip Anderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004),
278-82.
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not otherwise explained. It is difficult to describe in practical, tangible
terms.
Organizational researcher Edgar Schein has proposed a compelling
description of organizational culture:
A pattern of basic assumptions—invented, discovered, or developed by a
given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and
internal integration—that has worked well enough to be considered valid
and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive,
think, and feel in relation to these problems.2

Schein’s great insight is to focus attention on aspects of organizational behavior strongly associated with problem-solving and adaptation.
To understand an organization’s culture, Schein invites us to focus on
things associated with what has worked in the past, and to examine the
symbols, norms, values, behaviors, etc., that constitute these things. In
other words, culture is a theory of what works. This definition has great
significance for understanding innovation.
Militaries are societies unto themselves, with their own sociology,
history, values and beliefs. Military culture is built on these principles of
shared history and values. Operational and strategic concepts of “what
works” in the military context are entwined with principles of social
status and individual identity; consider the Air Force’s difficulties in
reconciling the increasing operational capabilities of unmanned aircraft
with its pilot-centric values, or the tortured logic of the Navy’s continued
reliance on the aircraft carrier as its central offensive asset, or the Army’s
continued devotion to the heavy fight. Innovation is not simply—or
even mostly—a question of capabilities and resources. Military innovation not only affects the way wars are prosecuted, but also changes the
order of military society, altering the relationship between the soldier,
sailor, marine, or airman and the organization. Elting Morison writes,
The opposition, where it occurs, of the soldier and sailor to [innovation]
springs from the normal human instinct to protect oneself, and, more
especially, one’s way of life. Military organizations are societies built around
and upon the prevailing weapons systems. Intuitively and quite correctly
the military man feels that a change in weapons portends a change in the
arrangements of his society.3

This article examines the individual element of military culture
as it relates to innovation. This perspective is necessarily incomplete.
Military culture is not just about individuals. It also exists at the strategic
level (what Carl Builder ably termed concepts of war), and even at the
national level.4 The focus of this essay is the “cultural concept of the
ideal combatant,” that is, assumptions underlying the role of a human
being in warfare—what makes an effective commander or subordinate,
and what the proper basis of the relationship is between the two. When
innovations align with a military organization’s concept of the ideal
combatant, the natural tendencies of the organization can be trusted to
succeed in developing and implementing the change. However, when the
innovation does not align with the concept of war, or when it undermines
2      Edgar Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 4th ed. (New York: Jossey Bass, 2010), 17.
3      Elting Morison, “A Case Study of Innovation,” Engineering and Science 13, no. 7 (1950): 8.
4     Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 127.
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assumptions about what makes an effective commander or subordinate,
leaders should expect that the innovation will be resisted.
This article helps leaders anticipate resistance to innovation rooted
in a misalignment between the current concept of the ideal combatant
and the new concept underlying an innovation. If leaders understand
the nature of this resistance, they will be better positioned to develop
appropriate responses to it.

Military Culture and Innovation
The Conservative Culture Hypothesis

Some explanations for military resistance to innovation claim there
is something in the essence of the military milieu or the military mind
that is antithetical to change. Williamson Murray describes this view,
“Military institutions exist in a culture of disciplined obedience in which
soldiers, sailors and airmen must remain steadfast in the face of terrifying
conditions… But disciplined organizations rarely place a high value on
new and untried ideas, concepts and innovations.”5 This can be termed
the “conservative culture hypothesis.” Samuel Huntington employs this
hypothesis when he describes the “military mind” as one that views the
world through the lens of “conservative realism.”6 An effective military
emphasizes order, obedience, hierarchy, division of function, and the
supremacy of the society over the individual. “Society” can mean both
the micro-society of the military and the society of the state the military
man or woman is sworn to protect. Military organizations are constantly
reinforcing their ties to the past, which serves two purposes. First,
military organizations value ceremony and tradition, emphasizing the
distinctness of the military community and imbuing its members with a
stronger sense of collective identity. Second, militaries value the knowledge of history, which, as Moltke said, is “the most effective method
of teaching war during peace.” 7 One can learn valuable lessons from
the experiences of others, using it to develop principles and concepts
for potential future application. Therefore, military organizations are
hyper-attentive to what has worked in the past, further strengthening
the military’s culture. According to the conservative culture hypothesis,
the classic military virtues of obedience, self-sacrifice, collectivism,
devotion to tradition and knowledge of history are strengths in preparing for and fighting war, but liabilities when the organization is seeking
to change.
The conservative culture hypothesis of military resistance to innovation is supported by some findings from broader studies of innovation
in other organizations.8 The hypothesis appropriately focuses not on
the strength of the military culture, but on its content. It is incorrect
to suggest a strong culture necessarily inhibits innovation. We must
5      Murray, “Innovation: Past and Future,” 301. Although I cite Murray, he is not a proponent of
this view. For his nuanced view of how military organizations respond to innovation, see his essays
in Innovation in the Interwar Period and his more recent Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
6      Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 79.
7      Quoted in Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 64.
8     Francis Flynn and Jennifer Chatman, “Strong Cultures and Innovation: Oxymoron or
Opportunity?” in Managing Strategic Innovation and Change: A Collection of Readings, 2nd ed., ed. Michael
Tushman and Philip Anderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 234-251.
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know something about the content of the culture to make that claim.
Organizations with strong cultures may be innovative if their cultures
encourage behaviors supporting innovation. For the military, the
conservative culture hypothesis posits that its cultural content stifles
innovation. For example, militaries emphasize the good of the group
over the individual, which discourages individual departures from
group norms. Military norms tend to be task-oriented and convergent
(focused on narrowing options and meeting mission requirements) as
opposed to idea-oriented and divergent (focused on developing good
ideas and expanding the range of ideas under consideration). Finally,
militaries value uniformity over diversity. Members of the military may
come from diverse backgrounds, but diversity is suppressed because personnel must be substitutable, a necessary condition in an organization
whose members are subject to sudden and violent death. The conservative culture hypothesis suggests all of these characteristics (collectivism,
convergent thinking, uniformity, etc.) militate against effective innovation in military organizations.
However, the conservative culture hypothesis has two problems.
First, it treats innovation as a monolithic phenomenon, when in fact
successful innovation is a process during which a given aspect of the
culture may be both a strength and a weakness, albeit at different stages.
The conservative culture hypothesis focuses on the content of military
culture that inhibits the generation of innovative ideas, but it does not
consider that the same characteristics that may hinder the emergence of
ideas (for example, a strong deference to authority) would facilitate their
implementation. The military is an execution-oriented culture, and military organizations will effectively implement innovations that receive
organizational endorsement. Thus, the notion innovation will improve
if the group’s norms for uniformity and convergence are diminished is
true only if that attenuation affects the organization during idea generation and not implementation.
The second, more significant, problem with the conservative culture
hypothesis is that it offers no explanation as to why militaries have different responses to different innovations. As mentioned above, many good
ideas do emerge in military organizations, with the responses ranging
from enthusiastic acceptance to fanatical rejection. To understand this
difference within the military context, it is not enough to say the military
has an anti-innovation culture.

Cultural Resistance to Innovation

To understand whether a military will struggle with an innovation, we must look beyond the technological challenges and examine
the relationship between an innovation and the culture. How does the
innovation align with the organizational concept of an ideal combatant? How does the innovation align with current cultural assumptions
in terms of honor, the delegation of authority, and the tolerance for
variation and the desired degree of uniformity? How does an innovation
affect how commanders lead, how subordinates obey, or how individual
combatants prepare for and fight wars? This link between an innovation
and the social structure of the military is the “cultural concept of the
ideal combatant.” While the content of this concept is complex, this
article highlights three characteristics especially relevant to innovation:
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1. The conduct of honorable warfare: how the organization values physical
courage in the context of war, and how it views the morality, justice
and fairness of various weapons and effects; e.g., the use of submarines or landmines, or the acceptability of civilian casualties.
2. The delegation of decision-making authority: how much the organization
delegates or centralizes the decisions to use force, modify a military
asset, alter a plan, or call on supporting assets, for example.
3. The degree of regularity in military assets, and the tolerance for differences among
those assets: how much a leader accepts variation in equipment, training,
effects, etc.

Honorable Warfare and Resistance to Innovation

The first element considered in this analysis is the organization’s
idea of honorable warfare. Honor is an inextricable component of the
military profession. It is an expression of many characteristics of military culture—obedience, courage, duty, self-sacrifice, tradition, fairness
and justice, and treatment of non-combatants. How does an innovation
align with ideas of honorable war? Consider three components: courage,
justice, and violence against civilians.
For the first seven thousand years of civilization, physical courage
was an inherent characteristic of all warfare. To kill, a combatant had
to be in a position of some vulnerability. Yet the nature of this courage
evolved over time in response to changes in warfare. The courage of
a pilot in the Second World War differed from that of a soldier in the
United States Civil War, which differed from that of a knight in the
Hundred Years’ War. One is not necessarily more courageous than the
other, but the value of each type of courage is highly dependent on
context. Continuous-aim gunnery revolutionized the accuracy of naval
gunfire; Elting Morison describes how these improvements changed the
nature of physical courage required for naval warfare: “The fourteeninch rifle, which could place a shell upon a possible target six miles away,
had long ago annihilated the Nelsonian doctrine… [It was] not that men
were no longer brave, but that 100 years after the battle of the Nile they
had to reveal their bravery in a different way.”9
Every generation in a military organization develops a unique
sense of the courage required in war. What was courageous behavior
in a prior conflict may be reckless or futile in a later one. Yet military
cultures will try to resist an innovation that upends their principles of
honorable warfare before succumbing to the logic of a new weapon.
Courage and recklessness are contextual, and the technology of war is
crucial to that context. A Royal Navy commander with the “disposition
to close” during the Napoleonic wars might perform well in battle, but
such behavior would be suicidal in engagements with German battleships during the First World War. An innovation that alters the calculus
of courage also changes the social context of war, and will therefore be
resisted by the organization.

9      Elting Morison, “Gunfire at Sea: A Case Study of Innovation,” in Managing Strategic Innovation
and Change: A Collection of Readings, ed. Michael Tushman and Philip Anderson (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 66.
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Unmanned aircraft provide a striking illustration of this dynamic.
As discussed above, the character of aerial combat changed dramatically
in the decades following the Second World War, but because every generation of pilot remained susceptible to a sudden and violent death in the
air, they shared a common identity. The operators of a remotely piloted
UAV remain conspicuously outside of that fraternity, despite the fact the
machines they pilot have more in common with modern piloted attack
aircraft than do first and second-generation fighters. What is different
about operators of UAVs? They attack from positions of relative safety.
In many cases, the ground crews supporting the drones are at greater
risk than the drone pilots. UAVs undermine one of the core assumptions
of the community of attack pilots—to be an effective pilot, you must
face danger. The initial response of that community—ridicule and rejection of drone operators—was entirely predictable.10
Since innovations often change the nature of courage required
of combatants, they also change the conditions of susceptibility of a
combatant to violence. Note that the innovation may increase or decrease
a combatant’s susceptibility. The issue is how the innovation affects a
generation’s concept of justice in conflict—how much risk combatants
should assume and whether they have the ability to fight back. The
advent of submarines created a fundamental problem for naval strategists: how to exploit the capabilities of the platform while adhering to
the rules of surface warfare. The ultimate answer—one cannot—was
preceded by several attempts to control the use of submarines. The
London Naval Treaty (1930) was an attempt by the United Kingdom,
the United States, Italy, France and Japan to regulate submarine warfare,
forcing submarines to abide by “prize rules,” requiring crews of merchant vessels be placed in safety before their ships may be sunk.11 Such
exercises in restraint are usually overcome by the expediencies of war,
but in the meantime they hinder exploration of affected technologies
and the integration of those technologies into broader operational concepts. It is probably not coincidental that militaries had fewer qualms
about unrestricted submarine warfare after advances in antisubmarine
defenses (sonar, depth charges, aerial surveillance) improved the odds
for the surface combatants.
To the degree that innovations undermine existing assumptions
about fairness in war, they are likely to be resisted. The reaction to
innovations that reduce risk in the defensive or the offensive is more
ambiguous. It seems a military’s response to such changes largely
depends on whether it enjoys an advantage under the prevailing way
of war. An innovation that significantly increases risk in the offensive
(machine guns, for example) is likely to be resisted by militaries with
favorable offensive capabilities under the existing competitive system.
The ideal combatant does not kill indiscriminately. Innovations may
change the degree to which the effects of war are felt by non-combatants. Military organizations develop rules or procedures to determine
acceptable civilian losses in pursuit of a military goal, yet technology
changes the variables in this calculation. Militaries seek to limit civilian
10     P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New York:
Penguin Books, 2009), 253-254, 367-368.
11      Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005), 589-592.
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casualties, and innovations that allow for greater precision in effects
(such as guided munitions or improved surveillance) are likely to be
embraced. However, some innovations decrease military control over
collateral damage, and in such cases, militaries may struggle to adapt.
The great challenge is that resistance to innovation on moral grounds
is often appropriate. (Consider the United States military’s abandonment
of offensive chemical and biological weapons.) The military profession is
not simply tasked with executing humanity’s wars; it also helps to determine what kinds of wars humanity will accept. Nuclear weapons are
history’s most powerful example of this task. But “the bomb” remains a
fact of the global military environment, despite its grotesque character;
until that changes, nuclear weapons should be susceptible to innovation. However, from the moment of the Trinity test on July 16, 1945, the
military profession has struggled with how to think about them. The
condition of US nuclear strategy almost seventy years after Trinity attests
to these challenges.
More often, innovations that run afoul of a military’s concept of
honorable warfare are not such stark moral challenges, but more subtle
deviations (such as Morison’s example of naval gunnery). In such cases,
it is not at all clear that the resistance to such innovations is good for
the future effectiveness of the organization. In general, innovations that
reduce military control over the effects on civilians are resisted.

The Shifting Balance of Control over Decision-Making

The second aspect of the concept of a combatant is the optimal
delegation of authority to make decisions. What is the appropriate
balance between detailed orders, procedures, etc., and the exercise of
individual initiative? In war, it is necessary for commanders to exercise
control over their forces, but it is also necessary for subordinate units
to interpret orders in light of changing conditions on the battlefield.
Carl von Clausewitz captured this tension when he wrote, “Everything
is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”12 Worded less
poetically, simplicity in conception and simplicity in execution are not
the same. The optimal balance between a commander’s tight control
and a subordinate’s freedom to adapt is not fixed, but changes over time
as the context of war changes. Innovation can alter the balance in either
direction.
Consider the authority to decide whether to attack hostile ground
forces from the air, particularly when the enemy is in close proximity to
friendly units. In the absence of communications technology, the pilot
must have the authority to decide on his or her own whether (and where)
to attack. However, when communications put a pilot within reach of
an air controller or some other coordinating mechanism, the pilot must
cede some of that authority. In that case, innovation nudges the balance
of authority in favor of greater command and control.
The evolution of infantry tactics in response to rapid-firing artillery
and machine guns offers an example of the opposite effect—innovations
prompting greater delegation of authority to subordinates. The slaughter
of infantry advancing in close order over open ground required that
12      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. by J.J. Graham (London: N. Trübner, 1873), 40.
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armies adopt a different means of assault, advancing by small groups,
using protective fire and moving in and out of cover. This tactic puts
infantry units out of contact with their commanders during crucial
moments of battle, and requires that junior non-commissioned officers
assume more authority in directing others and making tactical decisions.
Whichever direction the innovation pushes the balance, any alteration is likely to cause some social upheaval. However, the eternal and
abiding desire of commanders is to reduce the fog and friction of war.
Innovations that shift the balance in favor of greater transparency and
more direct control of their forces are therefore likely to be viewed more
favorably than those that shift greater responsibility to subordinates,
however necessary the transition of authority. The historian Michael
Howard, in an account of the evolution of European military strategy
leading up to the First World War, described how the French high
command initially embraced fire-and-maneuver tactics (based on the
experience of the British in the Boer War), only to reverse itself. Howard
wrote, “Such tactics demanded of the ordinary soldier a degree of skill
and self-reliance such as neither the French nor any other European army
(with the possible exception of the Germans) had hitherto expected, or
done anything to inculcate, either in their junior officers or in their other
ranks.”13 The conviction that turned the French high command back to
close-order assault was its belief in the absolute necessity of maintaining
contact between officers and infantry comprised mostly of conscripts
in the event of general mobilization. Howard imagined the question
leaders posed to themselves, “How could these lonely, frightened men,
deprived of the intoxication of drums and trumpets, the support of their
comrades, the inspiration of their leaders, find within themselves the
courage to die?”14 Innovations that shift greater responsibility to subordinates will be resisted more strongly than those that do the opposite.

The Desire for Uniformity and the Need for Differences

The preference of military organizations for greater predictability on the battlefield also informs the third and final variable in this
discussion of the concept of an ideal combatant: the desired degree of
regularity and the tolerance for differences. How much does a military
organization value consistency in equipment, training, and procedure
for similar personnel and units? Military organizations value predictability (knowing what effects can be achieved by a given military asset,
for example) and substitutability (knowing that a replacement asset can
achieve those same effects). Both are improved by standardization.
Commanders are comforted by the idea that the choice of unit A or
unit B is not a choice between two units with meaningful differences
in equipment and training—when commanders articulate their intent,
units will execute that intent with similar means and methods. This uniformity improves predictability. It is also necessary for substitutability.
A unit whose deployment ends or is rotated out due to losses can be
replaced by a unit with similar capabilities. Of course, there is no such
thing as perfect predictability and substitutability, but militaries do what
they can to reduce uncertainty in these areas. At the extreme, the ideal
13      Michael Howard, “Men Against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914,” International Security 9,
no. 1 (1984): 52.
14      Ibid., 50.
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combatant, whether a commander or a subordinate, is replicable across
the entire organization. How tolerant is the organization of variations
in equipment, training and procedure? Meaningful innovations may
require staged adoption, particularly if the employment of the innovation is not yet fully understood. That means the organization must
introduce variation and diminish uniformity, not a prospect military
leaders relish. Furthermore, there is great potential for learning from
uncontrolled variance in member behaviors.
During the first year of the United States Civil War, the Chief of
Ordnance of the Army, General James Ripley received numerous reports
regarding the effectiveness of Spencer and Henry rifles. These breechloading, repeating rifles, though less accurate than some muzzle-loaders
at great distances, were accurate at ranges less than 200 yards and greatly
increased the potential rate of fire for an infantryman using one—with
the Henry, at least sixteen rounds before reloading, compared to two or
three shots per minute for a competent soldier using a muzzle-loading
weapon. The math was compelling, but not to Ripley, who, in a letter to
the Secretary of the Army in December, 1861, explained his objection
to purchasing more than a small number of the weapons for field trials:
The multiplication of arms and ammunition of different kinds and patterns,
and working on different principles is decidedly objectionable, and should,
in my opinion, be stopped by the refusal to introduce any more unless upon
the most full and complete evidence of their great superiority.15

For General Ripley, the repeating rifles introduced an unacceptable
degree of variation in ammunition and arms, as well as the requirement
to issue much more ammunition to soldiers using Henrys and Spencers.
His response captures the way the military virtue of uniformity becomes
an impediment to adopting significant innovations. What advantage
would the Union have gained through the broad fielding of Henrys
and Spencers, coupled with training in controlled rates of aimed fire
(for Ripley’s concerns about ammunition were not entirely baseless—a
panicked soldier could exhaust his ammunition in minutes)?
Within the United States military, the degree of uniformity varies
both across services and branches within services. The more interconnected a combatant or unit is with a broader system of resources, the
less tolerant is the organization for departures from standard equipment and procedures. The Navy and the Air Force operate complex,
interdependent platforms, and small deviations can result in significant
displacements in their systems. This makes staged adoption much more
challenging—requiring more central coordination. However, the Army,
the Marine Corps, and Special Operations forces, in particular, have
greater latitude for exploring the effects of innovations in the operational
context. With small-scale or modular innovations, an organization can
do partial fielding or field experimentation. The more novel a weapon
or tactic, the more field experimentation is required. Yet even effective demonstrations may result in the rejection of the innovation if the
organization deems the results cannot be generalized.
In war, military personnel try new things in response to operational
challenges, and the organization tolerates this experimentation because
15      US War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies, Series 3, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899).
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it (usually) values tactical and operational success more than it does
rigid adherence to standard procedure. During peace, this tolerance for
uncontrolled experimentation (in the form of uncontrolled modifications of equipment, procedures, etc.) is much diminished, and hinders
innovation.
A military’s ideal concept of a commander, a subordinate, and the
proper relationship between them are partially determined by ideas about
honorable war, of the proper delegation of authority, and the appropriate
degree of uniformity in the organization. Innovations that challenge
these ideas can be expected to encounter resistance. In summary, military organizations will tend to resist innovations that:
•• Challenge existing notions of the nature and use of physical courage
•• Unfavorably change the balance of risk in the offensive or the defensive
•• Reduce control over the effects of military operations
•• Decentralize decision-making
•• Reduce the uniformity and substitutability of military assets
Leaders who recognize the ways in which an innovation is misaligned
with the dominant concepts of honorable warfare, decision-making
control, and regularity in military assets will be better positioned to set
the right conditions for change.

Leading Cultural Change, or Managing It?

When an innovation is incompatible with dominant cultural concepts, successful innovation leadership involves three key tasks: (1)
identifying the assumptions of the role of the ideal combatant that
underlie an innovation, and the extent to which those new concepts
align with the existing culture; (2) demonstrating that new assumptions
that are misaligned with the prevailing culture will improve the organization’s performance in the kinds of conflicts it anticipates; and (3)
persuading the organization that the new concept of a combatant is not
a rejection of the enduring values of the organization. This is a decidedly
heroic view of the role of the leader in leading innovation, in the face of
cultural resistance. But how realistic is it?
Innovation leadership in the military is constrained by three enduring characteristics of the military environment: (1) the need to innovate
in peacetime, (2) the control of military leaders over the instruments of
innovation; and (3) and the system of internal development and promotion of officers.
Although militaries exist for war, they operate more frequently (at
least in the modern era) in times of relative peace. This means militaries
need to imagine and to manufacture wartime conditions during times
of peace. War is the most persuasive and unforgiving of all competitive
contexts. As the saying goes, “the enemy gets a vote,” and the enemy is
very good at identifying and exploiting gaps between the full tactical,
operational and strategic possibilities of war and the military’s partial
understanding of those possibilities. The organization’s natural resistance
to embracing an effective innovation will not alter an enemy’s exploitation
of a stubborn adherence to ineffective approaches. For example, when
allied bombers lacking long-range fighter escorts suffered 20 percent
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losses in two raids against Schweinfurt in August and October, 1943, the
notion bombers could protect themselves through mutually supporting
fires seemed conclusively refuted. The allies suspended deep penetration
raids, only resuming them when longer-range escorts became available.16
But such stark facts are not naturally created in times of peace. The key
is creating conditions in peacetime that reveal the essential qualities of
a new problem, or the opportunities inherent in a new configuration of
technology, procedure, or technique. This is a leadership responsibility. But engineering such conditions requires a willingness to challenge
established concepts, bringing us to back to military leadership.
Military leaders control the use of resources for the purpose of
exploration and innovation. Military innovation is deliberate and
planned. The US military has units devoted to experimentation, but the
experimentation tends to occur within an established framework, and,
crucially, it focuses on resolving the problems presented by that framework, as opposed to discovering and solving problems unacknowledged
by that framework.17 In the decade before the First World War, the
British Army struggled to incorporate the machine gun effectively into
its operating concepts, largely because the Army’s conceptual problems
were framed in terms of offensive operations. The extraordinary and
transformational character of the machine gun as a defensive weapon
was therefore poorly understood.18 Furthermore, because militaries are
both public and authoritarian organizations, the entrepreneurial use of
military resources for unplanned experimentation and innovation tends
to be discouraged (to put it lightly) in peacetime. (Note that these constraints are relaxed in wartime, when the unsanctioned modification of
government equipment is common.)
Finally, as a result of the modern system of officer development
and promotion, senior officers tend to achieve their positions because
they (1) have the individual characteristics the organization desires in
its leaders, and (2) served as officers in the positions valued under the
existing culture. Their careers are reflections of prevailing concepts of
honorable war, the delegation of authority, or the degree of uniformity.
If the prescription for overcoming resistance to innovation is that senior
leaders undermine or abandon the strategic culture and values upon
which they have built their careers, the organization is likely to be disappointed. This is the paradox of innovation leadership: senior military
leaders are best positioned to create an environment that allows the
organization to discover and validate new ways of doing things, but they
are ill-suited to the tasks of identification, demonstration and persuasion
that are core to innovation leadership.
Given these three conditions—the need to innovate in peacetime,
control of leaders over the means to innovate, and the internal system of
leader development and promotion—heroic leadership may not achieve
the innovation results the military needs. Indeed, when an innovation is
16      Donald Miller, Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi
Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 195-205.
17      This roughly corresponds to what the philosopher Thomas Kuhn termed “normal science.”
See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2012), 24-27.
18      Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern
Warfare, 1900-1918 (Winchester, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 62-70.
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misaligned with the culture, leadership will more reliably stifle change
than encourage it. Yet leaders lead directly and indirectly. In innovation, direct leadership involves the use of authority to validate problems
and direct resources to the solution of those problems. It is deliberate.
However, such deliberate approaches tend to reinforce, rather than challenge, existing cultural assumptions. The data and reasoning driving
deliberate, top-down innovation leadership are themselves products of
the existing culture. When an innovation is aligned with the culture, the
organization can be trusted to manage the innovation well—whether
it’s managed from the top-down or the bottom-up. When the two are
not aligned, however, the leader must create conditions in which the
organization’s culture can change.
Military innovations that solve problems not yet validated will be
ignored or deprived of resources, more so during periods of fiscal constraint. Indeed, the most significant innovations may not solve validated
problems, beginning on the periphery (or entirely outside) of the organization’s dominant culture and strategy (e.g., carrier aviation), as solutions
in search of problems. Strategic military leaders are uniquely positioned
to create conditions such that organizations discover and validate new
military problems.

Recommendation 1: Engineer the Competitive Context of Innovation

In peacetime, leaders are responsible for engineering the organizational context to create conditions enabling inductive innovation—the
discovery and validation of new military problems. Indirect or “emergent” innovation leadership involves the management of the competitive
context for innovation. Whereas deliberate innovation leadership relies
on the omniscience of the senior leader, emergent approaches use the
full scope of the organization to explore and exploit new possibilities.
The competitive context is the way in which the organization identifies
the problems of competition it wishes to solve, and how it allocates
resources across the set of potential solutions to those problems. The
assumptions upon which a culture is based are changed through the
demonstration of viable (and preferable) alternatives; the competitive
environment in which a new approach is evaluated provides the context
for this demonstration. Every war game, every simulation, every conflict that involves other nations, every examination of strategy (even in
fiction) is an opportunity to discover something new.

Recommendation 2: Teach Officers How to Challenge Their Assumptions

Exploration and experimentation is pointless if we have not determined what information would cause us to question our assumptions.
Change happens when the old idea is invalidated by new facts, and a
new idea replaces it. Although improving military education may be a
commonplace recommendation for critics who have run out of ideas,
it is nevertheless foundational to learning how to learn. This requires
nothing less than a commitment to educating leaders about the character and sources of knowledge—epistemology. We are rarely aware of the
typical, self-preserving, responses that we have to dissonant information. Our tools for gathering and analyzing data become more powerful
every year, yet our understanding of the fundamental logic and methods
of research is not keeping pace. Throughout the continuum of officer
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education, we must learn and re-learn the core principles of epistemology: logic, scientific reasoning, and research methods. In order to create
conditions for this change, leaders should understand what constitutes a
refutation of dominant concepts of war and the role of combatants in it.
This is about teaching officers how to learn, how to change their minds,
and how to embrace complexity.

Recommendation 3: Give Officers Paths to Success

Two powerful mechanisms through which leaders change culture
are (1) the allocation of rewards and status, and (2) the recruiting, selection, retention, and promotion of leaders.19 Significant innovations
present leaders with personnel management challenges. When a change
in the way a military fights creates a new job, how does that job fit
into the organization’s existing framework for retention and promotion? Advanced militaries have elaborate systems for rewarding good
officers, and for signaling to those officers (and to their peers) who in
the organization has been identified as having potential for senior positions. In the 1920s, the US Navy successfully managed the addition of
an entirely new (and large) part of the officer corps—naval aviators.
This success rested on the astute decisions of Admiral William Moffett,
who ensured aviators served in positions that required knowledge of
surface warfare, and that non-aviators could command aviation units.20
Thus, although naval aviation posed a serious challenge to the dominant
concept of naval warfare, the naval aviation community came to be seen
as a part of the broader community of naval officers, one that supported
the core values of the US Navy. This delicate balance between revolution and conservation is exceedingly difficult to manage, and Admiral
Moffett stands out because of how well he struck that balance. He was
at various times opposed both by the traditional Navy community, and
by the aviators. His core policies can be summarized as follows. First, he
ensured naval aviators could achieve flag officer positions by requiring
them to develop proficiency in the broader community of naval leadership. Second, he created conditions in which traditional naval officers
interacted with and led aviation units, enabling them to see the new
capability within a broadened framework of naval warfare.
Admiral Moffett’s achievement was built on a simple principle: he
remained focused on the idea that naval aviation was an instrument of
naval power; this helped him avoid the trap of confusing technology
with identity. One of the greatest challenges to military innovation is
the way that military professionals over time derive their professional
identity from the technologies with which they interact, as opposed to
the effects those technologies are intended to achieve. Significant military innovation often requires professional identity be divorced from
platforms, and tied to higher-level concepts of operations.21 Yet such
disruption must preserve the organization’s enduring values. No new
military community will survive if it is seen to be opposed to these
beliefs and values.
19      Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 246.
20      Geoffrey Till, “Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: British, American and Japanese Case Studies,”
in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Williamson Murray and Allan Millett (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 210-11. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation
and the Modern Military (London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 76-80.
21      Morison, “Gunfire at Sea: A Case Study of Innovation,” 11.
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Conclusion

Courage, honor, authority, control, predictability—these are powerful military concepts. Innovations that appear to subvert them stand
little chance of success. In peacetime, significant military innovations
inevitably run up against the dominant concepts of the role of the combatant, and provoke organizational responses that range from simple
resistance to deliberate deception. Leaders who understand the culture of
the organization will be able to anticipate such responses. Furthermore,
through officer development and education, fostering informal experimentation, organizational design, and systems of officer promotion and
retention, leaders can build structures and career paths that protect new
approaches when they are most vulnerable to the dominant paradigm.
One of the greatest responsibilities of strategic military leadership is
fostering a context in which good ideas have a chance to develop into
effective means and methods of war. The future depends on it.

Changes in War’s Character

The Individualization of American Warfare
Glenn J. Voelz

Abstract: Since 9-11, the United States has embarked on a decade
of doctrinal and technical innovations focused on defeating networks and individual combatants rather than formations. This article examines this evolving model of individualized warfare within
the context of current debates over the appropriate role of military
landpower in an age dominated by persistent threats from non-state
actors and unconventional adversaries.

I

n late 2014, the United States reached a milestone of the 500th
non-battlefield targeted strike.1 Beyond the numbers, this event
is notable as one example of a new mode of state warfare based
on military power being applied directly against individual combatants
rather than formations. These so-called “targeted killings” are perhaps
the most vivid example of the individualization of American warfare,
particularly the Commander-in-Chief routinely reviewing and approving
strikes against named combatants, a phenomenon “without precedent
in presidential history.”2 However, this operational trend is by no means
limited to high-level counterterrorism efforts. It represents a more systematic disaggregation of national security threats and the adoption of
an individualized approach to military targeting that has dramatically
transformed the American way of war. Within this paradigm, the targeting of “high value individuals” and networks has replaced conventional
force engagement as the driving force of recent doctrinal change and
technical innovation.”
As the defining operational experience for a generation of junior
leaders, this new mode of warfare reflects the culmination of a decade of
tactical lessons, doctrinal adaptations, technical advances, and changes
to the institutional cultures of the US military. Indeed, since 9-11 the US
armed forces have “developed the fusion of operations and intelligence
for the purpose of hunting high-value targets into a high art.”3 Yet even
as these methods have been widely applied, there remains insufficient
analysis as to their effectiveness and utility as an element of US military
1      Micah Zenko, “The US Just Launched Its 500th Drone Strike,” Defense One, November 21,
2014, The New American Foundation, Long War Journal, and Bureau of Investigative Journalism all monitor
US drone strikes taking place outside the “active combat zones” of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya.
The sum of 500 total strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia represent an average among the range
of estimates as of November 2014.
2      Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,”
New York Times, May 29, 2012.
3      Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwille, Raphael S.
Cohen, Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014) 26
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power.4 This article describes the catalysts driving the individualization
of American warfare and considers the implications for future national
security strategy and the Army.

A Post-Westphalian Logic of Warfare

The rise of individualized warfare stands in stark contrast to the preceding Cold War era where focus of operational planning, intelligence
analysis, and doctrine centered primarily on the conduct of large-scale
conventional warfare against nation-state adversaries. The transition is
even more profound as a departure from the foundational presumptions of the “Westphalian” system that defined the context of state
warfare for over three hundred years. The end of the Thirty Years War
was notable as the transition point from the age of private mercenary
conflicts towards a modern construct of warfare in which combatants
became instruments of the state, acting on behalf of political sovereigns
rather than fighting for individual gain.5 This period also marked the
“depersonalization” of conflict as soldiers assumed collective identities
as members of professional armies. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s seminal
treatise on political power articulated the significance of this transition,
noting modern warfare was no longer a “relationship between one man
and another, but a relationship between one state and another, in which
individuals are enemies only by accident, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers.”6 This shift provided the intellectual foundation
for legal categorizations supporting the concept of lawful combatancy
and the treatment of prisoners, wounded soldiers, and civilians on the
battlefield.
As the Westphalian system depersonalized warfare, soldiers became
“generic” members of their national armies in terms of legal status and
appearance. Geo-political boundaries and national affiliations determined the application and scope of wartime protections, while uniforms
emerged to distinguish soldiers from civilians and to provide the operational context for lawful targeting.7 Within this mode of warfare, the
treatment of soldiers became status-based, meaning that privileges,
obligations and rules of engagement were no longer linked to individual
identity but rather to the soldiers’ generic status as part of a state formation.8 This convention has come under challenge as a result of recent
conflicts waged by “unprivileged enemy belligerents,” disqualified from
the privileges of combatant status as a result of joining or substantially
supporting non-state armed groups in the conduct of hostilities. The
ambiguous status of these combatants has led to a revolution in the logic
4      A recent paper by Austin Long, “Whack-a-Mole or Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and
Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Security Studies 23, no. 3 (July 2014) offers a useful
overview of recent scholarship on the topic and thoughtful examination of leadership targeting in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Separately, there is a significant body of literature on Israeli use of targeted
killings and methods of precision targeting, particularly in relation to operations in Gaza. While
potentially useful as a comparative case study, that discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
5      Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 162-163.
6      Jean Jacques Rousseau, “The Social Contract,” in The Social Contract and Other Writings, ed.
Victor Gourevitch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 51.
7      Gabriella Blum, “The Individualization of War: From War to Policing in the Regulation of
Armed Conflicts,” in Law and War: An Introduction, eds. Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha
Merrill Umphrey (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 52.
8      For elaboration on this concept see Gabriella Blum, “The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers,”
Journal of Legal Analysis 2, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 115-147.
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of military targeting and a shift towards highly individualized assessment of threats. This new operational paradigm reflects a personalized
form of warfare where the legitimate use of military force has become
“tied to quasi-adjudicative judgments about the individual acts and roles
of specific enemy figures.”9

Doctrine and Individualized Warfare

The individualization of American warfare is readily apparent in
contemporary doctrine and operational practices, specifically in applications of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies. Debates
over these war-fighting theories have led to doctrinal incoherence with
regard to specific methods; however, on a conceptual and operational
level they share the important commonality of systematically individualizing the adversary. One of the early lessons of campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan was “conventional warfare approaches often were ineffective when applied to operations other than major combat, forcing
leaders to realign the ways and means of achieving effects.”10 The central
challenge, as the Army’s targeting manual notes, was in “contrast to
major theater operations where the purpose is to find and destroy ships,
tank formations, or infrastructure, the most difficult task in insurgencies
is finding the enemy.”11 Over the last decade the US military has demonstrated remarkable adaptability towards this end, marked by a major
evolution in doctrinal methods and war-fighting approaches focused on
the problem of identifying and targeting individual combatants. While
counterinsurgency doctrine pointedly emphasizes a broad range of
governance and stability measures, much of the tactical focus in recent
campaigns gravitated towards highly refined kinetic and non-kinetic targeting efforts designed to “identify and separate the reconcilables from
the irreconcilables.”12 This effort included aggressive efforts to identify
key actors within insurgent networks and conduct kill/capture operations against top-tier targets.13 Over the last decade, doctrinal methods
evolved in direct response to these operational priorities and strategic
approaches.
The “find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate” targeting
approach evolved specifically as the preferred methodology for identifying and engaging high-value individuals.14 US forces in both Iraq
and Afghanistan applied this find-and-fix approach with great success
against insurgent networks and terrorist cells. In Iraq, these networkbased targeting approaches were used to develop “all-source intelligence
to provide situational awareness of the local environment, its social
9      Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, “Targeted Warfare: Individuating Enemy
Responsibility,” New York University Law Review 88, no. 5 (November 2013): 1521.
10      US Joint Chief of Staff, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division (J7), Decade of
War Volume 1: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs
of Staff, June 15, 2012), 2.
11      US Department of the Army, The Targeting Process, Field Manual 3-60 (Washington, DC: US
Department of the Army, November 26, 2010), Appendix B-1.
12      General David Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq,
“Counterinsurgency Guidance,” June 21, 2008.
13      One may arguably identify precursor models of individualized targeting in the Phoenix
Program from Vietnam or from other counterinsurgency examples. However, these cases are significantly different from recent US experience in terms of the scope of application, as well as the
broader intellectual, technical and doctrinal impact on war-fighting strategy.
14      Also sometimes referred to as F3EAD.
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networks, key decision-makers, and their motivations,” most famously
applied during the successful effort to track, target, and kill terrorist
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.15 In Afghanistan, such individualized
approaches were used extensively in targeting insurgent networks, resulting in a five-fold increase in raids between 2009 and 2011 designed to
capture or kill high-level insurgents.16 Beyond targeting active combatants, similar methods were applied against drug producers and criminal
networks as a means to undermine financial support to insurgencies.
Over the last decade, this find-and-fix approach has migrated into
conventional targeting doctrine and the Army’s institutional training
programs.17 Attack-the-Network theory (AtN) offers another example of
the doctrinal trend towards individualized warfare. This theory emerged
specifically for defeating improvised-explosive-device networks in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and over time has been applied to a broad range of
missions such as tracking Joseph Koni and Lord’s Resistance Army in
Uganda, analyzing the spread of Boko Haram influence in Nigeria, and
understanding threat finance patterns of narcotics networks in Latin
America.
Both find-and-fix and Attack-the-Network methodologies reflect
an evolution in analytical approaches related to the adoption of Social
Network Analysis for military targeting. Application of Social Network
Analysis to complex networks predates recent campaigns with significant
scholarly research dating back to the 1960s, notably Stanley Milgram’s
early work on network theory and structural disintermediation.18 Admiral
Arthur Cebrowski’s influential “network-centric warfare” expanded the
notion to distributed sensor systems and precision targeting; however,
he did not conceive of such methods being used specifically against
individual combatants. These concepts were more directly articulated
in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s, Networks and Netwars, where they
described the rise of non-state actors organized as decentralized networks.19 Under the guise of “fourth generation warfare,” William Lind,
T.X. Hammes and others, foresaw such networks and individual actors
supplanting the state as primary drivers of a new security environment,
an idea later sensationalized by Thomas Friedman’s thesis on “super
empowered individuals.”20
Operational Social Network Analysis techniques were introduced
directly in the influential 2006 publication of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency,
and have since matured into a foundational component of doctrinal

15      Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing, Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an
Organizational Innovation (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, March 2011), 33.
16      Carlotta Gall, “Night Raids Curbing Taliban, but Afghans Cite Civilian Toll,” New York Times,
July 8, 2011; and Tom Peter, “Afghanistan: NATO’s Night Raids Cause More Harm Than Good,
Report Says,” Christian Science Monitor, September 19, 2011.
17      Charles Faint and Michael Harris, “F3EAD: Ops/Intel Fusion Feeds The SOF Targeting
Process,” Small Wars Journal, January 31, 2012.
18      Steve Ressler, “Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present
and Future Research,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 2 (July 2006).
19      John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and
Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).
20      Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).
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thinking.21 These techniques provided the framework for identifying
individual roles, organizational positions, and influential actors within
given networks. At the tactical level, Social Network Analysis supported
the practical need for conducting “pattern of life” analysis, identifying
associations, habits, locations, movement routes, financial transactions, and overall visualization of network dynamics down to the level
of individual actors. Information obtained from this network analysis
often focused on personalized details such as physical descriptions of
suspects, their biographic histories, familial relations, biometric data,
and forensic evidence in support of operational targeting.22
The recent emergence of Identity Intelligence (I2) and methods
for personality-based targeting offers another example of the doctrinal
evolution towards individualized warfare.23 Identity Intelligence is not
an intelligence process, per se, but rather tailored products derived from
the fusion of identity attributes (biologic, biographic, behavioral, and
reputational information) into operational planning processes. Identity
Intelligence integrates the technical disciplines of biometrics, forensics,
document and media exploitation, with other all-source data for the
purpose of “connecting individuals to other persons, places, events, or
materials” and analyzing patterns of life.24 Only in the last few years has
Identity Intelligence matured as part of recognized doctrine; however,
its use in support of military operations evolved rapidly due to the
challenges of identifying and targeting individuals in environments
where positive identification has been problematic due to unverifiable
documentation or intentional evasion. Recognizing these challenges,
the DoD formally established biometrics as a core function in 2012
and directed combatant commands to integrate biometrics into mission
planning.25
What is remarkable about the evolution of counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism practices is the degree to which operational targeting has not only become individualized, but also personalized through
the integration of identity functions. The greatest weapon of insurgent
networks in Iraq and Afghanistan was anonymity, specifically the
ability of fighters to blend in with, and disappear into, local populations. Population-centric approaches of counterinsurgency, therefore,
placed Identity Intelligence activities at the center of efforts “to positively identify, track, characterize, and disrupt threat actors.”26 In Iraq
the targeting of high-value individuals became closely integrated with
21      For example, Social Network Analysis techniques feature prominently in the most recent
version of US Department of the Army, Intelligence Analysis, Army Techniques Publication 2-33.4
(Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, August 2014), as a methodology in US Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, Joint Publication 2.01-3 (Washington,
DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2009), and in US Department of the Army, The Targeting Process,
Field Manual 3-60 (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, November 2010).
22      US Department of the Army, The Targeting Process, Appendix B-1.
23      Identity intelligence (I2) appeared for the first time as part of US doctrine in October 2013
as part of the updated version of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication 2.0
(Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 2013).
24      US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterterrorism, Joint Publication 3-26 (Washington, DC: US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, October 24, 2014), V-5
25      Deputy Secretary of Defense, Authority to Collect, Store, and Share Biometric Information of NonUS Persons with US Government (USG) Entities and Partner Nations, Memorandum, Washington, DC,
January 13, 2012.
26      US Joint Chief of Staff, Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication 3-24 (Washington, DC: US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, November 2013), XVI.
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efforts against broader facilitation networks (finance, recruitment, training, logistics, media, command and control). This integration included
non-kinetic targeting against specific individuals using such methods as
leaflets, “most wanted” posters, text messaging, and hotline tip numbers
to create a “spotlight effect” for denying insurgents access to particular operational areas.27 Identity Intelligence tools and techniques were
also integrated into a wide range of missions dependent on the ability
to identify and distinguish specific actors on the battlefield such as
focused raids, checkpoint and area security, border control operations,
and detailed mapping of “human terrain.” In sum, the commonalities
among these diverse missions are doctrinal approaches and war-fighting
techniques focused on the lowest common battlefield denominators of
identifying and targeting individual combatants.

Technology and Individualized Warfare

The individualization of warfare has been fueled by several key
technical innovations over the last decade, including advances in persistent surveillance, standoff precision strike, data analytics, biometrics,
and forensics capabilities. These tools directly enabled what has been
described as a “patient and relentless man-hunting campaign” waged
by the US military against non-state actors.28 Certainly, the most visible
technology of this new mode of warfare has been the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles, or drones. Prior to 9-11, their operational use was limited
primarily to reconnaissance missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan;
they were not tested as a weapons platforms until early 2001, and then
were rapidly adapted for kinetic targeting in Afghanistan. Early in the
campaign, General Tommy Franks called the Predator “my most capable
sensor in hunting down and killing al Qaeda and Taliban leadership.”29
These platforms soon emerged as a central component in the military’s high-value targeting programs, and their number increased more
than 40-fold between 2002 and 2010.30 In Afghanistan there were a
total of 74 military drone strikes during all of 2007; yet by 2012, that
number averaged 33 strikes per month.31 Over time, improved sensors
and software packages enabled analysts to “recognize and categorize
humans and human-made objects,” providing unprecedented real-time
surveillance and detailed granularity for targeting individual combatants.32 Perhaps more significant has been the degree to which such drone
strikes “have gone from a relative rarity to a relatively common practice”
as a tool of US counterterrorism.33 Indeed, unclassified estimates suggest
27      Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, January 2007 to December
2008 The Comprehensive Approach: An Iraq Case Study (Norfolk, Virginia: US Joint Forces Command,
February 2010), 14.
28      Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY Preparing for War in the Robotic Age (Washington,
DC: Center for a New American Security, 2014), 17.
29      Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), 94-101; also, Andrew
Callam, “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” International Affairs Review 18, no. 3
(Winter 2010).
30      Jeremiah Gertler, US Unmanned Aerial Systems (Washington DC: Congressional Research
Service, January 3, 2012).
31      Amitai Etzioni, “The Great Drone Debate,” Military Review 93, no. 2 (March-April 2013): 2.
32      Andrew Callam, “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” International Affairs Review
18, no. 3 (Winter 2010).
33      Stimson Center, Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy (Washington,
DC: Stimson Center, 2014), 11.
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over 98 percent of non-battlefield targeted killings over the last decade
have been conducted by these platforms.34
However, the expanded use of persistent surveillance introduced
new challenges for analysts with a deluge of sensor data making it “nearly
impossible to track and identify suspicious activities and potential security threats solely through human analytical processes.”35 A separate
analytical challenge has evolved from the need to collect and interpret
different signatures from those of the doctrinally coherent, state-based
adversaries of the Cold War era. Analysts must now process and correlate multiple streams of disparate, unstructured data such as cell phone
numbers, biographic data, digital communications, biometric signatures,
and forensic evidence in support of lethal and non-lethal targeting. This
requirement has produced new data processing techniques specifically
designed to leverage Social Network Analysis methods, including tools
such as Analyst Notebook and the Distributed Common Ground System
(DCGS), enabling data integration and advanced network analysis.
Other database systems employed in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange, a massive repository
of tactical reporting, evolved in response to the immense data processing challenge of analyzing insurgent activities, individual identities, and
operational patterns.
Of all the technical advances emerging in recent years, biometrics
and forensics are perhaps the most vivid examples of the central role
of technology in waging individualized warfare. The need to verify
identity and distinguish adversaries from the larger population led to
the expansion in the use of biometric systems on the battlefield.36 As
with drone technology, there had been no significant operational use
of biometrics by the US military prior to Iraq and Afghanistan. In early
2001, the Army began developing the Biometric Automated Toolset
(BAT), offering an initial capability to collect, match and store biometric
and personal identifying information. The first major combat employment of biometrics occurred in 2004 by Marine Corps units in Iraq
where the technology was used to quarantine an insurgent safe haven in
Fallujah through biometric screening.37 Use of this technology grew as
part of the 2007 “surge” as the primary means of identity verification
and separating insurgents from the larger population. Biometrics, linked
with operational forensics, was also used extensively for analyzing and
penetrating cells employing improvised explosive devices, and by the
end of operations in Iraq the US had complied a biometric database of
some 3 million files on Iraqi citizens.38
Similarly, in Afghanistan, over 7,000 biometric collection devices
have been employed in support of detention operations, execution of
34      Micah Zenko, Reforming US Drone Strike Policies (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign
Relations, January 2013), 8.
35      Sandra I. Erwin, “As Defense, Intelligence Agencies Drown in Data, Technology Comes to
the Rescue,” Nation Defense Magazine, November 2014.
36      US Department of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on COIN and ISR Operations
(Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, February 2011), 65.
37      Thom Shanker, “To Track Militants, US Has System that Never Forgets a Face,” New York
Times, July 13, 2011.
38      Spencer Ackerman, “US Holds on to Biometric Database of 3 Million Iraqis,” Wired Magazine,
Danger Room Blog, December 21, 2011, http://www.wired.com/2011/12/iraq-biometrics-database/.
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high-risk warrants, and targeted raids against identified insurgents.39
Between 2004 and 2011, US forces collected biometric data on more
than 1.1 million individuals - equivalent to roughly one of every six
fighting age males - and used this data to identify thousands of known
enemy combatants.40 This measure was of particular importance in
Afghanistan, a country with limited institutional capacity for identity
verification, few birth certificates, drivers’ licenses and citizenship
documents, exacerbated by an active black market in forged identity
papers. For similar reasons, biometric technologies have spread to other
theaters where identity cannot be reliably verified by available documentation, such as counter-piracy operations in East Africa.41 As an Identity
Intelligence specialist at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command
explained, “biometrics puts a uniform on the enemy” and enables the
categorization of actors even in the absence of traditional status-based
signatures.42
Expeditionary forensics is another technical area that evolved
rapidly in direct response to the shift towards individualized warfare.
Forensic tools and analysis supported evidenced-based targeting
methods used to individualize, identify, associate, and scientifically link
people, places, things, intentions, activities, organizations, and events.
In late 2004, US forces in Iraq began collecting battlefield forensic
materials to identify suspected insurgents by cross-referencing evidence with detainee biometrics in support of follow-on targeting and
prosecution. By 2006, this capability expanded to include numerous
expeditionary forensic facilities analyzing ammunition, clothing, latent
fingerprints, and DNA, among other materials. By 2010, the United
States had deployed a total of seven forensic laboratories to Iraq and
eight to Afghanistan.43 During that year alone, expeditionary forensics
enabled the capture of over 700 high-value individuals associated with
improvised explosive devices, or suspected terrorist and criminal activities.44 According to one report, this fusion of forensic and biometric
information into actionable intelligence directly enabled “precise fires
to shape the operational environment, including supply chain interdiction, counter-threat finance operations, information operations, cache
destruction, and the capture of high-value individuals.”45 The task force
responsible for detainee operations in Afghanistan estimated that some
70 percent of key individual targets captured on the battlefield had been

39      David Pendall and Cal Sieg, “Biometric-Enabled Intelligence in Regional Command–East,”
Joint Forces Quarterly 72, no. 1 (January 2014): 70
40      US Government Accountability Office, Additional Training for Leaders and More Timely
Transmission of Data Could Enhance the Use of Biometrics in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: US
Government Accountability Office, April 2012), 1.
41      David Axe, “CSI Somalia: Interpol Targets Pirates,” Wired Magazine, Danger Room Blog, June
18, 2009, http://www.wired.com/2009/06/csi-somalia-interpol-targets-pirates/.
42      Antonia Greene, “Including Biometrics in Deployment Training Helps Soldiers Identify the
Enemy,” Army, April 30, 2012.
43      US Government Accountability Office, Additional Planning and Oversight Needed to Establish an
Enduring Expeditionary Forensic Capability (Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office,
June 2013), 4.
44      Oliver Herion, “Expeditionary Forensic Support to Joint Force Commanders: What Changes
or Considerations are Warranted?” (Quantico, VA: US Marine Corps Command and Staff College,
April 2012), v.
45      Thomas B. Smith and Marc Tranchemontagne, “Understanding the Enemy: The Enduring
Value of Technical and Forensic Exploitation,” Joint Forces Quarterly 75, no. 4 (October 2014): 124.
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identified with the help of biometrics and forensics technologies.46 A
study by the Army Audit Agency similarly concluded the conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan had revolutionized expeditionary forensics and
operational use of latent fingerprints and DNA, in particular.47 In sum,
the introduction of these technologies enabled a fundamental paradigm
shift in targeting whereby combatants were no longer “generic” soldiers
on the battlefield, but rather targeted as individuals based on identity
attributes and evidentiary analyses (see table below).
Key Characteristics of Industrial & Individualized Warfare
Industrial Warfare
Political Context

Westphalian; professional armies
fighting as political proxies with
defined geo-political objectives;
recognizes Jus in Bello constructs
Adversary
State armies comprised of
Characteristics
“generic” professional soldiers
applying doctrinal methods and a
depersonalized, bureaucratic logic
Operational
Contested primarily in the physiEnvironment
cal domain (land, sea, air, space);
engagements within a contiguous,
linear battle-space with explicit
operational boundaries
Theories of
Influenced by traditional tenets
War-fighting
of maneuver warfare, mass,
firepower, destruction of enemy
forces and seizure of key terrain
Analytical
Order of Battle analysis, doctrinal
Approach & Tools templating, traditional Indications
and Warning, conventional ISR
and technical signatures
Targeting Paradigm Status-based targeting against
units, formations and equipment
Objectives &
Physical attrition/destruction
Measures of
of the adversary war-fighting
Effectiveness
capability; predominantly
quantitative assessment - units
destroyed, terrain seized, kinetic
effects and technical BDA
Success Criteria & Defeat of adversary military force
End State
compels political capitulation,
orderly demobilization and
repatriation of combatants

Individualized War
Post-Westphalian; individual
combatants fighting for ideological
causes and ambiguous objectives;
challenges Jus in Bello constructs
Non-state entities; “unprivileged”
combatants using anonymity for
operational advantage; idiosyncratic,
highly personalized networks
Contested primarily in the
informational domain (influence and
identity); spatially and temporally
unbounded; fusion of military and
domestic security spheres
Influenced by counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism doctrines;
stability concerns, governance, and
population-centric approaches
Social Network Analysis, Attack
the Network, Identity Intelligence,
biometrics and forensic signatures,
document and media exploitation
Identity-based targeting against
individuals, cells and networks
Slowing the regeneration of key
leadership and operators; predominantly qualitative assessment - kill/
capture high value individuals,
measures of network centrality,
influence and cohesion
Risk mitigation rather than military
victory; legal limbo for detained
combatants and fighter recidivism
presents enduring challenge

46      Anthony Iasso, “A Critical Time for Biometrics and Identity Intelligence,” Military Intelligence
Professional Bulletin (July-September 2013): 39-40.
47      US Army Audit Agency, Workforce Requirements for Expeditionary Forensics, Audit Report No.
A-2012-0031-FFD (Alexandria, VA: December 27, 2011)
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Policy Imperatives and Strategic Choices

While new doctrine and supporting technologies have provided the
methods and tools of individualized warfare, ultimately this paradigm
shift resulted from specific policy preferences and strategic choices in
response to the threats posed by non-state actors. The 2001 Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF) established the initial legal context
for waging war against individuals and geographically dispersed networks with broad language authorizing the use of force against “nations,
organizations, or persons.”48 CIA Director John Brennan articulated what
might be considered the “trickle-down” logic of this approach, describing how these methods have gradually expanded to wider networks
of individual actors, noting that “in this armed conflict, individuals
who are part of al-Qaida or its associated forces are legitimate military
targets.”49 Yet this strategic approach has expanded far beyond “leadership strikes,” and now reflects a new paradigm of war waged by “precise
attacks against individuals” as the centerpiece of US counterterrorism
approaches in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere.50
The trend towards such individualized approaches seems a logical
path for a liberal democracy dealing with the threat of terrorism while
balancing the rights of citizens. Public discomfort with profiling
techniques in the aftermath of 9-11 created political pressure to focus
targeting against individuals with legitimate connections to terrorism
rather than applying categorical measures against entire suspect groups
(racial, ethnic, religious, or otherwise). More recently, public outcry
over broad application of domestic intelligence gathering by the NSA
suggests similar disapproval of dragnet-like approaches to counterterrorism. However, Americans have expressed few reservations with
focused intelligence collection and lethal targeting based on evidentiary
approaches and presumptions of culpability, thus presenting few political liabilities.51
Beyond the domestic audience, international opinion has also
pushed the US toward an individualized, and increasingly personalized
approach to warfare. Perhaps the best example has been the broad condemnation of US “signature strikes” directed against detected patterns
of adversary behavior, or signatures, rather than specific individuals.52
This approach closely resembles conventional targeting methods applied
against formations, equipment and facilities where technical signatures
generally offer reliable categorization of intended targets. However, this
technique has produced numerous incidents of misidentification and
unintended civilian casualties with significant political repercussions,
notably in Pakistan and Yemen, but also during military operations in
48      Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), Joint Resolution 23, 107th Cong., 1st sess.
(September 14, 2001). Also, Public Law § 2(a), 115 Stat at 224.
49      John O. Brennan, “The Efficacy and Ethics of US Counterterrorism Strategy,” Transcript of
Remarks at the Wilson Center, April 30, 2012.
50      John Yoo, “Assassinations or Targeted Killings Since 9/11,” New York Law School Review 57
(2011): 63.
51      Sarah Kreps, “Do Americans Really Love Drone Strikes?” Washington Post, June 6, 2014, and
Pew Research, Global Attitudes Project Survey, “Global Opinions of US Surveillance,” (Spring
2014), http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/nsa-opinion/.
52      Steve Coll, “The Unblinking Stare: The Drone War in Pakistan,” The New Yorker, November
24, 2014.
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Iraq and Afghanistan.53 In response, the Obama administration has
reportedly moved towards increased use of “personality” strikes only
against confirmed individuals in order to avoid diplomatic fallout from
unintended causalities. This process has been formalized by the creation
of a “disposition matrix,” a dynamic, individualized targeting database
consisting of biographies, locations, associations and operational profiles of high-value targets.54 The administration has also suggested a
policy preference for capture and prosecution of individual suspects,
when feasible.55
In terms of military strategy, the individualization of warfare has
also exposed an inherent tension between traditional military activities
and law enforcement functions when today’s targeting packages have
more similarities with police arrest warrants than with conventional
targeting folders of the Cold War-era. During the later phases of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, high-value targeting increasingly involved
such “evidence-based” methodologies, relying on identity verification
and forensic science to produce probable-cause-like adjudications as the
basis of actionable intelligence. One observer noted, the find-and-fix
paradigm evolved into a “police-like investigate, arrest, convict” model
of non-lethal targeting.56 Indeed, the current preference for such individualized approaches will continue to obfuscate traditional concepts
of state warfare and raise difficult procedural questions as technology
enables ever-greater disaggregation of the battlefield—and increasingly
personalized targeting methods.

Challenges for the Future

The US response to threats from non-state actors has evolved into
a new mode of warfare placing the individual combatant at the center
of the analytical and operational challenge. The question remains as to
whether this paradigm shift represents a transient diversion from the
military’s traditional focus on large-scale conventional conflict, or if the
experiences of the last decade will have a lasting influence on approaches
to land warfare and development of future capabilities and doctrine.
Certainly the Army’s natural inclination suggests a return to familiar
ground of thinking about, and preparing for, conventional land force
engagements. However, the catalysts of individualized warfare may not
allow a full return to more traditional operating methods. The recent
National Intelligence Council Global Trends report depicts a near-future
security environment characterized by terrorism, subversion, sabotage,
insurgency, and criminal activities; while others predict continuing outbreaks of “hybrid” wars similar to the ongoing conflicts in Syria and
Ukraine.57 The commonality among these diverse scenarios is that they

53     Danya Greenfield, “The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only ‘Act’ Like Terrorists,”
The Atlantic, August 19, 2013. Also, Lawfare Staff, “Civilian Casualties & Collateral Damage,” Lawfare,
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/contro
versy/.
54      Greg Miller, “Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals US Intends to Keep Adding Names to Kill
Lists,” Washington Post, October 23, 2012.
55      Brennan, “The Efficacy and Ethics of US Counterterrorism Strategy.”
56      Lamb and Munsing, Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation, 53.
57      US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington DC: US
Director of National Intelligence, December 2012), 59–60.
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are all likely to involve targeting against decentralized, individual combatants who use anonymity to operational advantage.
However, current operations against the Islamic State may well prove
a frustrating test case for the effectiveness of individualized targeting in
the absence of significant ground forces and robust local intelligence
networks. Unclassified reports of target selection during the early
phases of Operation Inherent Resolve reveal patterns closely resembling
conventional approaches, with a clear majority of strikes focused on
facilities, fighting positions and vehicles, and far fewer against specific
individuals and key leadership.58 Yet, even success in this effort may have
a potential downside. As the military continues to identify and strike
individuals from greater distances and with higher accuracy, it should be
expected that adaptive adversaries will move towards locations (megacities) or modes of operation (cyber) where US targeting advantages are
less asymmetric.
While there is little debate as to the awe-inspiring tactical efficiency
of US techniques for waging individualized warfare, it is less certain
these methods have been effective in achieving larger political objectives. The perpetual regeneration of terrorist threats inside Pakistan,
Yemen and Somalia offer little evidence these techniques have been
fully successful as a centerpiece of counterterrorism strategy. Likewise,
deteriorating conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest limits as to
what these approaches deliver to counterinsurgency efforts. The inherent ambiguity in the data raises the more difficult question as to whether
one can evaluate the utility of specific tactics and tools separately
from the overall strategic outcomes they produce. As General H. R.
McMaster, Director of the Army’s Capabilities and Integration Center,
has cautioned, “targeting does not equal strategy.”59 This area should
one be of continuing research and professional debate.
As President Obama recently observed during an address to
National Defense University, “we must define the nature and scope of
this struggle, or else it will define us.”60 Indeed, this has been the case
for an entire generation of soldiers socialized under this operational
paradigm and now highly skilled in the art of waging individualized war.
As one senior US officer recently noted, the task of “putting warheads
to foreheads” has become a core military function. The challenge ahead
will be creating a context whereby the experiences and tools refined
over the last decade can evolve and mature as an integrated component
of full-spectrum operations. The risk is that this expertise will be lost in
a rush back to focus on conventional warfare, or marginalized as some
exotic, niche function within a narrowing scope of strategic utility for
American land forces.
The goal should be full integration of these capabilities into a flexible landpower concept enabling rapid transition along the operational
continuum from conventional conflict against state adversaries to
58      Kedar Pavgi, “Five Months of Air Strikes in Iraq and Syria in Four Charts,” Defense One, January 8,
2015, http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/01/5-months-air-strikes-iraq-and-syria-4-charts/
102495/?oref=d_brief_nl.
59      Sydney J. Freedberg, “Raiders, Advisors And The Wrong Lessons From Iraq,” Breaking
Defense, March 20, 2013, http://breakingdefense.com/2013/03/gen-mcmaster-raiders-advisors-andthe-wrong-lessons-from-iraq/.
60      President Barrack Obama at National Defense University, May 23, 2013.
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individualized warfare in hybrid scenarios against non-state actors. To
this end, several specific recommendations are offered.

Recommendations

First, ensure that the technical capabilities refined over the last
decade continue to evolve even in the absence of a persistent operational targeting mission. The challenge of future hybrid scenarios, such
as the situation in Ukraine, will be in detecting and exploiting nonstandard signatures and data sources (cyber, open source, social media,
biometrics and forensics) and integrating them with conventional collection streams in support of situational awareness and targeting. This
task will require continuing advances in data processing and tools for
analyzing large amounts of unstructured information with the ultimate
goal of cross-domain integration, automated tipping and queuing, and
improved network visualization. These represent enormous technical
challenges that cannot wait for the next crisis.
Second, continue efforts to empower soldiers down to the lowest
level with real-time integrated data from national level sources. Current
biometrics technologies represent one useful example where a squad
leader on patrol can rapidly access national-level watchlist information
and biographic data on a subject encountered during tactical questioning. Within the contemporary threat paradigm there is no clearly
bounded battlespace; therefore, an individual of interest encountered in
a combat zone may also have relevance to a customs agent at an international airport, a police officer conducting a routine stop in Tucson, or
a counterterrorism analyst at the CIA. Bureaucratic interests, technical
barriers, and over-classification must not inhibit robust information
sharing between such entities. Informational empowerment downward
to the tactical level must be the ultimate goal so situational awareness is
not limited to the operations center.
Finally, continue to integrate concepts such as Identity Intelligence
and Network Analysis fully into the doctrinal canon and operational
usage. By all indications, various forms of hybrid or irregular warfare
will persist in the near future. These scenarios are likely to include lethal
and non-lethal targeting against networked entities operating in ungoverned spaces with weak identity regimes and adversaries determined to
leverage anonymity for operational advantage.
The techniques of individualized warfare and need for identity
verification on the battlefield will only grow in importance. The Army,
in particular, cannot afford to squander the hard lessons it has already
learned about waging this kind of war.
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Abstract: Widely available precision strike platforms, increasing
weapons costs and systemic constraints on major war are altering
how military actors prepare for future conflict. As the costs increase
and the utility of fielding massed formations decreases, actors seek
speed and surprise to force decisions short of escalating into costly
major wars. The character of conflict is therefore evolving to favor
small, multi-domain forces, which will require a new approach to
crisis management.

M

ultiple US military services are experimenting with how to use
smaller formations for missions ranging from crisis response
to forced entry. The Unified Quest 2014 exercise, the deep
futures war game run by the Army Capabilities Integration Center,
featured units engaged in what the new operating concept refers to as
“joint combined arms maneuver” in a megacity.1 Bold Alligator 2014, the
annual multinational littoral warfare exercise, experimented with smaller
amphibious assault formations operating from Joint High-Speed Vessels
and dry cargo ships, as well as long-range raids using MV-22 Osprey.2 The
force under examination was a composite, linking distributed units with
a “fly in” command echelon.
Other nations are also beginning to experiment with smaller, multidomain (i.e., air, sea, land, cyber) formations designed to fight short,
intense conflicts. As part of an ongoing conventional force modernization since 2008, the Russian military is fielding modernized brigade
combat team formations and smaller battalion tactical groups.3 Based
on lessons learned from the near-war with Pakistan in 2001, and the
ongoing challenge of balancing China, India is testing integrated battle
groups and formations able to launch short-notice attacks beneath the
threshold major theater war.4 The trend extends to armed proxies. As
1      David Vergun, “Army Prepares for Dangers Lurking in Megacities,” Army, August 28, 2014,
http://www.army.mil/article/132817.
2      Lance M. Bacon, “Bold Alligator 2014 Tests New Ways of Biting the Enemy,” Navy
Times, November 1, 2014, http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20141101/NEWS/311010026/
Bold-Alligator-2014-tests-new-ways-biting-enemy.
3      Robert McDermott, “Moscow Resurrects Battalion Tactical Groups,” Eurasia Daily Monitor,
November 6, 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40071#.
VMUBokY8Kc0.
4      Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War
Doctrine,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 158–190; the two and a half front war
concept refers to China, Pakistan and terrorism, see: Nitin Gokhale, “India’s Doctrinal Shift? The
Indian Army Is Undertaking Its First Strategic Transformation In More Than Two Decades and It
Has Its Sights Firmly on China,” The Diplomat, January 25, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/2011/01/
indias-doctrinal-shift/?allpages=yes.
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seen in Crimea in 2014, and in ongoing Iranian support to groups like
Hezbollah, regional powers are arming their proxies with increasingly
sophisticated weapon systems.
Despite different core missions and mandates as well as external threats, multiple security actors are clearly signaling preferences
for smaller, modernized “joint” forces. What do these initiatives tell
us about potential changes in the character of modern war? Are the
reforms simply local adaptions to anticipated conflicts, or do they indicate a larger pattern?
This article analyzes the trend towards smaller, multi-domain force
capabilities in global and regional powers. It argues that the character of
contemporary conflict is being changed by the proliferation of precision
strike and associated command, control, communication, computer,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems combined
with an assumption that conflicts will be fought beneath the threshold
of major war. These forces are altering how officers imagine future war.
As result, military thinkers appear to be developing new concepts and
forces substituting speed and multiple domain maneuver for mass on
the battlefield. The end result may be a new theory of victory.5 Multiple
nations are planning to use smaller, modernized combat formations to
signal their capabilities and gain advantage in a crisis, and if necessary,
fight and win short wars either directly or through proxies.

Character(s) of War?

Analyzing emergent trends across armed forces is an old idea in
military studies. Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800 – 1890) hypothesized the changing character of war was a function of how new material
conditions, from railroads to telegraphs, changed the speed of mobilization and the character of war. Reflecting on his time, Moltke observed,
“a change in the tactics of all branches” based on the fact that “ . . . the
firepower of an infantry platoon [today] surpasses the range and destructive effect of the case-shot of a six-pounder cannon.”6 Despite their
differences, Russian military theorists Marshal Aleksander A. Svechin
(1878-1938) and Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893-1937) believed
the material conditions of the industrial age called for a departure with
the Jominian conceptualization of ground maneuver prevalent since
Napoleon.7 Major General J.F.C. Fuller, architect of Plan 1919, sought a
science of war based on technology and mysticism.8 William McNeill’s
seminal work, Pursuit of Power, examined how material factors from
5      Stephen Peter Rosen was the first to introduce the term “theory of victory,” though the
concept is closely related to multiple aspects of classical organizational theory. For Rosen’s definition, Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1991), 19-20. The term is also used in Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military
Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Pal
Alto: Stanford University Press, 2010), 21, and Emily Goldman, “Introduction: Military Diffusion
and Transformation,” in Emily Goldman and Thomas Mahnken, The Information Revolution in Military
Affairs in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004).
6      “Bemerkungen vom 12. Juli 1858 über Veränderungen in der Taktik infolge des verbesserten
Infanteriegewehrs,” in Militärische Werke, Vol. II, Part 2, as it appears in Antulio J. Echevarria II,
“Moltke and the German Military Tradition: His Theories and Legacies,” Parameters 26, no. 1 (Spring
1996): 91-99.
7      Jacob W. Kipp, “The Origins of Soviet Operational Art, 1917-1936,” in Michael D. Krause
and R. Cody Phillips, Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art (Washington: Center of Military
History, 2007).
8      J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1926).
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technology to economic activity and the environment created different
modes of warfare and a unique specialization of violence.9
After the Cold War, numerous scholars and practitioners sought
to define the character of what former Army Chief of Staff General
Gordon Sullivan called, “post-industrial warfare.”10 Observing the complexity of conflicts in West Africa and the Balkans in the early 1990s,
Robert Kaplan argued there was a breakdown in the old state order
leading to a new era of struggles defined by resource competition, pandemics, urbanization, demographic shifts, and state failure.11 Former
British Army General Sir Rupert Anthony Smith suggested modern war
reflects the shift from the paradigm of industrial war to “war amongst
the people.”12 In industrial war, the utility of force, to use General
Smith’s expression, was total. Accordingly, the theory of victory was
the mass mobilization of society in order to defeat the armed forces of
the enemy state - conventional military force aligned with clear political
objectives. The emergent paradigm after the Cold War was war amongst
the people. Here the theory of victory shifted from mass armies seeking
decisive victory on a clearly defined battlefield, to a test of wills between
rival populations. Military force was not decisive. Rather, the utility of
force was establishing conditions for long-term conflict resolution, a
concept captured in current US Army doctrine.13
The question becomes which forces of change coalesce to produce
a paradigmatic shift in warfare. Borrowing from the Marxist concept
of modes of production, Mary Kaldor hypothesized a new mode of
warfare in which globalization internationalized intrastate identity conflicts leveraging illicit economic networks and guerilla tactics.14 Similar
to Kaldor’s modes of warfare, William Lind and Thomas Hammes
suggested distinct, identifiable generations of warfare paralleling larger
technological changes. Modern war was in the fourth generation, involving the use of all available networks (e.g., social, economic, political) to
compel an adversary.15 As seen in Russian actions in Crimea in 2014,
these conflicts can be a hybrid mixture of conventional capabilities and
irregular warfare conducted through proxies.16
9      William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982).
10      General Gordon Sullivan first used the term in a 1992 speech at the Land Warfare Forum.
11      Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism,
and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet,” The Atlantic, February 1, 1994;
Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War (New York: Vintage
Press, 2001).
12      Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Vintage
Press, 2008).
13      Unified Land Operations calls for INSERT (enabling conflict resolution). US Department
of the Army, Unified Land Operations, ADRP 3-0 (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army,
May 2014).
14      Mary Kaldor, Old and New Wars: Organized Violence in a Global World (Stanford University
Press, 1999). For an overview of the “new wars” literature see Martin Shaw, “The Contemporary
Mode of Warfare? Mary Kaldor’s Theory of New Wars,” Review of International Political Economy 7, no.
1 (Spring 2000): 171-180, and Mary Kaldor, “In Defence of New Wars,” Stability: International Journal
of Security and Development 2, no. 1 (2013): 4.
15      T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (New York: Zenith Press,
2006), i.
16      The leading authority on hybrid warfare is Frank Hoffman. See Frank Hoffman and James
N. Mattis, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Proceedings 132, no. 11 (November 2005): 1819. For an overview of the broader literature Hoffman spawned, see Timothy McCulloh and Richard
Johnson, Hybrid Warfare (Tampa: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2013).
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The Current Character

For emerging powers like China and India, there is a perception that
future conflicts will be fast, limited, and conducted by high capability,
professional formations.17 Since the late 1990s, Chinese military planners
have developed a vision of local wars waged by elite forces that strike
first and seek a quick victory.18 Building on Jiang Zemin’s 2002 guidance
for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to win local conflict
rapidly and decisively under conditions of xinxihua or “informationized
warfare,” each Chinese service laid out aggressive modernization plans.19
According to an earlier PLA study, “on the high-tech battlefield, annihilating enemy vital forces and arms can no longer be achieved by simply
adding numbers of forces, planes, tanks and artillery pieces.”20 Major
General Zhang Shiping, Deputy Director of War Theory and Strategic
Studies at the Academy of Military Science, defined these reforms as
“the transformation from mechanization to informationization... from a
defensive pattern to an offensive pattern.”21 Conceptually, some observers assessed the reforms as shifting the focus from wars of attrition to
quick campaigns, from an emphasis on defensive operation to offensive
operations, and from absorbing blows to operational preemption.
Since 2004, Indian defense circles debated the extent to which the
military should adopt a more offensive posture to deter Pakistan. Through
the “Cold Start” doctrine, a war plan envisioning a series of joint strikes
by integrated battle groups twenty kilometers into Pakistan, the Indian
military hoped to create a more agile and precise instrument of war.
Such an instrument would allow India to deter, and if necessary, attack
Pakistan, as a reaction to, or to prevent, a Pakistani or Pakistani-backed
limited attack on India.22 Indian planners believed a mix of diplomatic
pressure and nuclear escalation increased the importance of smaller,
high capability joint formations able to strike inside Pakistan on short
notice.23 To back Cold Start and other offensive, limited war concepts,
the Indian military embarked on a $100 billion, ten-year modernization
program. The reforms also included upgrading the Pakistani air force
to fifth-generation fighters and building a navy capable of projecting

17      The focus on this treatment is on conventional conflict. It does not look at hybrid warfare or
referring to Russian actions in Crimea what Eastern European and Baltic scholars are calling “new
generation” warfare.
18      Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985–95: A Chinese
Perspective,” China Quarterly 146 (June 1996): 445-448, 451-453; Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving
Campaign Doctrine and Strategies,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, The People’s
Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999). For an overview, see Jacqueline
Newmyer “The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” Journal of Strategic Studies
33, no. 4 (2011).
19      Shi Daoxian, “Analysis of Combat Styles In Informatized Warfare,” China Military Science
Journal 2 (August 2011).
20      Yang Yi, Gaojishu Tiaojianxia Zuozhan Fangshi, Fangfa Yanjiu Yu Sikao [Research and Reflection
on the Styles and Methods of Operations Under High-Tech Conditions] (Beijing: Military Science
Press, 1997), 7 as it appears in Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategies,” 152.
21      Zhang Shiping, China’s Sea Power (China: People’s Daily Press, 2009), 191.
22      Walter C. Ladwig III. “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War
Doctrine,” International Security 32, no. 2 (2007); Ali Ahmed, “The US Perspective on Cold Start,”
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Online (December 2010); Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen P. Cohen, “Is
India Ending Its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?” Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2011).
23      Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War
Doctrine,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 158-190.
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power— in the words of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh—“from the
Hormuz to the Malacca Straits.”24
In the United States, Cold War-era interdiction campaigns and
Soviet military theory are the historical foundations of the emerging
preference for smaller, joint precision forces. Starting with experiments
in Vietnam in the 1970s and later Assault Breaker experiments led by
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the United
States experimented with an integrated battle network of strike and
C4ISR assets.25 This move led Soviet military thinkers to theorize about
a “reconnaissance strike complex” that would give conventional munitions the same effects as nuclear weapons. Between the 1990/1991 Gulf
War and the air interdiction operation in Kosovo in 1999, the United
States rapidly accelerated its use of different types of precision strike
and ISR assets toward what Russian Major General Vladmir Slipchenko
called “sixth generation warfare.”26 Today, this network enables missions ranging from global strike to distributed ISR operations.27
Yet, the state’s monopoly on precision strike proved short-lived.
By 2006, even non-state actors like Hezbollah demonstrated the ability
to engage an IDF Corvette with a Chinese-designed C-802 Anti-Ship
Cruise Missile.28 China and Russia both maintain high-end precision
strike capabilities and a supporting constellation of space-based ISR
assets.29 Concerns over these near-peer capabilities animate Joint Staff
interest in concepts and systems able to counter future anti-access/area
denial threats to US power projection.30
Furthermore, a greater number of states are using proxies armed
with high-end capabilities to advance their interests. Although proxy
warfare is an age-old practice, actors like Russia and Iran increasingly
use their proxies to wage “hybrid warfare.” These groups benefit from
the proliferation of high-end capabilities allowing “irregular groups”
in Eastern Ukraine to operate advanced surface-to-air missiles and, in
the case of Hezbollah, launch anti-ship missiles. The use of irregular
proxies for crisis brinkmanship is not limited to traditional weapons
or combat alone. For Martin Libicki, capabilities from drones to cyber
technologies enable a new form of “non-obvious” warfare that enables
24      Ashok K. Mehta, “The Need for Long-Term Modernization Plan,” Political and Defence
Weekly 10, no. 2 (October 2010). For a discussion, see Walter Ladwig III, “India and Military Power
Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?” Asian Survey 50, no. 6
(2010): 1162-1183. Amit Gupta, “India’s Military Aviation Market,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 3, no. 2
(2009); and R. K. Jasbir Singh, ed., Indian Defence Yearbook 2009 (Dehra Dun, India: Natraj Publishers,
2009).
25      Barry D. Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects
(Wahington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 2007); Barry D. Watts, The
Evolution of Precision Strike (Washinton, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, August
2013); Thomas G. Mahnken, “Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime,”
Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences (June 1, 2011).
26      Vladimir Slipchenko and Voina Budushchego. Moscow: Moskovskii Obshchestvennyi
Nauchnyi Fond, 1999 as it appears in Jacob Kipp, “Russian Sixth Generation Warfare and Recent
Developments,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 9, no. 17 (January 25, 2012).
27      Global strike and distributed ISR operations are part of USAF doctrine, see: https://doctrine.af.mil.
28      Randy Huis, Proliferation of Precision Strike: Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, May 2012).
29      Ibid., 13-15.
30      US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept (Washington: US Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 2012)
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states to conceal their involvement.31 With respect to Russia, NATO
refers to a new strategy of “ambiguous warfare” leveraging covert action
and cyber-attacks.32
Just as the costs of hitting a target decrease for most modern militaries and their proxies, the price of force modernization is increasing.
Compare the costs of the F-18 Super Hornet and the F-35C, the US
Navy’s replacement. The unit cost of the older F/A-18 Super Hornet
is $57 million compared to nearly $130 million for its replacement, the
F-35C.33 As platforms become more expensive, states have to make
hard choices about their investments. While new systems like the F-35
promise superior capabilities, the sheer cost per unit restricts the ability
of even the United States, whose defense budget dwarfs that of most
other nations, to field mass formations.
The costs of large, conventional forces are increasing. Yet, the frequency of major theater war is decreasing. Most countries, especially in an
interconnected world, are concerned about the negative consequences of
long-term conflict. As seen in the collapse of the ruble since the Ukraine
crisis and capital flight from Russia during the 2008 Georgian conflict,
international investors are war wary. Through diplomatic pressure and
financial flows, any actor seeking a purely military solution to a problem
faces diminishing returns. In such a world, competition and militarized
disputes do not go away. Rather, there are incentives for crisis brinkmanship and preparing for short wars waged by small joint combined arms
teams or proxies.

Toward a New Theory of Victory

As seen in the previous examples, the proliferation of precision
strike, increasing weapons costs and systemic constraints on major war
alter how military actors approach operational art and prepare for future
conventional conflict. As the cost and utility of fielding massed formations decreases, actors seek speed and surprise in an effort to achieve
victory, that is, force a decision, short of escalating to costly major wars.
Furthermore, there appears to be a growing appreciation for the utility
of employing relative force ratios in multiple dimensions. This idea first
emerged in early concepts for integrating rotary wing aviation into the
Marine Air-Ground Task Force in the 1950s (e.g., single weapons system
concept) and in theorizing Special Forces (i.e., relative superiority).34 A
military can achieve the effect of a 3:1 ratio even against a numerically
superior opponent by attacking along multiple domains and presenting a foe with multiple dilemmas, a concept captured in the idea of

31      Martin Libicki, “The Specter of Non-Obvious Warfare,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 6, no. 3
(Fall 2012).
32     Peter Apps, “Ambiguous Warfare, Providing NATO with New Challenge,” Reuters, August 21,
2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/21/uk-nato-summit-idUKKBN0GL1KA20140821.
33      Costs for the F/A-18 Super Hornet obtained from F/A-18 Strike Fighter, United
States Navy Fact File, Last Update: May 26, 2009, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.
asp?cid=1100&tid=1200&ct=1. Costs for the F-35 C are based off 2013 figures from Brendan
McGarry, “Analyst: F-35C to Cost $337 Million Apiece in FY15,” DOD Buzz , July 30, 2014, http://
www.dodbuzz.com/2014/07/30/analyst-f-35c-to-cost-337-million-apiece-2/.
34      Terry C. Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation (London: Frank
Cass, 2004), 80-83; and William F. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory
and Practice (New York: Presidio Press, 1996).
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cross-domain synergy.35 This evolving set of assumptions produces a
preference for speed and multi-domain maneuver.
The new Army Operating Concept, Win in a Complex World, calls for
“expeditionary maneuver” and “joint combined arms” to present “our
enemies and adversaries with multiple dilemmas.”36 The concept places
a premium on operating “across multiple domains” and developing
“situational understanding through action while possessing the mobility
to concentrate rapidly.”37 The Chief of Staff of the Army is pushing for
a “professional force that is able to provide expeditionary, decisive landpower tailored and scaled to perform missions.”38 Through Regionally
Aligned Forces (RAF) connected by a global landpower network, the
Army will gain the situational awareness and access points to achieve a
“capability overmatch.”39 As stated in the Army Operating Concept, “to
retain overmatch, the Joint Force will have to combine technologies and
integrate efforts across multiple domains.”40 As seen in the 94th Army
Air and Missile Defense Command Task Force Talon deployment of
the High Altitude Area Defense battery to Guam and Pacific Pathways
regional exercises with the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, setting
the theater to achieve potential overmatch requires demonstrating the
ability to re-posture capabilities.41
The idea of using speed and multi-domain maneuver to destabilize a numerically superior adversary is at the heart of Marine Corps
doctrine.42 In the US Marine Corps, the new operating concept,
Expeditionary Force 21 calls for smaller, “special purpose” Marine AirGround Task Forces operating from a mix of shipping and partner
nations.43 These tailorable forces will be deployed forward and able to
respond rapidly to evolving crises ranging from embassy evacuation,
to arraying forces in theater to deter future aggression. The US Marine
Corps is also experimenting with a new Distributed STOVL [short takeoff, vertical land] Operations (DSO) concept that envisions employing
F-35B to “activate a shifting network of expeditionary airfields, tactical
landing zones and forward arming and refueling points with the intent
35      US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012).
36      US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex
World, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis: US Army Training and Doctrine Command,
October 13, 2014), iii.
37      Ibid.
38      Raymond Odierno, “The US Army: Trusted Professionals for the Nation,” Army (October
2014): 23.
39      David G. Perkins, “Army Operating Concept: Delivering the Future,” Army (October 2014):
65.
40      US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex
World, 11.
41      Vincent K. Brooks, “Rebalance and Beyond,” Army (October 2014): 107-108. Of interest,
the push for Joint combined arms maneuver capabilities in the Pacific is leading the Army to explore
additional watercraft and amphibious capabilities, see John Sullivan, “Army Watercraft Critical to
Joint Combined Arms Maneuver,” ARCIC-HQ, December 19, 2014, http://www.arcic.army.mil/
Articles/arcichq-Army-Watercraft-Critical-to-Joint-Combined-Arms-Maneuver.aspx.
42      US Marine Corps, Warfighting, MCDP 1 (Quantico: US Marine Corps, 1997). For a historical
treatment of the emergence of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps, see Pierce, Warfighting and
Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation, 85-103, and Terry Terriff, “Innovate or Die: Organizational
Culture and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the United States Marine Corps,” Journal of Strategic
Studies 29, no. 3 (2006).
43     US Marine Corps, Expeditionary Force 21 (Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, March 4, 2014),
2.
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of complicating enemy targeting solutions.”44 At the Infantry Officer
Course, the capstone exercise has second lieutenants launching airborne
raids with V-22s to destroy enemy air defenses and seize an airfield. The
mission involves multi-domain coordination with simulated F-35s using
Samsung tablets.45 Students in the Advanced Studies Program at the
Marine Corps Command and Staff College synthesized these concepts
as a new approach to distributed maritime operations that envisions a
wider range of expeditionary operations including using land forces for
sea denial and new shaping activities.46
The US Air Force and Navy are also examining ways to use tailorable strike packages with multi-domain overmatch potential. The
Navy is exploring a new concept, “distributed lethality” that envisions
“dispersed formations” of “hunter-killer surface action groups.”47 The
architects envision these formations achieving better multi-domain integration with the Marine Corps in order to, “provide persistent presence
that can influence and control events at sea and in the littorals, applying
the right capability to the right target for the joint-force commander.”48
US Pacific Command is testing the evolving AirSea Battle concept (now
called Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons,
JAM-GC), including most recently, Valiant Shield 2014, a combined air,
sea and cyber exercise involving land and carrier based aviation assets.49
Separately, the Air Force is conducting proof-of-concept exercises to
test “Rapid Raptor,” deploying detachments of F-22s with all support
personnel and material on C-17s to friendly air bases on short notice.50
Over the last fifteen years, the Air Force has also developed leap ahead
capabilities for remote split operation (RSO) using remotely piloted
aircraft (RPAs) in support of both Joint Special Forces Task Forces and
conventional ground units.51 While many of these systems and ideas,
including rapid deployment and airborne raids, are old, they are being
envisioned at lower echelons and in new contexts.
Other countries are also seeking fast, scalable multi-domain capabilities. Since 2000, the Indian military has conducted exercises in the
Arabian Sea integrating air, sea, and land task forces designed to blockade Pakistani ports and launch small amphibious operations.52 Similar
44      Marina Malenic, “USMC Drafts Key F-35B Operational Concept,” Janes 360, May 21, 2014,
http://www.janes.com/article/38269/usmc-drafts-key-f-35b-operational-concept.
45      Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “F-35s, V-22s, and Samsung Tablets: Junior Marines
Pioneer New Tech, Tactics,” Breaking Defense, May 21, 2014, http://breakingdefense.com/
2014/05/f-35s-v-22s-and-samsung-tablets-junior-marines-pioneer-new-tech-tactics.
46      The papers are available on request. Contact benjamin.m.jensen@usmc.mil. For a discussion
on possible ways to field smaller MAGTFs for distributed maritime operations, see Jeffrey Tlapa,
“The Micro-MAGTF: Optimizing Distributed Amphibious Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette 99,
no. 1 (January 2015).
47      Thomas Rowden, Peter Gumataoto, and Peter Fanta, “Distributed Lethality,” Proceedings 14,
no. 1 (January 2015).
48      Ibid.
49      Brok McCarthy, “Valiant Shield 2014 Comes to Successful End,” Pacific Air Forces, September
23, 2015, http://www.pacaf.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123425856.
50      “USAF Airmen Evaluate Rapid Raptor Concept in Guam,” Air Force Technology,
December 5, 2014, http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsusaf-airmen-evaluate-rapid
-raptor-concept-in-guam-4460735.
51      For an overview of USAF doctrine for reachback and distributed operations, see Curtis E.
Lemay Center, “Annex 3-30: Reachback and Distributed Operations,” November 7, 2014, https://
doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-30-D09-C2-Distributed-vs-Split-Ops.pdf.
52      Vinod Anand, “Evolution of a Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces,” Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses, http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jul-600.html.
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joint exercises between the Indian Army and Air Force since 2004 have
tested the ability to deploy integrated battle groups.53 During exercise
Sudarshan Shakti in 2012, Indian forces leveraged UAVs and satellite
precision targeting in support of a traditional integrated battle groups,
consisting of a division minus with attached armor, artillery and aviation
formations conducting short notice attacks against an adversary.54 In
December 2013 exercise Shahbaz Ajay sought to validate new, scalable
joint formations including integrating Indian Air Force operations with
airborne and helicopter insertion.55
Based on the conduct of the 2008 war with Georgia, Russia began an
aggressive military modernization effort focusing on ready brigades as
opposed to larger divisions that required time to mobilize.56 The concept
focused on smaller ground forces as part of a larger Joint force (i.e.,
tri-service interconnectedness). To assess the progress of the reforms
as early as 2009, the Russian military used the Zapad exercises to test
new concepts and force readiness. Of interest, the overall direction of
the reforms, similar to the Indians, is to use small, joint formations
that can move on short notice and engage targets from multi-domains.
In the Zapad 2013 exercise, Russian forces experimented with a wide
array of UAVs for target acquisition and Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) in support of air and ground forces.57 In separate
exercises held in Kemerovo Oblast in 2013, the Russians successfully
used UAVs to coordinate ground fires including rockets and selfpropelled howitzers.58 Based on events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
in 2014, the Russians are also exploring new approaches to irregular
warfare backed by the threat of conventional and strategic escalation.
Israeli Defense Force (IDF) doctrine calls for rapid counter-attacks
leverage multi-arm coordination for quick attainment of war objectives.59 After 2003, the IDF began exploring a “small and smart” Army
to shock opponents.60 According to IDF Chief of Staff Benjamin Gantz,
“The time factor is critical, and the campaign must be shortened because
the home front is paying a heavy price. The new operational outlook
presents a swift transition to a state of war and the implementation of
the “shock and awe” doctrine to achieve the campaign’s goal within a
few days.”61 The concept envisions helping the IDF survive budget cuts
while building on the assumption technological innovation will continue
53      Subhash Kapila, “India’s New Cold Start War Doctrine Strategically Review,” South Asia
Analysis, Paper No. 991, May 4 2004, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper991.
54      Nitin Gokhale, “India Military Eyes Combined Threat,” The Diplomat, January 17, 2012,
http://thediplomat.com/2012/01/india-military-eyes-combined-threat. For an analysis of the escalation potential of these exercises and the evolution of Cold Start, see Ali Ahmed, India’s Doctrinal
Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia (New York: Routledge, 2014).
55      IHS Jane’s, “India,” Jane’s World Armies, January 27, 2015.
56      For an overview as it relates to ground forces, see Rod Thorton, Military Modernization and the
Russian Ground Forces (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011).
57      IHS Jane’s, “Exercise Overview: Russian Federation,” Jane’s World Armies, November 12,
2014.
58      Ibid.
59      Israel Defense Forces, “Doctrine,” http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/about/doctrine/default.html.
60      Alex Fishman, “The IDF of the Next War: Army Chief Gantz’s Bold and Revolutionary
Plan Far More Significant than Money It Is Saving,” YNet News, November 7, 2013, http://www.
ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4403710,00.html.
61      Ibid.
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to favor increased lethality and precision. 62 As seen in the 2008 and 2014
during operations in Gaza, the IDF worked to integrate air and ground
fires in new ways, including how unmanned systems and intelligence
fed targeting.63 The IDF is at the forefront of developing mini-precision
munitions that will enable dispersed ground and air elements to engage
in multi-domain targeting in urban campaigns.64
Large militaries are not the only ones developing these capabilities.
Singapore is investing in what they refer to as a “3rd Generation Army”
that integrates multi-domain platforms in an “integrated battlefield”
construct capable of overmatching larger formations.65 The idea is a
“knowledge-based” force that observes and orients faster than future
adversaries can react, a vision similar to former Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chief of Staff Admiral William Owens in the 1990s. 66 Since 2007,
the European Union has fielded two multinational battlegroups. The
Nordic Battlegroup includes a Swedish infantry battalion designed to be
“reinforced with support resources such as engineering, logistics, antiaircraft, intelligence, transport helicopter, medical or mine clearance
units [and] should the need arise, combat aircraft with an airbase unit
or special forces.”67
There appears to be an emerging character of modern conventional
conflict. Military professionals the world over are imagining future war
where diffusing precision strike-capabilities change the tempo of operations. Exercises, concept development, and procurement all point to a
mode of warfare in which increasingly lethal, cheap technology as well
as economic and diplomatic constraints on sustained, major theater war
put a premium on fielding smaller, multi-domain capable forces. There
appears to be an assumption that speed is more important than mass
and forces can achieve short-term overmatch through multi-domain
maneuver.

Implications for Crisis Management

The diffusion of precision-strike systems combined with an assumption that conventional conflicts will be fought beneath the high-end
threshold is altering the character of war. Multiple nations are planning
to use smaller, modernized combat formations or hybrid proxies to
signal their capabilities and gain advantages in a crisis, and if necessary,
fight and win short wars. Given this trend, the question becomes what
are likely consequences?

62      Ibid.
63      For an overview of how Israel adapted from the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah for its operations in Gaza, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Israel’s War in Gaza: A Paradigm of Effective Military
Learning and Adaptation,” International Security 37, no. 2 (Fall 2012): 81-118. On fire-support roles
and missions, see Yaakov Katz, “Israeli Forces Deliberate Fire-Support Roles and Missions,” Jane’s
International Defense Review, September 3, 2010.
64      On mini-precision munitions, see Robert Hewson, “Small but Perfectly Formed: Mini
Munitions Offer Precision Impact,” Jane’s International Defense Review, August 14, 2009.
65      Speech by Senior Minister of State for Defence Mr Chan Chun Sing at the 3rd Generation
Army Wide Area Communications System Commissioning Parade, May 10, 2013.
66      Neo Kim Hai, “Towards a Knowledge Based SAF,” Singapore Armed Forces, http://www.
apqc.org/sites/default/files/files/KimHaiNeo_Towards%20a%20Knowledge-Based%20SAF.pdf.
67      “The EU Battlegroup Concept and the Nordic Battlegroup,” Regeringskansliet, May 5, 2014,
http://www.government.se/sb/d/9133/a/82276.
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There are two potential risks apparent in the emerging character of
war that will require military and civilian decision makers alike to relearn
the art of crisis management. First, as multiple countries optimize their
forces and doctrine, they could produce a world prone to rapid escalation
and miscalculation. One can imagine a scenario in which rapid deployments of multi-domain, first-strike systems accompany crisis bargaining
as a form of coercive diplomacy. Actors threaten to strike first, crippling
the adversary’s C4ISR as seen in AirSea Battle.68 Yet, because precision
forces have an inherent “first-mover” or “first-strike” advantage, it could
put premium on being the first party to strike a blow.69 Such a situation
could risk what Barry Posen calls “inadvertent escalation.”70 A world
of small, optimized forces seeking advantage before tensions escalate
could fuel a 21st century “short war illusion.” 71 Military planners could
inadvertently box in political leaders to high-risk courses of action predicated on lightning fast assaults that force an adversary to capitulate.
Operational plans need to factor a broader range of instruments
of power and move beyond flexible deterrent options to flexible coercive
options. Current joint doctrine moves from Phase 0 Shaping to Phase
I Deter.72 Yet, coercion, as latent force, is more than deterrence.73 It
includes compellence and coercive diplomacy, the art of finding levers to
employ minimal threats across multiple instruments of power to induce
a change in behavior.74 In crisis management, one does not wait until
Phase II to seize the initiative; one finds a way to force an adversary
to back down short of pulling the trigger. The goal, to use Sun Tzu’s
phrase, is to win without fighting. Using a wider array of coercive threats
reduces the incentives to rely on any single option, from military force
to economic sanctions.
Second, if what can be seen can be hit, and military actors are primed
for the offense, crisis response predicated on “showing the flag” is insufficient. The art of crisis management is in managing threat asymmetries
and developing future options. Every action in the transition from
Phase 0 to Phase I should produce potential costs for adversaries and
increase the range of response options open to national decision makers.
Large forces are large risks and, hence, potentially introduce more costs
than benefits in an escalating crisis. They also potentially limit response
68      Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point
of Departure Concept (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2010).
69      For an analysis of first-strike advantages, see Karl P. Mueller, et al., Striking First: Preemptive and
Preventive Attack in US National Security Policy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006).
70      Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1991).
71      For example, see debates about the origins and purpose of the Schlieffen plan: Holger H.
Herwig, “Germany and the ‘Short War’ Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?” Journal of Military
History, 66, no. 3 (July 2002): 681-69, and Kier Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What
It Means for International Relations Theory,” International Security 32, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 155-191.
72      US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2011) discusses Flexible Response Options (FROs), but focuses the majority of the appendices on
Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs).
73      Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
74      In addition to Schelling, major studies on coercion include Daniel Byman and Matthew
Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft:
Diplomatic Problems in Our Time, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), Alexander L.
George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems in Crisis Management (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), Lawrence
Freedman, ed., Strategic Coercion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), and Oran Young, The
Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).
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options as, with carriers, they change the focus from crisis response to
protecting the proverbial capital ship. Future joint plans will need to
look beyond traditional force demonstrations and uses of large formations like carriers and brigade combat teams to “pressurize” a crisis.
These risks highlight the need for the defense community at large
to become more imaginative in approaching coercive diplomacy. Small,
joint expeditionary forces imposing potential costs on an adversary act
to signal intentions, but they are only one signal amongst a larger array
of instruments of power. The effects of coercion tend to be cumulative. Therefore, new approaches to leveraging force demonstrations
and other military signals alongside diplomatic and economic pressures
become a strategic priority to advance national interests short of triggering increasingly dangerous “limited” wars. If a new theory of victory is
emerging, then its core idea depends on credible signaling of the cascading risks and costs of any potential conflict.

Of Note

Reconsidering Why We Lost
Daniel Glickstein

Adding to the Special Commentary in the Winter 2014-15 issue of
Parameters (vol. 44, no. 4), Daniel Glickstein gives Daniel Bolger’s
Why We Lost an “Incomplete” grade.

W

hy We Lost offers an inside account of the Afghan and Iraqi
conflicts by retired Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger. It cites
hyper-realistic descriptions of tactical firefights and conducts
a broad, strategic discourse on the major policy goals of those wars.
Chapters of the book characterize many of the prominent military and
civilian personalities involved, but I hew here to General Bolger’s strategic commentary and would like to single out three key points for further
scrutiny:
•• the lack of a cohesive enemy in both Iraq and Afghanistan;
•• how deeply the oscillation of American support and the broadcasted
deadline for an American presence impacted the readiness of the
Afghan Security Forces (ANSF), and the strategic calculus of our
enemies; and, lastly,
•• the importance of “buy-in” from local civilians and the cooperation of
local security forces in forging an enduring stability.

Know Thyself, Know Thy Enemy

The most vexing problem for tactical forces in Iraq and Afghanistan
was identifying the enemy. As General Bolger noted, our technology and
training “sent every American platoon of soldiers into action confident
that they could slay their antagonists with impunity today, tonight, and
as long as it took…as long as the Americans could find the enemy. As
usual, therein lay the rub.” (426) With the exception of periodic Special
Operations Forces raids and larger conventional operations (valley
sweeps with blocking positions, etc.), the average day consisted of
clearing routes of improvised explosive devices and meeting with local
national leaders, including periodic interruptions of indirect-fire attacks
and ineffective hit-and-run ambushes. Usually, coalition forces could
expect to escape unscathed, and in some instances even “pick off” a few
of the slower antagonists. But “a gaggle of one-sided firefights…do not
victory make, especially against guerilla enemies.” (428)
Additionally, there was a failure to acknowledge the diversity of
antagonists in each theater. Al Qaeda and the Taliban took center stage
and presented the strongest threat to American soldiers. But organized
groups such as the Haqqani Network and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin,
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Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi militia, and non-affiliated local
nationals interspersed into the Afghan and Iraqi mix as well. General
Bolger states “we were drawn into nasty local feuds, we took on too
many diverse foes, sometimes confusing supporters with opponents
and vice versa.” (429-430) The counterinsurgency canon that came to
the forefront by 2006 posited that providing services to the population
and protecting them against the insurgents would win greater popular
support and weaken the enemy. But troops already stretched too thinly
could not guarantee 24/7 protection for civilians across each theater,
and all the afore-mentioned foes had ample opportunity to threaten,
coerce, or cajole varying levels of support. And appeals and strategies
that might work to counter the Taliban proved completely ineffective
against the violence of a farmer angry at events such as Robert Bales’
murder of Afghan civilians in 2012.

Short-term Commitment

Another major point raised by General Bolger is the irreparable
damage stemming from the media-shaped erosion of long-term US
commitment. By the late 2000’s, the American public’s tolerance for
extended, bloody campaigns abroad as fading fast, and many politicians
were echoing this sentiment. The antagonists in Iraq and Afghanistan,
no strangers to using the internet and social media to study the enemy,
were well aware of this shift in domestic US politics. Predictably, the
insurgents were willing to bide their time, avoid risky and decisive
engagements, and wait for the international coalition and American
forces to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. The Coalition, and not
the insurgents, fell into a sustainability trap.
Unfortunately, the fleeting commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan
negatively impacted US service-members, too. While General Bolger’s
suggestion of a correlation between drug abuse and disciplinary issues
amongst soldiers and the eroding US commitment may be exaggerated,
his overall claim the “president thoughtfully and deliberately condemned
Americans in uniform to years of deadly, pointless counterinsurgency
patrols sure to end in a wholesale pullout” rings true. (374) Faced with
deficient local security forces, the likely prospect of ambushes and
improvised explosive device strikes with no real enemy in sight, and the
inevitable conclusion the war would be over in another year or two, the
strain from 2011 onwards was quite substantial for US service-members.

All Security is Local

The last critical point, and most vexing problem, is the matter of
local support and security. Consider the notable successes of the past
decade: Colonel McMaster’s stabilization of Tal Afar, Captain Travis
Patriquin’s unconventional methods leading to the origins of the “Sunni
Awakening” in Iraq, and the fruitful albeit short-lived deployment of
Afghan Local Police. Although each case is unique and characterized
by different methods, local buy-in and support were critical to each. A
foreign military force can only affect so much change in a given country,
and each decision casts second- and third-order effects of unknown
magnitude. (David Kilcullen once offered the interesting analogy of
considering what would happen if an Iraqi security force tried to come
in and establish order in New York City.) Local national forces appear
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to constitute the only option with the ability to attain legitimacy, used
along with the background knowledge needed to root out antagonists
at the tactical level.
Regrettably, the lingering question is how to find, train, and
empower these local forces to reach a suitable level of performance.
Finding young men and women with tactical prowess is difficult, and
made worse by trying to determine whether or not they are sympathetic
to enemy combatants. In addition, the sectarian divisions in Iraq and
the influence of criminals and war lords in Afghanistan also block this
effort. There is a fine line between developing local security and training
and abetting local militias (Shia death squads in 2006-2007 Iraq, for
example), and this nuanced problem deserves further attention.

Conclusion

General Bolger’s blunt talk in certain chapters must be taken in
stride, and should not detract from his depiction of the past decade
of conflict. His statement that the American military is more suited to
decisive, conventional strikes such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq is absolutely correct. But this fact should not be pushed to an extreme where
we abandon counterinsurgency yet again, and pray for better, more
conventional future conflicts. Instead, General Bolger’s work should
spark further debate on the factors contributing to the effectiveness of
counterinsurgency but still require study.
For me, the most critical issue was the process of choosing and
training a local military and police force. Other soft skills such as
interacting with local politicians and religious figures and partnering
with contractors and civil-military teams to establish public works and
facilities are indeed difficult, but the military made significant progress
in these areas over time. However, the security-force training process
was too often plagued by “stop-go” changes, insider attacks, corruption,
desertion, and sectarian divisions. This is the area needing further illumination. Train-and-equip programs remain preeminently a domain of
the US Department of Defense and US Armed Forces. Given General
Bolger’s critical positions as an advisor to the Iraqi Army and later as
the commanding general of NATO’s training mission in Afghanistan,
I had hoped to hear more about these problems, which arguably may
determine more than any other whether the US can meet minimal and
sustainable strategic objectives in any conflict-affected countries determined to be in the US national interest. Despite this shortcoming, Why
We Lost lays the groundwork for analysts, civilian and military, to reexamine strategic tasks, derive lessons, and exhibit the moral courage to
tell policy-makers their ends require far more time (and other resources)
than their terms of office can provide.

Commentary & Reply
On "Defeating the Islamic State"
Jason W. Warren
This commentary is in response to BG(R) Huba Wass de Czege's article "Defeating
the Islamic State: Commentary on a Core Strategy" and Paul Rexton Kan's article
"Defeating the Islamic State: A Financial-Military Strategy" published in the Winter
2014-15 issue of Parameters (vol. 44, no. 4).

R

ecent articles concerning the defeat of ISIS by BG(R) Huba
Wass de Czege and Paul Rexton Kan in the Army’s flagship
journal Parameters seek to overturn Clausewitz’s assertion that
“War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” (On
War, 75) The United States and its allies will not defeat ISIS through
legitimacy-seeking-nation-building projects—for which the West does
not currently have the political will to execute over the long term—nor
by reducing ISIS’s financial networks and waging a law-enforcement
campaign against it. Host-peoples may perceive the West as arrogant in
assuming it can force the “legitimacy” of an Iraqi or Syrian government
on them. It would also be disingenuous to claim population-centric counterinsurgency operations, such as the “government in a box” proposed
by BG(R) Wass de Czege, is not nation building, as these operations seek
to clear the enemy, hold key terrain (and population centers), and build
national forces and government (including public infrastructure). This is
literally a description of nation building.
The most efficient way to combat ISIS is through the employment of
US conventional military power supported by the strongest allies available in the region, such as the Kurdish peshmerga. The obvious “solution”
is to fight fewer ill-advised conflicts in failed nation-states that have little
strategic value to the United States or its allies. However, when that is
not a possibility, the default option should not be population-centric
counterinsurgency. There are a number of successful pre-1945 examples
of counterinsurgency operations that have little to do with fostering
host-nation legitimacy or conducting financial “warfare.”
A social-science approach to warfare has overly influenced US
military doctrine. This approach, which trumpets “engagement” as a
warfighting function, seeks to redefine the nature of war. “Engaging”
other cultures with joint military exercises and training, officer exchanges,
and infrastructure projects, builds on a notion of counterinsurgency that
has negatively influenced more conventional doctrine, hinging strategic
success to the solidification of legitimacy for a host-nation government.
Building legitimacy, as espoused in FM 3-24, is beyond the scope of
US military operations. As conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
have demonstrated, infrastructure projects and the imposition of
“Western” rule of law on foreign peoples are fools’ errands. A former
Army company commander in Iraq recently challenged my claim
population-centric COIN had failed—until I asked him what happened
to the Iraqi government’s legitimacy as soon as US troops left the area.
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A casual survey of the news in America reveals problems with corruption, and it is folly to think predominantly military forces with a
sprinkling of interagency personnel can solve the intractable, centurieslong squabbles and injustices of other nations and peoples. History
offers many examples of failed operations in this vein from Alexander
the Great to the present.
Decision-makers tend to lack historical insight, however, and have
little knowledge of past events since 1945, let alone antiquity. Training a
military force in local culture and history, as community police, and for
civil engineering, is beyond the capabilities of all but elite US units. It
should thus come as little surprise that legitimacy-building efforts have
failed since 1960, and in fact proponents of population-centric COIN
cannot point to a single modern success, which begs the obvious question of why the United States continues to employ such methods. For
example, John Nagl’s assertion in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, that the
British succeeded in employing population-centric COIN in Malaysia
has been debunked as a “one-off” based less on counterinsurgency and
more on the de facto segregation of the Chinese insurgents (who were
thus already separated from the Malaysian population at large), as well
as the geographic situation of Malaysia.
Financial warfare and the use of law enforcement to confront adversaries like ISIS, are also only sideshows for the main event of armed
confrontation. ISIS fighters cannot be arrested in the conventional
sense, and the use of law enforcement to incarcerate Taliban and Al
Qaeda fighters has met with only mixed success on previous battlefields—many returned to the battlefield after incarceration.
Victory is achievable through the employment of conventional
forces accompanied by competent local allies, such as the Kurds. The
main emphasis must be the finding and fixing of ISIS, and their ultimate
destruction. Non-lethal counterinsurgency methods play a tangential
role in this endeavor. As Peter Mansoor establishes in his book Surge,
conventional forces employed during that phase of the Iraq campaign,
used more lethality than in previous operations there. In fact, the restive
Iraqi provinces imploded into sectarianism, and ISIS conquests soon
followed once US forces departed, indicating non-lethal legitimacy and
engagement had failed.
Special Operating Forces (SOF) and airpower (including drone
strikes) play a tangential role in targeting ISIS leaders. Although
SOF-Airpower will not win the war, it supports conventional ground
operations. As recent events in Yemen reveal, without conventional
forces’ protection and intelligence gathering, SOF cannot operate
effectively.
Examples of US conventional military power employed in the
Philippines, numerous incursions into Latin America from the 19th20th centuries, and Connecticut’s success in the Great Narragansett War
(King Philip’s War), all demonstrate how conventional power with competent local allies can defeat insurgents such as ISIS. Competent military
power, less concerned with legitimacy, nation building, law enforcement,
and financial warfare, did succeed in these cases, and would again, if the
United States were to unleash it in the Levant today.
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The Author Replies
Paul Rexton Kan

I

am not sure the diligent people at the US Department of Treasury
would take kindly in having their efforts to combat ISIS labeled as
“sideshows.” Be they Clausewitzian or not, their efforts to damage
ISIS’s ability to operate and form a functioning state are in the best
keeping of the American tradition of using all of our instruments of
national power to defeat an enemy.
There is little in my article suggesting a conventional military campaign would be ineffectual against ISIS; nor is there any suggestion that
COIN is the only option. In fact, winning hearts and minds may be
more distracting than going after bank accounts and bottom lines. To
imply my article recommends the United States and its partners “arrest”
and “incarcerate” members of ISIS in Syria and Iraq is a facile interpretation. As the recent Special Forces raid in Syria that killed Abu Sayyaf
attests—there was little need to Mirandize the purportedly central
figure in ISIS’s economic organization in order to hurt ISIS. Does Major
Warren suggest the information gained from the raid on the inner workings of ISIS and its finances be discarded, or the raid itself should have
been shelved in favor of some sort of conventional campaign? Is he
recommending the US forego its current efforts to cripple the illicit
financial networks that underpin ISIS’s power?
Major Warren implies the strategic choices when employing an
integrated financial and military strategy are binary rather than complementary. Using financial tools against a foe does not immediately lead
to COIN (or to nation-building) or preclude a conventional military
approach. The choice is not a binary one—it’s not “tanks or banks.”
A conventional military approach can also include a component of
economic warfare waged against a proto-state like ISIS. The history of
conventional wars is also the history of embargoes and sanctions that
were part and parcel of a broader strategy to bring down an adversary.
The notion that conventional fighting alone can be credited for the
small set of examples Major Warren lists at the end of his commentary
is a narrow approach for what is clearly a broader problem. Although
history is not my discipline, I am fairly certain the enemies in those wars
did not use illicit financing to pay for online propaganda and internet
recruitment efforts to draw more foreigners into the fray, or to pay for
expanding their franchise to countries in other continents.
If, as Major Warren argues, “Victory is achievable through the
employment of conventional forces accompanied by competent local
allies, such as the Kurds,” then I am confused. I believe the US Air
Force is a conventional force that has already been employed along with
the Kurds against ISIS targets in the current campaign. The Iraqi military and moderate Syrian rebels may not be “competent local allies” in
the eyes of Major Warren; but, it is unfortunate that he should discard
“training and officer exchanges” because he believes they represent
how social science has “overly influenced military doctrine.” Perhaps
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his commentary is merely an argument for a larger role for conventional
US ground forces in an expanded war across both Syria and Iraq. Should
policy makers decide to accept such an escalation, the ensuing campaign
could also be augmented by a financial strategy to weaken ISIS. The
successful ground operations against Hussein’s Iraq followed years of
sanctions and the tracing of his regime’s illicit finances. These economic
efforts hobbled Iraq’s ability to replace military equipment and train its
forces, contributing to coalition military operations against the increasingly economically fragile nation.
To be sure, an integrated military and financial strategy is not a
tonic for ill-conceived policy choices. However, the inclusion of financial efforts in whatever types of wars the United States wages—COIN
or conventional or some mixture—against a foe like ISIS should not be
removed from serious strategic discussions.

On "Battlefield Euthanasia: Should MercyKillings Be Allowed?"
G. K. Cunningham

This commentary is in response to David L. Perry's article "Battlefield Euthanasia:
Should Mercy-Killings Be Allowed?" published in the Winter 2014-15 issue of
Parameters (vol. 44, no. 4).

D

r. David L. Perry’s provocative article on the ethical viability
of battlefield euthanasia brings an ancient practice into the
present day with startling clarity. One of the real strengths of
Perry’s analysis is the selection of exemplary case studies that are not
detached and abstract, but concrete and, most of all, recent. It would be
very easy to dismiss this topic as obtuse moral musings, but Perry has
not given us that option. Instead, he directly demonstrates this is an issue
for our times.
Perry concludes decisions on battlefield euthanasia remain, for the
moment, a function for the adjudication of the military justice system.
However, legality and ethicality are two different, if related, issues. The
imposition of “lenient sentences on well-intentioned soldiers convicted
of battlefield euthanasia” may be the best we can hope for in the context
of current social mores, but that is still, sadly, a pretty weak solution.
Perry himself appears to realize that, but he may have a point, in this
case: It may well be the best conclusion ends up also being a pretty weak
solution. Real life is like that, sadly.
Most ethicists would agree dealing out death is wrongful when it terminates an individual’s potential to exercise agency. Clearly we can waive
that standard when the individual’s agency means the denial of agency to
another person. Hence, we can argue in favor of self-defense—it is presumably okay to kill an individual who is trying to kill you. Euthanasia,
however, might require a parallel rationale, that is, the individual killed
has no agency left to exercise. That is the problem I think we face. Is an
individual in pain truly competent to surrender his agency and beg for
death? It may be he has a serious head injury. It may also be that he still
has enough brain left to function. Is one soldier qualified to make that
kind of determination on behalf of another, who is writhing in pain, and
whose judgment may be unreliable? If pain is at the heart of the issue,
which is the better course of action: the application of moral judgments,
or the application of morphine injections?
Perry mentions the inestimable James Rachels in his article.
It was Rachels who also pointed out, “The first thing is to get one’s
facts straight.” (Elements of Moral Philosophy, 3rd ed., 17) Unfortunately,
in such battlefield situations, truly straight facts are nigh impossible to
find. Thus, Perry addresses a difficult issue, one made up of “harrowing
dilemmas” made even more difficult by advances in medical technology
that make it possible to remediate horrific wounds, damage once fatal a
few decades ago, but now routinely fixed. Both the human body and the
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human spirit seem astonishingly resilient. It may seem justifiable to end
unbearable suffering, but we need to be sure the unbearableness of the
suffering is a verifiable fact, not merely a well-intentioned assumption.

The Author Replies
David L. Perry

I

am very grateful to my friend, former colleague, and distinguished
Marine officer G. K. Cunningham for his thoughtful comments on
my article. I have no quarrel with most of the claims he makes, but a
few points of clarification seem appropriate in response.
In the third paragraph Dr. Cunningham states, “Most ethicists
would agree dealing out death is wrongful when it terminates an individual’s potential to exercise agency.” He rightly notes an exceptional
case of killing in self-defense, and perhaps would also affirm capital
punishment as fitting retribution for certain heinous crimes.
But even if we then focus on innocent persons, meaning not guilty
of a capital crime and not posing a lethal threat to others (characteristics
that also undergird the just-war principle of noncombatant immunity),
some civilian requests for euthanasia (in the Netherlands, e.g.) are made
by competent individuals who (reasonably) no longer value their continued life, or (reasonably) believe it portends little more than unbearable
pain, suffering, dementia, indignity etc. I can not speak for most ethicists, but certainly many prominent ones (including several noted on p.
121 of my article) believe honoring such requests—designated as voluntary active euthanasia—can be morally justified, even when doing so
clearly means killing an innocent, rational person—“when it terminates
an individual’s potential to exercise agency.” (A similar argument can
support physician-assisted suicide, when patients are still able to take
lethal doses of medicine themselves.)
So perhaps Dr. Cunningham would agree the really troubling cases
of euthanasia that end someone’s ability to be agents/subjects of their
own lives are ones where competent individuals are killed without the
informed consent owed to them and against their stated wishes—i.e.,
involuntary euthanasia.
Dr. Cunningham goes on to note a different moral situation, when
“the individual killed has no agency left to exercise.” In domestic settings we might imagine individuals who used to be competent but now
can no longer reason due to advanced dementia, or others whose mental
disabilities never permitted them to be competent. If such individuals
were also clearly suffering terribly, and nothing short of death or complete unconsciousness would alleviate their misery, then unless they had
previously (while competent) stated preferences to the contrary, perhaps
nonvoluntary euthanasia might be regarded as merciful and right. I still



Commentary & Reply

135

believe such an argument can justify morally some cases of battlefield
euthanasia.
But I also agree with Dr. Cunningham that the prognosis for a
soldier who has just received a serious brain injury can be too ambiguous to warrant active euthanasia on the spot. As I noted on p. 133, “The
most our troops would typically expect on the battlefield is for medics to
treat wounds and save lives as best they can, and use as much morphine
as needed to alleviate suffering, even if the dose required might also
suppress the victim’s breathing.” I would now go further and say our
troops ought to be able to expect those things, especially since I have
concluded it would not be prudent for our military to legalize battlefield
euthanasia.

Book Reviews
On Strategy
Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of
Uncertainty
Perspectives on Strategy
The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice
by Colin S. Gray
Reviewed by Major Nathan K. Finney, US Army strategist currently on
the Army Staff.

F

ew authors have been more prolific, or as penetrating, as Dr. Colin
S. Gray. Currently wrapping up a career in academia at the University
of Reading as the a professor in the Department of International Politics
and Strategic Studies and the Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies,
he also served as a defense advisor for both American and British governments, at one point serving on the Reagan Administration’s General
Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. These experiences, together with decades of research, led to over two-dozen books,
multiple edited volumes, and innumerable journal articles.
Among this vast body of work, the trilogy of The Strateg y Bridge:
Theory for Practice, Perspectives on Strateg y, and Strateg y and Defence Planning:
Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty will most shape this discipline – and
the education of practicing defense and strategic planners – well into
the future.
While all three are complementary, The Bridge and Perspectives are
the most similar. Much as his predecessor in strategic theory, Carl
von Clausewitz, whose magnum opus On War was written to explain
a general theory of war that could be used in educating practitioners,
Gray uses these two tomes to delve into a general theory of strategy. The
Bridge is the more comprehensive of the two, taking Clausewitz’s theory
and building upon it to describe the dicta and parameters necessary for
practitioners to bridge tactics and policy – to be “good enough” in the
translation of force into political effect. Perspectives, on the other hand,
expounds upon some of the specific dimensions of strategy Gray was
unable to address sufficiently in The Bridge. The most important additions these two books provide to the theory and practice of strategy
are to its inherently relative nature and the dialogue and negotiation
that make up the development of any strategy (as well as the particular
strategies that lead to actions on the ground).
Strateg y and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty, the
last book in the trilogy, builds upon Gray’s general theory of strategy
– including the incorporation of the relative and iterative nature of strategy. In this book, however, Gray focuses on the necessity and difficulty
in planning for future security. As might be deduced from the expanded
title, Defence Planning is in large part a discussion of uncertainty – in this
case, the uncertainty that plagues attempts to plan for the future defense
of a polity.
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Three core elements of Gray’s discussion on defense planning are:
the impossibility of overcoming all uncertainty about the future when
shaping the people, processes, and technologies for defense of a nation;
as in war and strategy, it is a human endeavor and is therefore influenced
by the political and bureaucratic preferences of those involved; and, also
like war and strategy, it is an exercise in relativity – one need only be
“good enough” (better than the adversary) to be successful. Of particular interest to current efforts at shaping the Department of Defense
in our current environment is Gray’s dichotomy stemming from the
political nature of defense planning. This dichotomy details the fact that
defense planning can only be tested when employed to achieve political
effect and must have both an internal and an external consistency; all
measures at planning for the future must meet today’s domestic politics
and bureaucratic preferences (internal) and be successful when employed
against an adversary (external).
Finally, Gray spends significant space covering the importance of
historical understanding to defense planning – because this is the only
source available to ascertain patterns of behavior accurately that could
be drive human choices in the future:
“The choice of historical experience as the essential fuel for a tolerably prudent theory of defence planning is not exactly a heroic one. The
reason is that there is literally no alternative to education in history for
the preparation of contemporary defence planners.” (Strateg y and Defence
Planning, 38)
Such a focused treatment of the place of history in a defense planner
or strategist’s intellectual tool kit makes one wonder whether it should
play a larger role in the education of military and civilian leaders, whether
before service or during their career progression. The ability to pick up
a book on history belongs to any literate individual – the capability to
read history holistically, ascertain trends, and determine patterns useful
in planning for future defense scenarios is something requiring focused
education over time.
Overall, Defence Planning is an admirable addition to the theory of
strategy Gray developed in his previous two books. I recommend military and civilian leaders interested in – or likely to be involved in – the
development of strategy or the preparations for the future defense of
a polity read this remarkable trilogy, as well as study it over the course
of their careers. Each book will provide different insights and cognitive tools necessary to hold together the bridge spanning the policy and
tactics that make up strategy development and defense planning. These
books should join works like On War, the Art of War, and the History of the
Peloponnesian War as mandatory canon internalized by the military leaders
and practitioners likely to participate in the development of strategy.
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Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy
By Barry R. Posen
Reviewed by LTC Joseph Becker, Department Chair for Military Strategy at the
National Intelligence University.
The opinions expressed by this review are personal to the author and do not
imply Department of Defense endorsement.

G

rand strategy is an often controversial term in the vocabulary of
United States foreign policy. Competing visions of the US role in
global affairs lead to watered-down policy pronouncements which must
be evaluated in hindsight by their manner of implementation for a clear
interpretation. In his latest book, Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand
Strategy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Barry Posen
makes such an assessment. He identifies a relatively consistent pattern of
activist behavior which he dubs a grand strategy of “Liberal Hegemony.”
This strategy, he argues, has been wasteful and counterproductive in
securing US national security interests, and he offers a competing vision
for US national security strategy. While most readers will find his arguments against Liberal Hegemony compelling, his grand strategy of
“Restraint” will be divisive on a number of levels.
Posen is clear and systematic throughout the book in defining his
terms and developing his arguments. He scopes his use of the term
grand strategy along national security lines related to the generation of
military power, avoiding potential pitfalls of debate over issues such
as public health or domestic policy. He defines liberal hegemony as a
strategy of securing the superpower position of the United States largely
through the active promotion of democracy, free markets, and Western
values worldwide. Variations of this strategy have been championed on
both sides of the political aisle by liberals and neoconservatives. His
counterproposal, Restraint, is a realist-based grand strategy which focuses
US military power on a narrow set of objectives, relies on “command of
the commons” to ensure global access, avoids entanglement in foreign
conflicts, and actively encourages allies to look to their own security.
Posen advances a largely maritime-focused strategy to command the
world’s commons.
Liberal hegemony is a strategy based upon a worldview that sees
accountable governments as safe and secure partners for perpetuating the
American way of life and non-accountable or non-existent governance
as a threat that must be managed or ultimately rectified. It encourages
a leading role for the United States in establishing and defending this
order. It is this role which Posen believes to be ill-conceived and poorly
defined, leading needlessly to wars of choice and the open-ended commitment of US forces worldwide. Posen views the current network of
US alliances and security guarantees as largely a Cold War relic, allowing
countries such as Germany, Japan, France, the Republic of Korea and
even some of the Middle Eastern oil suppliers a free ride on the US
taxpayer. He also believes that some of these commitments have encouraged reckless behavior, with Iraq and Israel as particular examples. Posen
states that, since the end of the Cold War, policymakers have consistently
exaggerated the threats to US interests in various regions of the world,
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overstated the benefits of military engagement, and embroiled the US
in a morass of identity-based conflicts with little hope for a solution. He
argues that most US allies could (and would) manage their own security
if forced to do so and they would naturally balance against threats to
regional stability and the emergence of aspiring hegemons. Also, importantly, Posen bases his arguments on the assumption that great powers
(current and emerging) will maintain a nuclear deterrence capability and
this will largely reduce the likelihood of great power wars.
The grand strategy of liberal hegemony, in the form described by
Posen, would likely have fewer supporters today than any time since the
early 1990s. There is no doubt the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the larger Global War on Terror, have been tremendously
costly in terms of blood and treasure, and their long-term benefits are
dubious. As of this writing, the Iraqi government faces mortal danger
from extremist groups. Democracy in Afghanistan is a tenuous prospect
at best. Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, the recently departed director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, was quoted in recent statements as
saying that even after more than 13 years of war the US is not safer and
extremist ideology is “exponentially growing.” There is little argument
that business as usual is no longer an option in US national defense.
While the status quo would seem to require a change, the level of
disengagement recommended by Posen could be problematic in ways his
book fails to explore. The network of alliances and security guarantees
maintained by the United States does more than simply abet stability
in far-flung areas of the world. The United States, as a nation, tends to
be rather opinionated as to the conduct of world affairs. While rarely
stated explicitly, security assistance in its various forms is one of the
levers used by Washington to gain influence over the decision-making
processes of other nations. A prominent example is Congress’ linking of
security assistance for Pakistan in 2011 to a concrete set of performance
objectives. It is also true that countries hosting US bases or deployments
usually reap considerable economic benefits from those arrangements
as well.
Unfortunately, balancing power is a dangerous game which does
not always lead to stability. Posen argues, for instance, the US should
remove ground forces from Japan and the Republic of Korea, believing
the South Koreans are more than a match for the North Koreans and
both Japan and the ROK will balance against China once they have to.
But what if the Japanese and the Koreans assess the threat differently
than the United States? What if one nation attempts to “buck pass” its
security preparations to another and holds out too long? Stalin did this
before World War II, expecting France to bear the cost of balancing
against Germany. When France fell, the stage was set for Hitler’s invasion of Russia.
Balancing can also have unintended consequences. Posen states,
“Restraint aims to energize other advanced industrial states into improving
their own capabilities to defend themselves…” (162) But the capability to
defend generally implies a capability to attack as well. Japan’s balancing
against China would almost certainly arouse insecurities on the Korean
peninsula, among other places. Nationalist tendencies in either location
might also encourage a state to flex its newfound muscle. Perhaps the
US can no longer afford to be the guarantor, but abandoning this role
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will relinquish a measure of control the United States maintains over
its international environment. The United States will always maintain
some responsibility to assist its allies and could be drawn into regional
conflicts whether or not it prefers.
Posen’s vision for “command of the commons” means the United
States would dominate the air, sea, and space. His treatment of space
is brief and largely sound, but he underestimates the contested nature
of this arena. Air forces are treated as essential but could be right-sized
to coincide with a reduction of ground forces. The thrust of Posen’s
argument is the United States should support its grand strategy of
Restraint through a maritime-focused force, significantly reducing the
size and priority of ground forces. In his view, the balance of power and
nuclear deterrence will reduce the likelihood of great power war, and a
reluctance to engage in smaller-scale regional conflicts will eliminate the
need for massive counterinsurgency operations and render the current
force structure irrelevant. Oddly, Posen argues for a reduction in naval
forces as well, going so far as to assess the number of aircraft carriers
in the fleet. The United States, he believes, has the economic might to
reconstitute the reduced forces if necessary, but should save its money
in the meantime.
Regardless of the reader’s views on the grand strategy of Restraint,
this book has value. Posen outlines the benefits of having a clearly
articulated grand strategy and demonstrates the pitfalls the United
States has faced in navigating national security policy without this level
of clarity. His case against becoming embroiled in conflicts requiring
counterinsurgency operations is strong. The grand strategy he proposes
is problematic for a variety of reasons, largely for the optimism of its
assumptions and its required alignment of forces. However, this work
provides a starting point for debate and a structure from which various
alternatives might be built and assessed. Posen is right that something
needs to be done differently.
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Memoirs/Biography
Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice
By John Nagl
Reviewed by Paul J. Springer, PhD, Professor of Comparative Military Studies,
Air Command and Staff College
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hat is it about colonels named John with revolutionary ideas about
how to conduct warfare and an inability to function effectively
within the existing military system? For the US Air Force, it was John
Warden and, to a lesser extent, John Boyd, who invented entirely new
concepts for aerial warfare, but who could never get out of their own
way enough to maximize the effect of their ideas. For the US Army,
Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl played the same role, and it is evident in
his recent memoir, Knife Fights, that he has only partially internalized the
old cliché about capturing more flies with honey than vinegar. A West
Point graduate, Rhodes Scholar, and recipient of a PhD from Oxford
University, Nagl quickly developed a reputation as a brilliant defense
intellectual and he is accustomed to being the smartest person in the
room. Unfortunately, he at times conflates raw intelligence with subject
matter expertise, and his ego gets the better of him throughout this work.
Nagl was integral to the development of the US Army’s 21st-century
understanding of how to conduct counterinsurgency warfare, and his
first book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, has justifiably been required
reading for military leaders deployed to the long conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq. His memoir offers a tremendous opportunity for insight into
the development of FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency, the key doctrine manual
guiding much US military decision-making in both conflicts. However,
far too much of his memoir is dedicated to settling old scores and taking
unnecessary cheap shots at people who helped him at every stage in his
career. While some degree of criticism for senior leaders’ decisions is
certainly warranted, this reviewer found Nagl’s decision to deliberately
insult the members of his first platoon completely beyond the pale. It
comes across as arrogant, demeaning, and peevish, completely unbecoming of an officer of his stature. Nagl would do well to consult Eugene B.
Sledge’s With the Old Breed for an object lesson in how to criticize fellow
service members—the insiders who served with Sledge could certainly
identify the cowards and the villains in his work, but outsiders could not
do so with any certainty.
After detailing his service in the Persian Gulf War, Nagl explains
his intellectual development at West Point, Oxford, and the Command
and General Staff College. None of those august institutions, nor their
faculty, met Nagl’s high standards, suggesting his theme for the work
will soon devolve into “If only they had listened to me.” After finishing his dissertation at Oxford, Nagl was appalled to have it rejected at
presses he considered worthy of his efforts, and he makes no friends in
the publishing community with his vicious attacks upon Praeger, the
press that eventually published his work. Even a chapter break does not
halt the assault on Praeger, who Nagl blamed for poor book sales, even
though there is little evidence he lifted a finger to help those sales.
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Chapter 3 is by far the best in the work—it is a thoughtful memoir
of his deployment in 2003-2004 to Al Anbar province, just as the
region descended into complete anarchy. There, Nagl discovered the
fundamental differences between theory and practice. The chapter is
exceptionally well-written, balanced, and offers a solid critique of his
experiences, both positive and negative, in the Iraqi desert. Sadly, it is
somewhat marred by his heavy focus upon his fellow officers—even
though NCOs and enlisted personnel bore the brunt of the casualties
under his command, there is little evidence Nagl knew much about
them, and he has little to offer about their contributions and sacrifices,
leaving the distinct impression they had little influence upon the war.
In Chapter 4, Nagl turns his attention to the genesis of FM 3-24,
but once again, his petty attacks significantly influence the value of his
discussion. He goes to great lengths to inform the reader that Conrad
Crane was the second choice to lead the writing effort, although to
Nagl’s credit, he eventually admits that Crane, a self-effacing academic if
ever there was one, was the better choice for the role. Additional insults
are lobbed at senior civilian and military leaders, including some who
significantly aided Nagl’s career. In pursuit of said career, Nagl relates a
tale of essentially selling out his co-author, Paul Yingling, for the sake
of his own promotion opportunities, a move that paid no dividends.
Perhaps that is why he passionately attacks the promotion system’s
failure to elevate his choice of leaders, while at the same time demonstrating how often the process was circumvented by aspirants with
powerful benefactors.
By Chapter 6, Nagl’s story has worn thin—he presents himself as
one of the central architects of the strategy applied in Iraq in 2006,
and yet, David Petraeus elected to leave Nagl commanding a training
battalion in Kansas rather than bring him into the inner circle as he
did with so many other promising officers. Nagl offers an outsider’s
summary of events in Iraq and Afghanistan, but probably should have
focused instead upon his own role and how his unit performed in its
“train the trainers” mission. It is clear Nagl offered a verbal summary of
his dissertation to the officers who regularly rotated through his training
course, it is not so obvious what else was accomplished by his unit.
Chapter 8 stands out as Nagl’s chance to offer advice on how the
military should conduct its affairs in the future, and is another shining
example of what happens when he turns his formidable intellect upon a
challenging problem. He comes to many of the same conclusions as have
other prominent defense analysts, namely, US conventional dominance
and nuclear deterrence make irregular warfare the only viable option
for any opponent seeking to fight the United States or its allies. This
chapter would benefit from offering a bit more guidance regarding the
key works an interested reader should consult for more information, as
the extremely truncated bibliography hits a few of the obvious highlights, but barely scratches the surface of good works currently available.
Overall, this memoir has some unique insights, particularly regarding the need for, creation of, and resistance to a new counterinsurgency
doctrine. Unfortunately, the author’s often-cutting style, relentless selfpromotion, and continual name-dropping severely undercuts the final
work. Nagl’s perspective is reminiscent of Cassandra of Greek mythology—an oracle with unfailing accuracy, but doomed to be disbelieved
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by all who heard her prophecies. Perhaps Cassandra, and John Nagl,
would have won over more believers had they been able to present their
predictions in a less caustic fashion. This book is a worthy addition
to the shelf for any consumer of war memoirs, any student of military
doctrine, or a scholar interested in the development of modern counterinsurgency theories. Its flashes of greatness outweigh its negatives, but
much like the war in Iraq, it could have been so much more successful
with a better execution of a well thought-out plan.

The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National
Security
By Bartholomew Sparrow
Reviewed by Steven Metz, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
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ew people have influenced US national security policy as much as
Brent Scowcroft. Some luminaries burned more brightly – Henry
Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski come to mind – but their time in the
spotlight was shorter. Scowcroft was a senior policy maker in both the
Ford and George H.W. Bush administrations, and an influential figure in
Washington policy circles between and after his stints in the White House.
And he was there for some of the most seminal events in American
history including the final collapse of South Vietnam and the end of the
Cold War. As Bartholomew Sparrow puts in The Strategist, his massive
new authorized biography of Scowcroft, “…no other official or analyst
has consistently had such a profound impact on the national security
policy of the United States. For many in Washington, Brent Scowcroft
is a pillar of the foreign policy community and a global strategist par
excellence.” (xii)
Capturing a career of this magnitude is an ambitious undertaking so Sparrow’s book includes well over 500 pages of primary text.
It draws deeply from both secondary and primary material – including Scowcroft’s personal files – as well as extensive interviews with
Scowcroft himself and dozens of his colleagues and associates, many of
them central architects of American security policy.
Sparrow’s admiration for Scowcroft is evident on every page. At
times it tips so far toward imbalance that it detracts from the power of
the book: the author consistently gave Scowcroft credit for everything
that worked out well and absolves him of responsibility for what might
seem to be missteps. For instance, when recounting components of the
Bush policy that were less than successful or outright failures such as
Afghanistan and Yugoslavia, Scowcroft recedes into the background.
On successful endeavors such as the Bush administration’s response to
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, he moves to the fore as when Sparrow
argues that Scowcroft “Almost single handedly…determined what the
United States’ response to the invasion of Kuwait was going to be” (385).
Still, there is much to be drawn from this impressive book. Two
questions are particularly important. Sparrow places great stress on the
idea that Scowcroft is the model of a national security adviser, combining a detailed grasp of complex issues with realism, pragmatism and a
willingness to work behind the scenes rather than hogging the limelight.
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Sparrow notes George H.W. Bush described Scowcroft as “the perfect
national security advisor. He’s an honest broker, yet has strong opinions
of his own.” (488) “He believes in working with other influential people
out of public view,” Sparrow wrote, “Somewhat wary of Congress,
skeptical of the media, and uncertain about the wisdom of the public,
he believes in a security policy made by mandarins – a hierarchical
approach…” (559)
If this is accurate, the question is how the United States can routinely find such people. It is not a coincidence that Scowcroft and Colin
Powell, who had some of the same attributes, came out of the military.
Is the answer that the National Security Adviser should routinely come
from the senior ranks of the military? That has some appeal but also
profound implications for civil military relations. As illustrated by the
tenure of retired Marine General James L. Jones as Barrack Obama’s
national security adviser shows, success in uniform does not always
translate into success at the National Security Council.
A second important question – and one Sparrow addresses more
directly – is whether Scowcroft’s brand of pragmatic realism is still as
relevant today as it was during the Cold War. During Scowcroft’s time
in office, the global security system was very much state centric. The
conflict with the Soviet Union had matured to the point that it was possible to craft a working consensus among Americans and their elected
leaders that allowed things to get done. Today’s security system is very
different. Violent transnational networks, both ideological and criminal,
may not have fully surpassed other nations as security threats, but they
are at least co-equal.
Domestically, the Cold War idea that partisanship should at least
be muted in national security policy has collapsed. Instead, there is
hyperpartisanship driven by a new form of populism created by the
Internet, 24 hour news, and talk radio. This new populism has now
spilled over into relations between the Executive Branch and Congress,
making national security policy simply one more battleground for partisan political conflict. It is not clear whether a national security adviser
like Scowcroft, who deliberately kept a distance from partisan squabbles,
could be effective in this complex, dangerous new political climate. It
may be that he was the perfect national security adviser for the final
years of the Cold War but not a model for the future.
In any case, Sparrow’s magisterial book provides an invaluable
picture of an important era in US national security policy and lays a
foundation for talking about America’s future even if it does not attempt
to provide a roadmap for it.
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Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable
Pacific
By Robert Kaplan
Reviewed by Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation
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he South China Sea has rocketed into the headlines in recent years
spawning a cottage industry of instant experts proffering alarmist
commentary and provocatively titled volumes. Tensions in maritime
Southeast Asia have been on a slow boil since at least 2010, but whether
the South China Sea merits the label of “Asia’s cauldron” is debatable.
Kaplan is prone to hyperbole, but he has done his homework and is no
neophyte when it comes to the Asian littoral (he is also the author of
Monsoon — a geostrategic examination of the Indian Ocean published
in 2010).
Kaplan is right on target when he underscores the importance of
the South China Sea to the wider region describing it “as central to
Asia as the Mediterranean is to Europe.” (49) Using colorful anatomical
terminology he describes this body of water as the “throat” connecting two oceans — the Pacific and Indian. (9) The South China Sea is
certainly a major maritime thoroughfare crisscrossed by a spider’s web
of sea lanes. But is it accurate for Kaplan to identify this semi-enclosed
sea as “a principal node of global power politics”? (49) If “global power
politics” is used as a synonym for geostrategic competition between the
United States and China, then the answer is “yes.”
However, many in the United States and elsewhere insist the tensions in the South China Sea are not about “power politics;” rather (for
many in Washington and other capitals), what is under threat is the
sacrosanct principle of freedom of navigation. Arguably, the real issue
is which great power or set of powers will guarantee this principle now
and for the foreseeable future, and whose interpretation of freedom of
navigation will be observed in this body of water.
But for many in China the issue is Beijing’s territorial claims over
many islands, reefs, atolls and associated waters in the South China Sea.
These claims tend to be made on the basis of a purported historical
record of Chinese presence and activity in the area as well as China’s
interpretations of international law. And many Chinese view highminded US rhetoric about the sanctity of freedom of navigation as a ruse
to justify continued geostrategic meddling and invasive military activity
in Beijing’s maritime backyard. The author suggests China’s approach
to the South China Sea is “akin” to America’s Monroe Doctrine in the
Caribbean Basin. (13) However, as Kaplan observes, this parallel has its
limits. An important difference is Washington never made territorial
claims to all the islands and waters of the Caribbean; rather, the United
States asserted a sphere of influence. This is not to say Washington hasn’t
muscularly asserted itself in this region over the years, but rather the
United States never asserted sovereignty on the basis of historical claims.
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The heart of the book is contained in the first two chapters which
address the South China Sea’s significance to China and the rest of the
world. While Asia’s Cauldron book does not add much beyond what
has already been written about the South China Sea itself, Kaplan’s
astute broader geostrategic analysis is well worth the price of admission. Discussion of this body of water becomes a launching pad to raise
larger, uncomfortable questions about the future trajectory of US-China
interactions in East Asia and the Western Pacific.
The strategy of other claimants to the land formations and associated waters to counter Chinese pressure tactics is to push the United
States to remain engaged in Southeast Asia while avoiding an escalation of tensions to actual military conflict or to the point of forcing the
capitals of the region to choose Beijing or Washington. Understanding
how these other claimants and interested parties play is important and
Kaplan does make efforts in this regard. Unfortunately, too much of
the book — six of its eight chapters — is crammed with perceptive but
peripheral geopolitical travelogue of the states surrounding the South
China Sea. Much of this discussion — successive chapters on Vietnam,
Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Taiwan, and China — does little
to illuminate the roles each of these actors play in the South China Sea
slow boil drama.
These shortcomings aside, Asia’s Cauldron is recommended reading
for national security communities all along the Pacific Rim and around
the world.

The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy: Ensuring Access and
Promoting Security
By Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner, editors
Reviewed by Larry A. Grant, CDR USN (ret.), Research Associate at The Citadel
Oral History Program and Adjunct Professor, Charleston, SC

T

he history of America’s relationship to the world’s oceans and seas
began with the crossing of the Atlantic Ocean. American interest
spread following independence to the Mediterranean Sea when North
African pirates tested the young republic. The growth of the China
trade and the movement of the nation westward to the Pacific expanded
American horizons yet again, but the Indian Ocean did not assume a
similar level of importance to the United States as these others until
long after World War II. It caught strategists’ attention only belatedly
and almost entirely as a consequence of the need to protect the flow of
Middle Eastern oil and in reaction to Soviet advances in those waters.
According to Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner in The Indian
Ocean and US Grand Strategy it is time that negligent attitude toward this
important body of water and its surrounding nations changed.
This book explores the same general territory mapped out by Robert
D. Kaplan’s Monsoon in 2010. Kaplan wrote; “It is my contention that the
Greater Indian Ocean, stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past
the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau, and the Indian Subcontinent,
all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, may comprise a
map as iconic to the new century as Europe was to the last one.” (xi)
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The formerly slighted Indian Ocean is, in Kaplan’s view, on the verge
of becoming a new international strategic locus for the United States.
This prediction and the concomitant requirement to make prudent
national strategic preparations for the consequences that would follow
from its realization provide the thematic framework for the collection
of essays that make up The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strateg y. Editors
Dombrowski and Winner argue in their introduction that the rise of
the Indian Ocean as a trade route and potential battleground elicits
“questions about whether, and how, American policymakers should
adjust their previously limited approach to the region.” (2) The required
information for this reassessment according to the editors includes: 1) a
determination of US interests in the region; 2) a grasp of the geopolitical
characteristics of the region and their dynamics; and 3) the development
of mechanisms by which the interests of the US can be furthered.
The editors argue there are significant risks even in maintaining
the status quo. In light of recent events, perhaps the most compelling
of those discussed is that “allies and partners in the region may perceive the status quo or a slight decline in US defense activities...due to
the Afghanistan and Iraq drawdown as Washington pulling back more
broadly. This may result in more aggressive behavior on the part of
adversaries…” (11) (If the chaos there is evidence, this last prediction
seems to have been realized in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq and may suggest
that the decline in US influence is already underway). The editors accept
the Obama administration’s proposed “Asian pivot” as a potential step
in the right direction, but they also point out that it does not include a
specific strategy for the Indian Ocean. They return to this deficiency in
their concluding chapter, offering the “beginnings of an analytic framework for evaluating the contending strategic approaches offered” by the
authors of the other essays. Their unsurprising conclusion is the United
States would benefit from a coherent Indian Ocean strategy.
The editors’ introductory and concluding chapters bookend essays
by eight other scholars offering varying assessments of the need for
American engagement and the methods through which America’s geopolitical future in the region ought to be pursued. The second through
seventh of the essays examine various strategic options, and essays eight
and nine track the possible paths of evolution of recent policies into
the future. All of the authors are either scholars or foreign service professionals with backgrounds in strategy, political science, or Asian or
Pacific affairs.
Strategic speculation like that contained in The Indian Ocean and US
Grand Strateg y often makes for interesting reading assuming one can
decipher the sometimes dense prose. However, the likelihood of any
of the suggested Indian Ocean strategies receiving a serious trial in the
near future seems small as long as other concerns continue to take center
stage. For example, future China policy will undoubtedly include an
Indian Ocean component, but of more immediate interest is China’s
advancing “Great Wall of Sand” as some are calling China’s island
hopping and building program in disputed South China Sea waters, and
her growing influence in an area that is home to important American
allies. Chinese encroachments there will not wane soon and will capture
much of America’s limited resources before they can reach the Indian
Ocean.
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If some of those resources do pass through into the Indian Ocean,
it will almost certainly be en route to the Middle East. There they will
continue to go so long as the Middle East – where it could be argued the
United States has long had and is now watching the decline of the sort of
regional policy these authors advocate for the Indian Ocean – continues
in its currently chaotic state. Perhaps that crumbling structure, which
might be thought of as a policy under real-world review, ought to be
repaired before moving on to other regions.
Prudent contingency scholarship and planning – like scientific
exploration – always has value, even though it may not be realized until
long afterward. At present, however budget pressures may keep the realization of an Indian Ocean regional strategy consigned to the academic
seminar for room.

The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to
Replace America as the Global Superpower
By Michael Pillsbury
Reviewed by Timothy L. Thomas, senior analyst at TRADOC’s Foreign Military
Studies Office. He has written extensively on Chinese cyber issues and
strategy.

A

uthor Michael Pillsbury’s book The Hundred-Year Marathon, which is
about China’s quest to become the world’s primary superpower by
2049 (the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party of China), contains
three key elements. First, this book is unique in that, with regard to China’s
geopolitical strategy, it attempts to weave two important elements of
Chinese historical and cultural thought, namely the use of stratagems and
the concept of shi (how to attain a strategic advantage over an opponent),
throughout the entire narrative. Pillsbury relies extensively on writings
and strategic lessons learned from the Warring States period, stating, “I
learned that the Warring States mind-set has long been dominant among
China’s leaders.” Pillsbury stresses that hawks have “persuaded the
Chinese leadership to view America as a dangerous hegemon that it must
replace.” Other works on Chinese strategy typically move away from this
emphasis, making the analysis feel less “Chinese” and more “Western.”
Second, Pillsbury offers readers several insights regarding his personal history that indicate the extensive depth of his knowledge and
why his book has to be taken seriously. His information comes from his
access to classified sources (where the shi concept was mentioned often,
he writes), personal interviews among a host of primary sources in China
(to include former leader Deng Xiaoping), and access to Chinese defectors. His ability to read and speak Mandarin, access to such sources, and
his work with the Central Intelligence Agency, and his role as a policy
advisor were also important.
Third, Pillsbury’s book, perhaps unintentionally, may long serve
as a primer for aspiring Chinese analysts. He offers educators several
areas where they should direct their attention. For example, he lists the
nine principal elements of Chinese strategy that form the basis of the
Hundred-Year Marathon, and in the conclusion of the book he lists concepts the United States can adopt from China’s Warring States era to
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offset or counter China’s strategic aims. Further, to insure analysts are
not taken in by Chinese claims the United States is nothing more than a
global hegemon or a great Satan, he explains in some detail how much
assistance America has provided China over the years, in economic,
diplomatic, and military terms.
In spite of these extensive friendly gestures on the part of the United
States, China looks at US assistance (through its prism of skepticism and
suspicion) as part of an overall stratagem against China. It continues to
harbor concerns the United States is out to humiliate China. Perhaps
this is merely a case of how China has learned to view the world through
the Warring States template, where power politics, intrigue, deception,
and open warfare existed side by side. Or perhaps this is simply the case
with autocratic regimes, as we often hear the same claims of humiliation
from Russia’s current leadership, even though they have been offered
extensive assistance through the years. The assistance was clearly not
intentioned to exert “dominance” over Russia, rather, it helped Russia
get back on its feet. The United States simply does not have the desire,
budget, forces, or strategy to dominate strategic giants such as Russia
and China.
The book has a few shortcomings. For example, it would have been
informative for Pillsbury to access and report on the context of some
of the People’s Liberation Army’s more recent strategic works beyond
the Science of Military Strateg y (2001). It is important to know if Pillsbury’s
continued references to the Warring States period are still in vogue. Or
are we seeing more creative input in concert with President Xi Jinping’s
“China Dream?” When Pillsbury asks whether we are continuing to
“unwittingly assist in the challenger’s ascendance,” important responses
are required from the perspective of strategy. Analysts, independent of
their level of experience, should carefully weigh the lessons Pillsbury
has learned. The responses of a new generation of strategists to such
questions as “whether we are assisting the Chinese” will shape our
future meaningful engagement with China. Books like Pillsbury’s will
be important to their assessment processes.

Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters
By Bernard D. Cole
Reviewed by Richard Halloran, formerly with The New York Times as a foreign
correspondent in Asia and military correspondent in Washington, DC

T
Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2013
320 pages
$34.95

his book is a primer on the strategically vital, internationally complicated, and potentially explosive region running from the Yellow Sea
through the Straits of Malacca to the western Indian Ocean. The study
moves on known headings, with few discoveries, as it seeks to help those
unfamiliar with these turbulent waters.
The author, Bernard D. Cole, is a retired Navy captain who was
skipper of a frigate and commodore of a destroyer squadron. As an
academic, he earned a PhD in history from Auburn University, has specialized in Asian naval issues, and teaches at the National War College
in Washington DC.
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Early on, the author points to the “essentially maritime character”
of the region, then bit by bit acknowledges the basically continental
orientation of Asian nations throughout history. Today, he writes: “Few
Asian nations have coherent maritime strategies or ocean policies that
reflect both truly vital national interests and defense-budget realities.”
Cole says Western nations have been influenced by the famed
US naval officer, Alfred Thayer Mahan, British strategist Sir Julian S.
Corbett, and French naval officer Theophile Aube. But he does not
name an Asian counterpart, and neither Sun Tzu nor other classical
Chinese strategists have much to say about seapower.
Indeed, from 1498 when the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama
landed in India, Asian nations were notable for their lack of naval power
to fend off European, Russian, and American seaborne incursions. By
the mid-twentieth century, foreign flags flew over all but three Asian
nations: Japan, Thailand, and Nepal.
Two exceptions to this absence of seapower: A Chinese admiral,
Zheng He (sometimes written Cheng Ho), led several exploratory
voyages through the South China Sea and across the Indian Ocean in
the fifteenth century. But China’s imperial rulers, as Cole points out, lost
interest after that.
Japan responded to the arrival of American and Russian warships
in the 1850’s by building a navy strong enough to defeat Russia at sea
in 1905 and to attack the US fleet in Pearl Harbor in 1941. But during
World War II, Japan lost 3,032 warships and commercial ships and was
left with little afloat.
Thus, Asian seapower is largely a product of the postwar period
in which Asians have built navies from the keel up. China’s plans have
been the most ambitious, but Beijing had to resort to getting a People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) general, Liu Huaqing, to change into a naval
uniform to begin assembling a fleet. (The PLA comprises all of China’s
armed forces.)
Liu, Cole writes, “made his mark as the country’s most influential
modern flag officer” in the 1980s. His plans were based on three phases
that reflected his thinking as a soldier whose armies operate along lines
of defense, advance, and logistics.
By 2000, Liu’s navy would be able to defend waters from the coastline to what he saw as “the first island chain” running from northern
Japan south through the Philippines to Indonesia. By 2020, the Chinese
navy should be able to defend farther east, to “the second island” chain
running from Japan through the Mariannas to Indonesia. “Finally,”
Cole concludes, “by 2050, the PLAN (PLA Navy) would possess aircraft
carriers and have the capacity to operate globally.”
For the moment, Cole asserts, Japan has a better navy: “It is the
most capable maritime force in East Asia. It is not as large as China’s
navy but it is more technology-intensive, more experienced, and more
highly trained.” He argues Japan’s naval strategy has gradually shifted
“from a narrowly focused defense of the home islands to a global focus.”
However, Cole contends: “National policy makers in Tokyo during
the past decade or more have failed to acknowledge this maritime
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dependence; they have not adequately funded the armed service most
crucial to Japan’s national security.”
India reflects the experience of many Asian nations in shedding
colonial rule, in this case from Britain in 1947, soon to begin assembling
an armed force, including a navy. As Cole notes: “It is no exaggeration
to say that Indian maritime strategists take the name ‘Indian Ocean’
literally.”
Cole reports that India’s 55,000 sailors, a relatively small number,
man “an impressive fleet” that includes two aircraft carriers. The author
reports that India’s naval leaders appear to realize that their force is not
capable of going “one on one” against the Chinese. Hence, India has
sought to forge “strong relations with other navies, particularly those of
the United States, Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam.”
Asian Maritime Strategies, while valuable, is marred by several questionable contentions. A sampling:
The author asserts that John Lehman, who served in the Reagan
Administration “was almost unquestionably the most strategically minded
Secretary of the Navy in US history.” Yet Mr. Lehman was distinctly controversial and was reined in by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger for
overstepping his authority.

Some 44,000 American sailors are deployed at sea on half the fleet’s
288 ships on any given day, Cole says. A few pages later, an admiral is
quoted as saying 50,000 sailors are underway on 145 of the fleet’s 285
ships. Not a big difference but a good editor should have insisted that
those numbers be reconciled.
In Japan, Cole says, the Japanese government “pays most of the
costs” of US warships based there. That is overstated as the Japanese
cover the yen costs—shipyard workers, guards, rent—while the US pays
considerably more for the ships, their operations and maintenance, and
the pay and allowances of the crew.
In Australia, the author says, US Marines are establishing a base. In
fact, the Marines are rotating through Australian army training areas.
Similarly, he writes that US ships will be homeported in Singapore when
they are being rotated there for a six months at a time. Politically, rotating troops through someone else’s training grounds or ships through a
host nation’s piers and setting up a base or port are quite different.
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Modern Soldiers
The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the
Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries
By Anthony King
Reviewed by George J. Woods, III, Colonel (USA Retired), Professor of Strategic
Leadership, US Army War College

A

fter more than a decade of continuous conflict, Anthony King, a
Cambridge graduate and professor of sociology at Exeter University,
authored a superb and in-depth look at today’s soldiers. King’s research
passion, the examination of the sociological phenomenon “collective
action”—how and why groups form and sustain themselves—ranges
from sports teams to the military. In The Combat Soldier, King meticulously “explores how cohesion and combat performance, often assumed
unchanging and universal across wars, may have changed in the course
of the last century, as armies have moved away from the citizen towards
the all-volunteer professional model.” (39)
King examines how armies in Western-like, democratic societies
behave and maintain cohesion in the face of the hellish experience of
combat. He does so by deftly analyzing how the “multiplicity of factors
including comradeship, political motivation, doctrine, tactics, and training (39)” affected combat performance in battle from World War I to
the present. Rather than a macro perspective, he studies the phenomenon from the grassroots level using the infantry platoon as his unit
of analysis to identify what motivates these soldiers to act in unison in
a combat environment. His method includes comparing citizen army
platoons from World War I to Vietnam against the modern, professional army platoons which have fought from the Falklands to the most
recent operations in Afghanistan. By design, his emphasis focuses on
six armies: Australia; Canada; France; Germany; the United Kingdom;
and the United States, and applicable infantry platoons from their
marine ground units. Precise definitions and disciplined social science
methodologies aid King’s objectivity in analyzing the conditions affecting combat performance. Consequently, he challenges commonly held
notions of citizen armies, both positive and negative, in comparing their
performance across countries and wars to make his findings more comparable and generalizable.
S.L.A. Marshall’s research based on 30 years of study on combat
soldiers serves as King’s starting point. Marshall, widely regarded as the
expert on soldiers in combat, came under attack over the past 25 years.
Criticisms cast doubt on his methodology and objectivity, discrediting
the findings in his seminal work, Men against Fire. While addressing criticisms of Marshall’s research, King examines and defends the essence of
Marshall’s surprising and controversial findings—one in four combat
soldiers actually fired weapons in battle. In the chapter, “The Marshall
Effect,” King reestablishes the efficacy of Marshall’s work and uses
it to serve as his foundation for exploring the differences in combat
performance between citizen armies of the twentieth century and
professional armies of the current century. King explains how armies
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formerly appealed to “masculine honour, nationalism, ethnicity and
patriotic duty” (97) to inspire soldiers to fight in the citizen armies of
the 20th century. However, he argues new factors have emerged, as a
result of the shift from mass to modern tactics due largely to advances
in technology and the changing nature of modern warfare. Such factors
account for significant increases in the effectiveness of today’s combat
soldier—a direct result of the shift to all-volunteer, professionalized
armies. King contends the technical and tactical expertise of matured
all-volunteer professional armies (inclusive of both commissioned and
non-commissioned officers, and probably veteran soldiers) was developed and sustained through rigorous training. Expertise in individual
skills contributing to synchronous collective action has become the
dominant factor in determining platoon combat effectiveness. King
defines effectiveness as how well these “groups [platoons] generate accurate and effective fire on the battlefield with their personal weapons”
(38) or, in today’s counterinsurgency environment, “the privilege of not
firing because it [the platoon] has positioned itself in a way where it overmatches its opponent so thoroughly that resistance is plainly futile.” (38)
King’s comprehensive and detailed explanation of how today’s armies
conduct training through drills and rehearsals is persuasive.
In his final chapter, King examines a significant issue confronting
the US military today –the integration of women into the infantry. He
provides a balanced and comprehensive treatment of this issue. Although
he does not offer specific answers, recommendations, or methods by
which the decision should or could be implemented, he does provide
a different frame of reference through which to consider the issue and
evaluate possible ways to achieve the desired end.
In reading King’s book, I reflected on whom would most benefit
from reading it. Historians and sociologists would find his book a fascinating in-depth exploration to inform their views and put today’s combat
experience into an historical perspective. For military professionals, the
book is most relevant for today’s infantry officer. Though written by an
accomplished academic, King’s thorough analysis and research, complemented by expert testimonials, makes the book readable while advancing
a meticulous and compelling argument. In particular, King’s descriptions of current infantry platoon training in various armies provide an
informative and cross-sectional view. He implicitly communicates the
vital role commanders and trainers from company to division level play
indirectly in combat infantry platoon development.
Other military officers may find value in King’s work in drawing
parallels with either their own branches of service (air and naval) or
branch within the ground forces (armor, artillery, etc.) identifying the
factors driving their own “collective action” and informing their own
professional expertise. They would also gain a broader appreciation for
what makes combat soldiers effective on today’s battlefield. From the
service chief or combatant commander perspective, especially in these
times of fiscal austerity and unpredictability, the important role they play
in advocating for funding to resource training and readiness emerges.
Although an outcome less tangible than those compared to monies
spent on modernization (platforms) and personnel (end strength), King
provides compelling justification as to why readiness should be fiscally
resourced on par with, if not more than, the other two—if a credible
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combat land force is to be preserved. Having the best equipment in
the hands of individuals alone is insufficient to make an army effective.
King reaffirms, above all, readiness is what makes combat soldiers effective in battle.

Every Citizen a Soldier: The Campaign for Universal Military
Training after World War II
By William A. Taylor
Reviewed by COL (Ret) Charles D. Allen, Professor of Leadership and Cultural
Studies, US Army War College

A

s the American profession of arms seeks to reclaim its identity, it
is encouraging to see the emergence of warrior-scholars. William
Taylor is one, as an Annapolis graduate and former US Marine Corps
officer who transitioned back into civilian society to pursue a career in
academia. In Every Citizen a Soldier, Taylor appropriately examines familiar
terrain – the US policy formulation process to address postwar national
security through the preparedness of its military force to protect American
interests. Ostensibly, his thesis is the US military’s drive to reduce the time
to prepare individuals and units for war through a program of universal
military training was subverted by political and social agendas.
For this reviewer, such an examination is particularly timely as the
United States marks more than forty years since the end of conscription
and the inception of the All-Volunteer Force with the termination of the
Vietnam War. Since that conflict the US has been engaged in numerous
military operations across the globe—from the heightened Cold War
and a series of contingency of operations (Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, and
Kosovo) to the hybrid conflicts of the global war on terror spanning the
range of military operations. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Martin Dempsey recasts the National Military Strategy with his
focus on readiness, force structure, and modernization. Arguably, the
latter two enable readiness of the joint force to fulfill missions directed
by civilian officials in the White House and on Capitol Hill.
Taylor provides the context of experiences of the Second War World,
which weighed heavily in the American psyche, especially as the nation
imagined global threats could emerge after the Allied victory in 1945.
During the war, it was apparent, as Taylor clearly presents, American
society reconnected with its values and the national leadership held its
citizenry responsible in supporting the war. He describes the three-fold
challenges faced after the war: balancing national interests with individual liberty; determining the role of universal military training (UMT)
and its impact on groups within American society; and defining the
relationship of citizenry to its military.
Taylor provides a well-explicated precursor to the UMT efforts.
Military historians will be familiar with the post-First World War
Plattsburg Movement where American students and businessmen
volunteered for basic military training under the command of thenformer Army Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood. The movement’s
success greatly influenced Wood and future generals whom he mentored—George C. Marshall and John Palmer—both who became the
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foremost uniformed advocates for UMT. This legacy of the First World
War became the National Defense Act of 1920, which reorganized the
General Reserve (including the National Guard). However, a critical
provision for compulsory military training of males between the ages
of 18 and 21 was dropped from the bill. In hopes the world would not
brook another conflict of a scale as the Great War, the United States
followed George Washington’s imperative for a “respectably defensive
posture” (22) with a small standing army and reliance on mobilizing its
citizenry for military operations.
Embroiled in the Second World War in 1944, Army Chief of Staff
General Marshall signed War Department Circular No. 347 to make
UMT “the primary goal of the army’s postwar establishment.” (29) To
Marshall, UMT was essential in developing military leaders, informing public opinion on military matters, minimizing the expense of a
large standing army, and aligning democratic traditions with civilian
participation in defense and a small standing force. Above all, Marshall
and other uniformed advocates saw UMT as the way to improve military
effectiveness.
It is easy to use contemporary professional vocabulary to frame the
Army effort as a military campaign in its design, planning, and demonstration of a UMT program. The Army chief of staff provided the
vision and strategic direction. The general staff performed estimates
of friendly and opposing forces. Together, they developed concept of
operations, and “scheme of maneuver” with lines of operation. It was
clear to military leaders of the time that readiness of the force was absolutely essential for national security. In an Army that grew from 400,000
to 5.4 million between 1938 to 1942, it was important to shorten the
time to train individuals and units for future wars. The Army identified
early on supportive stakeholders, called “Friendlies”—as well as opposition groups to UMT. For this reviewer, the chapter “Pig in a Poke”
was especially intriguing and illuminating in presenting the concerns
of leaders from, labor, religious, pacifist, and minority groups. These
groups clearly identified that military necessity had direct and, from
their perspectives, undesirable consequences for American society.
In today’s vernacular, the lines of operation included communication synchronization and strategic messaging across the War Department
where senior officers were “on message” and set about to inform, shape,
and build support for UMT in the public sector. Clearly, the goal was
to build a constituency capable of influencing policy development. Not
surprisingly, members of Congress levied charges of impropriety in
civil-military relations against the War Department.
Taylor’s analysis reveals, while senior military leaders had a very
specific conception of UMT, President Truman had a broader vision
for UMT as an instrument to shape American society. Shades of
Clausewitz—in other words, the military instrument was adapted and
subordinated to policy. In response, the military fiercely resisted changes
to the core design of its program. The UMT’s essential elements were
to select men meeting entrance requirements, and train them to achieve
individual and collective skills thereby effectively contributing to unit
readiness. As Taylor contends, perhaps the fatal flaw inherent in the
UMT structure was the maintenance of racial segregation for the sake
of military effectiveness.
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Elements of the UMT discourse foreshadow contemporary discussions of the US military and the Army. One can easily envision similar
internal debates on Department of Defense force structure and capabilities needed to protect national security interests in an environment
of global threats and domestic fiscal challenges. I expect the drive to
develop the narrative for Strategic Landpower had similar elements of
campaign design with its intent, lines of operations, and messaging.
Despite the advocacy of iconic strategic leaders like President Truman
and General Marshall, UMT was not enacted (defeated in 1948) and
selective service was reauthorized by Congress in the summer of 1951.
Subsequently, “large segments of American society remained untouched
by military service.” (167) Again, the military necessity so clear to Army
leaders did not resonate with civilians in the Executive and Legislative
Branches. Other priorities subordinated the military instrument to
civilian-derived policy.
Taylor has produced an immensely informative and insightful
book for senior military professionals. His concluding chapter captures
the critical responsibility of strategic leadership: “Senior army leaders
grappled with the daunting challenge of crafting a postwar policy in the
face of great uncertainty. Even as battles…still raged, they attempted
to create a viable army that would stand the test of the unknown and
be well suited to a democracy.” (168) Such challenges endure for our
military leaders of today and Taylor’s work serves as important contribution to understanding the nature of policy formulation for the security
of the Republic.
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Irregular Fighters
The Islamist Phoenix: The Islamic State and the Redrawing of
the Middle East
By Loretta Napoleoni
Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Professor of International Relations
and Comparative Politics at Armstrong State University and Visiting Research
Professor at the US Army War College
New York, NY: Seven
Stories Press, 2014
160 pages
$11.95

S

ince its inception in June 2014 when ISIS released a statement
announcing the establishment of the Caliphate, not a single day
has passed without the media reporting some activity by this notorious extremist organization. For example, the British weekly magazine
The Economist reported that ISIS is spreading fear, but is losing ground.
(March 21-27, 2015) The Christian Science Monitor Weekly reported ISIS
is sophisticated, lethal and growing in numbers, but will not become a
global force. (March 30, 2015) Some reporters treat ISIS as just another
annoyance, while others question the ability of the West to deal with
this new brand of terrorist organization effectively. No matter how
the media treat ISIS, one important thing must be kept in mind: in the
post-World War II period, no armed group has ever carved out such a
large territory. It is an armed organization “redesigning the map of the
Middle East drawn by the French and the British” with the Sykes-Picot
Accord of 1946. In her book, The Islamist Phoenix, Loretta Napoleoni
argues that, while the Western media treats ISIS as little more than a gang
of thugs on a winning streak, the organization is proposing a new model
of nation-building that relies on globalization and modern technology.
(xiv) According to Napoleoni, ISIS and its leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi
are viewed by many Sunnis in Iraq as an Islamist phoenix risen from the
ashes of Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s jihad. (14)
ISIS’s spiritual leader, al Baghdadi, presents himself to members of
the Caliphate as a man with honorable qualities, and traces his lineage to
the Prophet Mohammad. In one of his official appearance after being
elected Caliph, al Baghdadi spoke inside the Grand Mosque of Mosul
dressed in the traditional attire of an imam. (16) In his speech to his
followers, al Baghdadi shows himself as “a wise and pragmatic” religious
leader telling them, “I am the wali [leader] who presides over you, though
I am not the best of you, so if you see that I am right, assist me. If
you see that I am wrong, advise me and put me on the right track, and
obey me as long as I obey God in you.” (17) Al Baghdadi also portrays
ISIS to its followers (and the world) not as the monstrous organization
represented by the Western media. Instead, al Baghdadi presents ISIS as
a legitimate organization fighting the alliance between corrupted Muslim
elites in the Middle East and Western powers. (78) Therefore, al Baghdadi
has said “those who can immigrate to the Islamic State should immigrate,
as immigration to the house of Islam is a duty.” (76) He also called upon
all Muslims to join the Caliphate to reconnect with their roots. This call
also served as a means of creating Arab identity. An integral part of al
Baghdadi’s mission is the purification of Islam, which is to be accomplished via Salafism. Salafism doctrine calls for all Muslims to go back
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to the purity of religion, to the origins of Islam and the teachings of the
Prophet. (85)
Another important element of al Baghdadi as the Islamist phoenix
is his appeal to geography. (81) As Robert D. Kaplan has written in
The Revenge of Geography, “geography informs, rather than determines.
Geography, therefore, is not synonymous with fatalism. But it is, like the
distribution of economic and military power themselves, a major constraint on – and instigator of – the actions of states.” (29) In the case of
the Islamic State, al Baghdadi and ISIS attempt to rebuild the Caliphate
in Syria and Iraq is linked to their belief that this is an area where God’s
judgment will come to pass. Also, geography has always been essential
to Islam – both religiously and politically. (81) The Islamic State and al
Baghdadi are also actively involved in the globalization of world politics.
Rather than rejecting modernity, its leadership shows an unparalleled
grasp of the limitations facing contemporary powers in globalized and
multipolar world. (xiv) ISIS has been able to use technology to spread
its messages and promote its cause, linking them to the world news. For
example, one of ISIS’s more successful ventures “is an Arabic-language
Twitter app called The Dawn of Glad Tidings, or just Dawn. The app,
an official ISIS product promoted by its top users, is advertised as a way
to keep up on the latest news about the jihadi group.” (63) Unlike the
Taliban or al Qaeda which rejected music, technology, dancing, etc., ISIS
has not only embraced them, but also put them to use to advance its
cause very successfully.
In conclusion, the Islamic State’s use of terrorism to promote
changes in the Middle East differs from previous organizations, such
as the Taliban or al Qaeda. These groups were fighting to promote their
view of Islam in different parts of the world; al Baghdadi and ISIS are
trying to establish the Caliphate in the Muslim world and, where God’s
judgment will come to pass. ISIS is also different from previous terrorist organizations due to its embrace of geography, pragmatism, and a
sense of nation-building. I highly recommend this short but timely book
addressing an organization that has had much written about it yet about
which much remains a mystery. Students of the US Army War College
would benefit from reading Napoleani’s work. ISIS and al Baghdadi have
learned that conquering territory is easy; the difficult part is managing
and providing what people need and want from their leaders.

Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists: Lessons from the War on
Terrorism
Gabriella Blum and Philip B. Heymann, editors
Reviewed by Sibylle Scheipers, PhD, Senior Lecturer in International Relations,
University of St Andrews

I

n Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists, Gabriella Blum and Philip B. Heymann
reach out far beyond legal debates and into the field of counter-terrorism policies. The message of the book is the United States needs to move
away from a perspective that views the law as a cumbersome liability in
its fight against global terrorism and it ought to base its approach to this
task mainly on non-coercive means.
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On the whole, this book is worth reading. At first glance, parts of
the book seem to be stating obvious lessons from the “war on terror,”
such as the idea that adopting a war paradigm as a response to terrorist attacks can lead to inadequate and counterproductive policies. This
point has been made over and over again after 9/11. However, French
Prime Minister Manuel Valls’ announcement that “France is at war with
terrorism” after the 7/8 January 2015 attacks in Paris demonstrates it is a
point well worth repeating. Lessons from the “war on terror” are easily
forgotten in the panic ensuing a terrorist attack. The book provides a
store house of memory, patiently discussing arguments leading down
the wrong road and policy options which are likely to backfire.
However, the chapter on targeted killing is one of the weakest.
There is little in Blum and Heymann’s recommendations with which
US officials would disagree; targeted killing should be a measure of last
resort, targeted persons must pose a real threat, targeted killing has to be
lead by sound intelligence, and caution must be taken to avoid collateral
damage. In this case, the devil is in the definitional detail, but Blum and
Heymann do not dig deep enough to tease this out.
The book’s discussion of detention unfortunately focuses solely
“outside the combat zone” and implies detentions in Afghanistan
and Iraq were less problematic because detainees were apprehended
on the “battlefield” and therefore ought to be treated as prisoners of
war. However, a number of individuals who ended up in Guantanamo
were captured in Afghanistan and Iraq, though not necessarily on the
“battlefield,” and it was by no means clear whether or not they were
combatants.
The chapter on interrogation is the best in the book as it really pushes
the debate towards uncomfortable questions such as US cooperation with
foreign intelligence agencies possibly using torture. It also goes a long
way to deconstructing the “ticking bomb scenario” and shows it is merely
hypothetical scenario that should not guide our thinking on interrogation.
The third part of the book moves into the field of non-coercive
policies. It makes the case for abandoning the outright refusal to negotiate in favor of a case-by-case assessment, a point recent research has
supported. The second, more original suggestion the authors make is
akin to a global “hearts and minds” initiative towards the Muslim world
on the part of Western governments. This rests on the assumption that
the chief enabling factor of terrorist attacks is the popular support terrorists enjoy as far as their views of the Western world are concerned,
even if this support does not extend to the tactics they choose. This is
an interesting idea, even if it is not fully convincing. It does not address
the problem of homegrown terrorism specifically. Neither does it apply
to all sorts of “terrorisms,” as the authors seem to imply: historically, the
extreme left terrorist networks of the 1970s and 1980s relied much less
on popular support than current Jihadist terror networks do.
Yet these weaknesses should not distract from the fact that this is a
good book. It ought to be a must-read for policy-makers in the field of
counterterrorism. Terrorism scholars will find much in the book they
already know, but will be rewarded with carefully presented arguments
and discussions and will be able to use the book’s weaknesses as solid
indicators of issues needing further debate.
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Canadian Army
A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000
By Peter Kasurak
Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy CD, PhD, Canadian Army Land
Warfare Centre and Editor in Chief, Canadian Army Journal

T

he history of Canada’s civil-military relationship after the end of the
Second World War is a complex story, parts of which remain largely
untold. Having started the war as a significant yet still subordinate ally to
the British Empire, Canada emerged from the war with a new voice of
independence shaped in part by its wartime relationship with the United
States. Still, for much of the Cold War era, Canada’s military forces found
themselves split between its British traditions and an emerging American
way of warfare resulting from latter’s dominant role in the cooperative
defence of North America, the Korean War, and NATO’s defence of
Western Europe.
In his most recent work, A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s
Army, 1950-2000, independent scholar Peter Kasurak offers a broad and
sweeping narrative of the Canadian Army’s history from the Korean
War to the beginning of the War on Terror. While general histories of
the Canadian Army are nothing new, Kasurak’s study is very different
from previous offerings in its analysis of the chosen subject. Departing
from what he describes as “the standard narrative of the army’s history,”
Kasurak sets out to reframe a story often viewed through the lens of
Samuel Huntington’s Soldier and the State with the perspective of Peter
Feaver’s Armed Servants. The exercise is novel and intriguing, if not at
times outright controversial, with the results often at odds with the
established scholarship on the subject.
The history of the postwar Canadian Army is typically divided
into two eras. The period from 1945 to the unification of the Canadian
military in 1968 has at times been referred to as the “command era,”
followed afterwards by what many critics have referred to as a “management era.” The former is often perceived as a golden age of the Canadian
Army – British roots, influential, worldly, combat experienced, and professional. The latter - during which the army was integrated with the
other two armed services into a single unified service, ushered in what
one military historian later described as a “generation of professional
decline.” In the post-unification era, Canadian Army values had been
replaced with civilian business management concepts. British traditions
and ethos were discarded. It is this established narrative that Kasurak
takes aim at, and using Feaver’s agency theory sets out to demonstrate it
was in fact not the civilian leadership but rather the army that was “the
author of its own decline,” beginning not after unification but instead
right after the Second World War.
Any attempt to recast a military organization’s historical characteristics and attributes so significantly in a single study is bound to
run into difficulty, and Kasurak’s book is no exception. The history of
Canada’s postwar army has yet to receive detailed academic attention
and there remain some gaping holes in the basic narrative, never mind
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the analysis or revision of the existing historiography. For example, the
defence department’s historical directorate has published almost no official history of the Cold War era Canadian Army above the regimental
level. Moreover, army biography, especially of the senior Cold War era
leadership, is almost non-existent. There is no official history of the
postwar army headquarters or the Mobile Command organization that
replaced it after unification of the Canadian Forces. Many of the army’s
NATO operations and UN peacekeeping missions have yet to receive
proper official or academic histories.
Kasurak’s book had an opportunity to fill some of these critical
gaps in the historiography of the subject, so it was disappointing that
the author did not do so. Though it is framed as a critical study of the
army’s institutional evolution, unfortunately National Force is just another
history of civil-military relations that in this instance sides with the
civilians over the soldiers. There is in fact very little explanation in the
book of how the army actually functioned as an institution during the
Cold War, how headquarters functioned, how the army was commanded
or structured, or how the army’s combat development processes conceived, designed, built, and managed its various field forces. Similarly,
the defence operational research and development establishments that
influenced so many army procurement decisions during the Cold War
receives barely a nod in this study. Instead, readers are given limited
context of what shaped army decision-making leaving one to wonder
how the author was able to determine exactly that senior Canadian army
officers were engaged in a deliberate, decades-long campaign of “shirking” their duty to serve the state’s civilian leadership. Though Kasurak
admits “it should not be imagined that civilians are above criticism,”
too often he gives them a free pass, and this book is clearly aimed at
reducing the complex institutional processes of shaping armies through
war and peace into a singular struggle between the noble politician and
the nefarious general officer.
While the notion of challenging the army’s established narrative is
both original and welcome, missing scholarship has forced Kasurak to
gloss over critical elements of the army’s history and draw conclusions
without any proper foundational context. The result, unfortunately, is a
fractured and biased history that at times appears contrived rather than
deduced. In the absence of other scholarship on the period, this book
is recommended as an acceptable addition due to what new material it
does bring to the narrative. However, readers are cautioned to examine
its evidence and conclusions with a very critical eye.

Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day
By Marc Milner
Reviewed by Colonel Gert-Jan Kooij (Royal Netherlands Army)

University Press of Kansas,
Lawrence, Kansas; 2014.
400 pages
$34.95

E

ver since the fighting for the beaches of Normandy and the struggle
for the first objectives of Operation Overlord came to an end, the
role of the Canadian Army has been underestimated and undervalued.
In seven decades of historical publications, it has been accused of being
an ineffective force that benefited from good fortune. Although the
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Canadians fought hard, they were referred to as “hockey players led by
donkeys.” Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day proves these
allegations to be false. The story of the Canadians during Operation
Overlord, is one of well-trained and well-organized units fulfilling their
mission to stop the panzers.
Marc Milner is a well-respected professor and director of the
Brigadier Milton F. Gregg, VC, Centre for the Study of War and Society
at the University of New Brunswick. Additionally, he is an expert on
World War II with many books and publications on military history. In
2011, the Society of Military History awarded Milner the Moncado Prize
for his article in The Journal of Military History, based on his research for
Stopping the Panzers. He spent many years researching Operation Overlord.
In contrast to other historians he focused on the Canadian forces and
the German units opposing them. He and his team conducted research
in many archives such as those of the Canadian regiments, the Royal
Canadian History Institute in Toronto, the Howard Gottlieb Archives
in Boston, the Liddel-Hart Centre in London, the US Army Heritage
Center in Carlisle, and many other Canadian, British, American and
German archives. Milner also visited Normandy to understand better
the terrain and the environment in which the Canadians had to fight.
Stopping the Panzers is not a repetition of earlier books or journals
about Operation Overlord. It is a rich collection of new facts of the
Canadian role and the German opposition to the 7th and 9th Canadian
Brigades. Thorough research by the author and other scholars lead to
new facts. Operation Overlord was mainly about speed and operational
tempo and – in contrast to the other larger allied partners – this is not
what the Canadians displayed. The mission of the Canadians was never
to conduct a fast offensive operation. The mission for the 3rd Canadian
Infantry Division was not to advance with speed and seize Caen, instead
the mission was to stop the impending German counterattack. The
Germans anticipated an allied landing on the beaches of Normandy.
One of their options was to thrust this landing back into the North Sea
with an armored attack on the allied bridgehead west of Caen, which is
precisely what they tried to do. Allied planners expected the Germans to
counterattack, which could have hampered the entire allied operation.
If the Germans had driven a wedge between the British and US armies,
the landing would have failed. The mission of the 3rd Canadian Infantry
Division was not to seize Caen, but to control key terrain along the road
from Bayeux to Caen, consolidate, and stop the counterattack. They
paid a high price with the highest numbers of casualties of all allied units
during this operation.
Stopping the Panzers is a paradigm shift in Canadian history on
Operation Overlord. It is a well-written book that is, despite the vast
amount of new facts, easy to read. Because it is based on rigorous
research from allied and German archives and because the author’s
familiarity with the terrain Stopping the Panzers is not just another book
about Operation Overlord, but a truly unique view on the Canadian
mission and role in the operation. Because it is so groundbreaking and
well-written it is a “must-have” for every individual interested the Second
World War. This is a job well done by Milner, his team, and above all,
the men of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division who paid a very high price
for doing what they had to do.
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Civil War, WWI, WWII, & the Vietnam War
Embattled Rebel: Jefferson Davis as Commander in Chief
By James M. McPherson
Reviewed by Matthew Pinsker, D.Phil, Associate Professor of History and
Pohanka Chair in American Civil War History at Dickinson College

N
New York, NY: Penguin
Press, 2014.
320 pages
$32.95

obody was better trained as a mid-nineteenth-century commander in chief than Jefferson Davis. There were more important
American military leaders and more successful Washington hands prior
to the Civil War, but Davis was almost unique in the way he navigated
both worlds. A graduate of West Point, combat veteran and war hero
(from his role as a regimental officer in the Mexican War), Davis was
also a long-serving US senator from Mississippi, who had chaired the
Committee on Military Affairs and held the post of Secretary of War
during the Pierce Administration. If anybody was prepared for the challenges of an American civil war, it was Davis. Yet both contemporaries
and historians have always appeared underwhelmed by the man whom
James McPherson now sympathetically labels, “The Embattled Rebel.”
Part of the problem was too much expertise. Davis knew better
than his generals how to fight the war, and with a few exceptions (such
as in his relationship with Robert E. Lee), he meddled and micromanaged incessantly. McPherson goes so far as to claim, “No other chief
executive in American history exercised such hands-on influence in the
shaping of military strategy.” (11) That’s a bold statement in light of
Abraham Lincoln’s equally assertive leadership style, but the noted Civil
War historian demonstrates time and again how obsessive Davis was
about exercising his duties as commander in chief. The signs were apparent from the beginning, when on Sunday morning, July 21, 1861, the
Confederate president “could stand it no longer” and “commandeered a
special train” to take him out to the first great battlefield of the war near
Manassas Junction. (41) There, Davis even acted briefly as a field commander, “rallying” straggling troops by proclaiming, on horseback, “I
am Jefferson Davis…Follow me back to the field.” (41) Lincoln, too, saw
a little bit of combat in 1864 at Fort Stevens near Washington, but the
former Illinois militia captain never ventured anything quite as bold as
this. Nor was Lincoln as aggressive as Davis in demanding face-to-face
conferences with his generals in the field, though both civilian leaders
were surprisingly eager throughout the conflict to travel out to the frontlines to see for themselves what was happening.
Of course, Lincoln usually gets praised for being attentive to such
details while Davis often gets vilified for nitpicking. McPherson warns
against allowing these sorts of comparisons to cloud a more objective
evaluation of the losing side of this equation. Instead, the author tries to
understand Davis on his own terms and that’s exactly what makes this
particular Rebel leader seem so embattled. Even the most devoted Civil
War buff will be surprised by how early and often Davis found himself
criticized and undermined by his own contemporaries. At his First
Inaugural address as an elected president, delivered on February 22,
1862, Davis felt compelled to acknowledge, “we have recently met with
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serious disasters,” (66) even though the war was not yet a year old. And
soon after those sobering remarks, Davis’s favorite field commander,
Albert Sidney Johnston, was dead (mortally wounded at Shiloh) and the
Confederate’s most popular general at the time, Pierre G.T. Beauregard,
essentially went absent without leave, forcing Davis to relieve him. The
western theatre was proving disastrous for the Confederacy, an especially
painful reality for the Mississippian in charge. And by late spring 1862,
the Union forces, which had successfully sailed out from the defenses
of Washington to the Virginia peninsula, were only miles away from
capturing Richmond.
Fortunately for Davis and the Confederacy, out of this grim
period General Lee emerged as kind of military savior, accepting field
command in early June 1862 and then earning an extraordinary run
of victories over the next year with the Army of Northern Virginia,
until their terrible defeat at Gettysburg in July 1863. But even so, the
underlying trouble for Davis during that selective series of triumphs
was how much Lee’s success as a military strategist often collided what
McPherson terms here the “policy” interests of the Confederacy. (9)
Southern military offensives in the fall of 1862, for example, actually
alienated Border States such as Maryland and Kentucky, and did little
to affect diplomatic affairs. Lee’s audacious tactics also came at a high
human cost — one the lesser-populated Confederacy could ill-afford.
Even if Davis could forget some of these problems — and
McPherson makes clear he never did — whatever hopefulness the
Confederate president may have derived from Lee’s short-term gains
was soon lost in a cascade of recriminations over setbacks in the west
and elsewhere. Davis spent weeks traveling across the South trying to
quell problems among his feuding generals, especially regarding his
deeply unpopular western departmental commander, Braxton Bragg.
Nothing worked. There were also desperate problems with commissary
and supply, made worse by poor administrative decisions. The tetchy
cabinet was a revolving door — four different secretaries of state, five
secretaries of war, and one miserably unhappy vice-president. Moreover,
Davis faced deepening resistance from a balky Confederate Congress,
anxious state officials, and a growing southern peace faction. Then, on
April 30, 1864, the beleaguered president’s five-year-old son died tragically, after falling from a balcony at the Confederate White House.
Yet despite all of it, Davis endured. He was in poor health
throughout the conflict and repeatedly beset by critics, but what emerges
from McPherson’s compact study is the portrait of a leader undaunted.
Davis may have been irritable, but he was never defeatist. While he has
always been a difficult man to admire, McPherson, who openly acknowledges his sympathies for the Union, nevertheless has created provocative
grounds for greater empathy and deeper analysis than most readers have
ever tried to devote to the forlorn figure of Jefferson Davis.
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Doughboys on the Great War: How American Soldiers Viewed
Their Military Experience
By Edward A. Gutiérrez
Reviewed by COL Douglas V. Mastriano, PhD, Department of Military Strategy
Plans & Operations, US Army War College

Lawrence, KS; University
Press of Kansas, 2014
320 pages
$34.95

D

oughboys on the Great War: How American Soldiers Viewed Their Military
Experience, by Edward A. Gutiérrez, was written with the goal of
capturing how American soldiers thought about their experience in the
First World War. In particular, Gutiérrez sought to reveal the motivation of the men “to answer their country’s call.” The book opens with a
discussion of how views and memories change over time. The challenge
for Gutiérrez was to find reliable sources capturing the thoughts and
feelings of American soldiers in the First World War during, or close to,
the end of their military service. The obvious starting point for such data
were biographies and personal letters. Yet, Gutiérrez also sought sources
posing similar questions to “establish broader patterns of understanding and ascertain why men fought.” (3) The solution for the author was
found in post-war questionnaires distributed by the states of Virginia,
Connecticut, Utah and Minnesota. Gutiérrez spent fourteen years studying these surveys and found that data collected shortly after the soldiers
returned from military service portrayed their feelings and motivations
more accurately. By using this information, Doughboys on the Great War
endeavored to explain “why individuals volunteer to go to war, and, if
reality fails to match expectations …to ascertain the cause of these erroneous presumptions.” (12)
Using data collected largely from these questionnaires, Gutiérrez
traced the impressions and motivations of the “Doughboys” from their
entry into the Army, to basic training, the journey to France, combat,
and home again. Just as was the case in Europe 1914, patriotic enthusiasm proved to be one of the chief motivations in joining the military in
1917 and 1918. Yet, there was something grander than this. Gutiérrez
uncovered, in his extensive research, a sense of duty was indeed a greater
motivation than enthusiasm. To highlight this view, a Virginian is
quoted as saying “I believe now that it is the duty of every man to serve
his country in time of need.” (23)
Yet, the sense of duty could not make up for the lack of preparedness in the United States. Upon arriving at basic training, the men of
the fledgling American armed forces found a lack of equipment, tanks,
planes, clothes and even rifles. The Wilson Administration naively
believed preparation for war would provoke war. When war finally
came in April 1917, the United States lacked what it needed to train
and equip a modern army. Instead, soldiers often trained with wooden
rifles, under the instruction of an officer, who equally lacked the skills
needed to train a force for war. Indeed, many men would needlessly die
in combat due to inadequate training and preparation. As one soldier
wryly commented, “It is however, a matter of grave discussion, why,
when at Camp Gordon, we were taught to sing, while after the armistice
we were taught to fight” (Frank Holden, War Memories. Athens, GA:
Athens Book Company, 1922 [77]).
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Gutiérrez discovered insufficient physical preparation was compounded by a lack of psychological understanding. Once the soldiers
experienced the reality of modern war, they found neither a sense of
duty nor enthusiasm could help them overcome fear and devastation.
Instead, the moral character they had developed in life before entering
the army proved vital. Quoting one veteran in this regard, “Men get out
of war what they brought to it.” Gutiérrez rightly added, “The prewar
life experience and personality of a soldier dictate how that soldier will
react in battle. Individual predispositions share a soldier’s experience.”
(44) This proved especially true in the US military of the First World
War, which lacked the skills to train an army for modern warfare.
Although outside of the scope of the book, a more extensive
description of the campaigns and engagements in which the Doughboys
fought would have provided better context for the reader. This would
have enhanced its value by putting into perspective the views of the
soldiers who experienced battle. Yet, despite this, Gutiérrez provides a
well-researched and thoughtful book.
Doughboys on the Great War is a gripping and engaging view into the
feelings and perspectives of the average soldier before, during, and
immediately after World War I. It does a terrific job painting a picture of
the soldier’s experience, to include an engaging description of the motivations driving Italian-Americans and African-Americans in proving
their worth in battle to reflect their value as citizens. Overall, Gutiérrez’s
book is a valuable contribution to the historiography on the First World
War, and a welcome addition to the Centennial commemoration of the
tragic epoch.

A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the
Collapse of the Habsburg Empire
By Geoffrey Wawro
Reviewed by James D. Scudieri, PhD, (Col., USA [Ret]), Independent
Consultant & Research Analyst, US Army Heritage and Education Center,
Historical Services Division

T

he present work is a long-overdue look at a neglected topic on the
First World War. Author Geoffrey Wawro is a well established author
with earlier monographs on the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian
Wars of 1866 and 1870 respectively. His current work blazes a new trail.
A Mad Catastrophe examines the pre-war Austro-Hungarian Empire,
policy makers’ monumental decisions, and the disastrous operations in
1914. The acknowledgments section is a fascinating read unto itself on
his ancestors and their links to the current story. He intends to demolish
the myth of the quaint Austro-Hungarian Empire under grandfatherly
Emperor Franz Joseph. His introduction sets the stage in no uncertain
terms.
Chapters 1 through 5 describe the peacetime Dual Monarchy,
including war plans and the pre-military response to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie. He sees an
unworkable state, the more so due to Magyar duplicity; Austrian inadequacy; and unsolvable, ethnic tensions, which demanded national,
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self-determination. Franz Joseph, the venerable Emperor from 1848, is
out of his depth in the unraveling domestic situation and the more-challenged diplomacy of the early twentieth century during its latest crisis.
Domestically, his shortcomings were glaring in a structure that empowered him over a bureaucracy of ostensibly representative institutions.
Wawro explains why the Hapsburg state did not posture itself for
success. The long-expected showdown with Serbia, showcased by the
assassinations, provided more challenges than opportunities. Diplomacy
notwithstanding, nearly six weeks passed before troops invaded Serbia.
Swift action by Austria would have capitalized upon international sympathy. More critically, Chief of General Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf
should have understood Austria’s limitations in fighting both Serbia and
Russia simultaneously. A Serbian campaign had to be immediate or not
at all.
The text paints a similarly dismal picture of Austro-Hungarian conflict of military operations. Chapters 6 through 13 cover 1914. Austrian
General Oskar Potiorek commanded no less than three disastrous
invasions of Serbia in four months, between August and December.
Conrad sabotaged proper weighting of effort and deployment in either
theater. The fighting in Galicia ebbed and flowed, but Wawro’s thrust is
poor Austro-Hungarian performance against a better-prepared Russian
Army, despite its own challenges. Chapter 14 outlines the devastating
cost to the Empire of just five months of war with staggering casualties.
He is not the first historian to state Austria-Hungary retained a sort of
“militia army” due to losses in experienced officers and noncommissioned officers, besides untrained conscripts. The Epilogue reviews the
rest of the war, marked by faster decline, and the unsuccessful, post-war
successor states to Austria-Hungary.
In essence, the political, social, and economic situation of the
Habsburg state meant significantly underfunded budgets for manning
and equipping with tremendous ramifications for preparedness. Scripted
exercise scenarios substituted for free-thinking maneuvers. Numerous
aspects of national power lacked adequate capability and capacity.
Austro-Hungarian land forces did not have the strategic basis, operational finesse, and tactical articulation for the characteristics of warfare
and the proposed doctrinal solutions to the dilemma of defensive firepower. The army had not seen action in nearly half a century; whereas
the Serbians were battle-hardened after two Balkan wars. The Russians
had learned important lessons from the war with Japan in 1905. Some
Austro-Hungarian leaders understood modern warfare, but learning
was far too uneven across the force.
The author made skillful use of well-documented, primary sources.
He has masterfully woven official documents, senior leaders’ evaluations, subordinates’ comments, and foreign observations into smoothly
flowing prose. He astutely blends the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels. Moreover, the book’s maps integrate the analysis between armies
and corps on the ground, while the text showcases the exceptional
degree to which infantry divisions with thousand-man battalions were
the “coin of the realm” of land power. Note these divisions were large
formations, the more so as Austria-Hungary and Russia fielded divisions
of eighteen and sixteen battalions respectively, compared to the more
common twelve.
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The book shows the deadly combination of rabid ethnic nationalism
unleashed in total, industrialized warfare. Atrocity begets atrocity on
both sides. Austro-Hungarian treatment of Serbs in particular in 1914
aroused some senior officers’ outrage at such excesses.
The particular use of primary sources leads to the book’s greatest challenge, which is balance. Wawro leaves no doubt repeatedly and
explicitly that Austrian leaders, the Emperor and Conrad in particular,
were blundering incompetents. The Dual Monarchy was ineradicably
flawed, hopelessly unprepared, executed its plans ineptly. The reader
is left wondering how such an entity could have waged four years of
protracted war unprecedented in totality. It was not alone in woefully
under-forecasted requirements for a prolonged war with a muchexpanded force structure. Insufficient tactical articulation to counter the
power of the defense, and shortcomings in battlefield intelligence to set
the stage for a successful attack too frequently turned potential flanking
attacks and synchronized assaults into catastrophic failures.
The book often reads more as an indictment, rather than an assessment. The text tends to present the demise of the Hapsburgs as a
predestined, linear decline from peacetime unpreparedness to wartime
bungling. Wawro faced unique challenges with these primary sources.
Still, more helpful would have been an integrated, comprehensive analysis of politics, economics, manpower, and equipment production, etc.
This issue of balance perhaps symbolizes the conflicted twenty-firstcentury mind in comprehending the inconceivable wastage of the Great
War on most unforgiving battlefields with punishing learning curves
for both attacker and defender. Arguably, a revolution in military affairs
(RMA) took place between 1914 and 1918. There were shortcomings
aplenty in 1914. Yet, what army of the major powers realistically could
develop a defensive doctrine that could win a war quickly? The politicians would not end the war, the diplomats could not, and the generals
groped for war-winning solutions.
Austria-Hungary’s most senior leaders too often decided poorly.
Arguably, they made more mistakes than their foes; but these errors
were unaffordable given their army’s inherent weaknesses, compounded under wartime conditions. Also, a German “rescue” seems an
inadequate explanation of individual and collective political, social, and
military resiliency to 1918.
Wawro’s book is nonetheless an important work, a case study of
senior leaders facing increasingly acute challenges without clear solutions.
Indeed, he convincingly explains how Austria-Hungary was conceivably
the major power least prepared to wage war in 1914, even compared
to Russia and Turkey. There are numerous insights for the twenty-first
century. Peacetime plans and wartime execution must account for shifting diplomatic, political, social, and economic factors; plus they must
balance national perspectives and interests with alliance/coalition goals.
Indeed, the wider and more complete research on the Great War to date
highlights the depth and breadth of mistrust among the powers. Their
interests evolved before and during the war, often in unforeseen ways.
Wawro shows how diverging Austrian and German strategic and operational aims can make ostensible allies into competitors or adversaries.
Finally, perhaps Wawro’s greatest illumination is how Austrian leaders
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failed to comprehend the Clausewitizian notion of war as serious means
to serious end, replete with chance.

The Devils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941
By Roger Moorhouse
Reviewed by Joseph A Maiolo, Professor of International History, King’s
College London

T
Basic Books: New York,
NY 2014
372 pages
$29.99

he Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939 is one of the most notorious
diplomatic arrangements of all time. With this deal on economic
cooperation and spheres of influence between the Third Reich and the
Soviet Union, Hitler and Stalin crushed Poland, divided up central and
Eastern Europe between them and heralded the coming of the Second
World War. During the Cold War, historians could only consult the
German records of the negotiations leading to the non-aggression pact
and the brief period of Nazi-Soviet collaboration, but since the collapse
of the Soviet Union our knowledge of the Soviet side of the episode has
benefited enormously from the opening up of Russian archives.
In The Devils’ Alliance, Roger Moorhouse draws on the latest research
and sources to offer readers a vivid retelling of the making and breaking of the deal. He carefully reconstructs the game of political hardball
played play by the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop,
and his Soviet counterpart, Vyacheslav Molotov. The absorbing story
of the diplomatic bargaining over frontiers and trade is set against
the wider context of the implementation of the pact. The twenty-two
months of Nazi-Soviet collaboration enabled the two regimes to experiment in the brutal imposition of their ideological visions on the peoples
of Eastern Europe. Behind the German armies, advancing into Poland
came special police units to murder Jews and others deemed enemies of
the Third Reich; the advance of the Red Army permitted Moscow step
by step to Sovietize its share of eastern Poland and the Baltic states and
to murder or exile its political foes. With great skill, Moorhouse conveys
the human tragedy of these events with telling details from individual
experiences. Through these individual tragedies multiplied thousands of
times over, Moorhouse reminds us why the collective memories of the
period of Nazi-Soviet collaboration overshadow the politics of Eastern
Europe to this day.
Moorhouse underscores the basis of the deal was strategic, not ideological. Although the two regimes are often lumped together under the
“totalitarian” rubric, there was no red-brown political affinity drawing
them together. Ribbentrop may have dreamed about a grand alliance
between the Axis states and the Soviet Union to confront AngloAmerican powers, but he was alone in this respect. Hitler needed the
pact to isolate Poland. Stalin opted for it because he could archive Soviet
territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe and remain out of the impending
European war, at least temporarily. In this respect, it is worth recalling
the Nazi-Soviet Pact failed to achieve Hitler’s primary purpose: he had
hoped the stunning announcement of the pact would persuade London
and Paris to abandon Poland to its fate and to seek a peaceful way out of
the European crisis of 1939.
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As we know, Britain and France did not seek peace because they
were determined to defend their status as great powers, and the balance
of economic-military power was ultimately in their favor. Germany
avoided a slow defeat through attrition and economic strangulation
by the swift victory over France in May-June 1940. No one was more
surprised than Stalin, who had predicted his deal with Hitler gave the
Soviet Union a few years of peace to arm and prepare for the expected
war against Germany and its allies. Although Moorhouse correctly dates
the formal German decision to attack the Soviet Union to December
1940, Hitler began to air the idea with his top military advisors just after
the French sued for peace. He was never at ease with a grand political
bargain that allowed Moscow to acquire German machine tools and
blueprints of advance weapons in exchange for industrial raw materials.
Mistakenly convinced they could defeat the Red Army in a few weeks,
the German high command enthusiastically prepared for Operation
Barbarossa. In 1941, Soviet intelligence reported these preparations with
growing alarm, but Stalin dismissed them as provocations to lure him
into a war he did not want. He saw the German arms buildup in Eastern
Europe as part of the hard bargaining process over territory and trade
the Nazi-Soviet pact had initiated. In a report of 5 June 1941, the Joint
Intelligence Committee in London came to the same conclusion. Stalin
simply did not expect Hitler would attack until the war against Britain
and its informal ally the United States had ended. As Moorhouse shows
in his book, Stalin’s failure to anticipate the German attack cost the Red
Army and the people of the Soviet Union dearly.

Four Decades On: Vietnam, the United States, and the
Legacies of the Second Indochina War
Scott Laderman, Edwin A. Martini, eds.
Reviewed by William Thomas Allison, PhD, Georgia Southern University

T

he American War in Vietnam continues to engage creative scholars
from across diverse academic disciplines to rethink both the legacies of the war and the war itself. The editors of Four Decades On have
assembled an impressive collection of scholarship in this vein, drawing
from the transnational study of identity, memory, film, culture, tourism,
and economy. The contributors explore boundaries, official histories and
counter-narratives, and remembrance and reconciliation to assess the
enduring legacies of a ten-year war, now literally Four Decades On, and
they go beyond traditional, though still useful, American or Vietnamesecentric approaches. The resulting collection compels reflection on how
assumptions and myths influence memory, and emphasizes the illuminating conclusions of new, cross-disciplinary approaches applied to
understand better the deep and lingering legacy of this war. In this, the
editors succeed.
Christina Schwenkel, for example, an anthropologist at the
University of California, Riverside, argues transnationalism influences
the evolving narrative of the war exhibited at museums, memorials, and
other war-related sites in Vietnam. As Vietnam’s economy becomes
more global and war tourism gains popularity among American visitors, narratives at these sites (which Schwenkel calls “memory-scapes”)
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have shifted from the older hurray-for-we-defeated-the-Americans to a
softer, more American friendly tone, often focusing on mutual victimhood of combatants and non-combatants, regardless of nationality. For
Schwenkel, reconciliation, ironically, may be the most important if not
unintended consequence of Vietnam’s desire to open markets with the
United States and court American tourists.
Analyzing cultural legacies looms large in this collection. Historian
Walter Hixson, of the University of Akron, examines how Americans
have emphasized healing and overcoming the Vietnam Syndrome
through a variety of means, but most interestingly through film, which
tends to focus on the American soldier as victim and the Vietnamese
as nearly invisible. These cultural influences allow revisionist history to
take root, which can deflect attention from real questions of American
intent in Vietnam and American militarism in general.
Fitting well into this rubric of memory, narrative, and reconciliation
are the divisive issues of “Agent Orange” and accounting for POWs/
MIAs. The legacies of both have been strewn with myth, politics, and
manipulation. Diane Niblack Fox, an anthropologist who also teaches
Vietnamese Studies at the College of the Holy Cross, offers one the
better article-length studies of this controversial issue. Fox looks at
the impact of the use of chemical defoliants from multiple perspectives – science, medicine, public policy and law, the work of non-profits,
history, and most interestingly the actual experience of those directly
affected. She ably dissects the various meanings and contexts of “Agent
Orange” among diverse constituencies that transcend class, borders,
and even time. Fox argues that closing the gap between state policy
and international relations with individual experiences and needs is key
to approaching reconciliation for Americans and Vietnamese over the
“Agent Orange” controversy. H. Bruce Franklin, professor of English
and American Studies at Rutgers University, likewise tackles the POW/
MIA myth, providing again one of the better article-length examinations of the evolution of this extremely sensitive issue. From the political
manipulations of the Nixon administration to Chuck Norris’ numerous
Missing in Action films, Franklin pulls no punches in explaining how
the POW/MIA myth maintained momentum from its apparent usefulness in all but silencing the anti-war movement in the early 1970s to
perpetuating the myth through flying the black POW/MIA flags as a
way to focus on American victims of the war rather than on why the
United States engaged in such a disastrous war in the first place. Similar
to Hixon, for Franklin, the POW/MIA myth conveniently enables
Americans to ignore the difficult national questions of memory and
legacy from Vietnam.
This collection will find eager readership among specialists and
graduate students, but those with a more passing interest in what is the
most innovative scholarship on the Vietnam War will find some of the
essays difficult. Because some among the academic community insist
on using pretentious terminology and, further, assume all are familiar
with their particular discipline’s theoretical frameworks, they make their
otherwise valuable work inaccessible to a willing cross-disciplinary audience. This frustrating problem crops up across the collection and can
be distracting. Another minor and related issue is a hint of rejection
toward more traditional historical approaches. Scholars utilizing these
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new, important approaches should be mindful of the debt they owe to
the useful work that preceded theirs which provides a firm foundation
for historical understanding, without these newer methods they would
have no context and little upon which to build.
Do not let these concerns, however, discourage reading these valuable essays. Four Decades On challenges assumptions, dispels myths,
and offers insightful arguments on causation, memory, narrative, and
reconciliation among nations and, more interestingly, among peoples.
As we enter fiftieth anniversaries of key events of the American War in
Vietnam, we will be reminded how much that experience continues to
affect us, and how we are still unwilling to engage in an honest discussion on “Vietnam.” Laderman and Martini have compiled a provocative
collection of the best new scholarship on the “Second Indochina War.”
Specialists should read it and engage in the conversation.
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